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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis is concerned with local practices that seek to contest 
international statebuilding measures. This line of inquiry stems from 
the need to generate knowledge on the ways in which international 
statebuilding is mediated and re-negotiated in local spaces. Rather 
than focusing on the much-analyzed hidden/everyday forms of 
resistance, the objective of the analysis is to understand the parallel, 
disruptive practices that directly challenge the international 
statebuilding project. These particular forms of contention are 
important as they explicitly engage with the coercive power of 
international statebuilding. Through the case study of post-Dayton 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the thesis aims to generate an account of 
local contention and dynamics between domestic and international 
actors that is attentive to both material and non-material domains and 
practices. In doing so, the analysis identifies a range of contentious 
acts in the institutional, discursive and symbolic domains. While 
administrative practices slow down and block decision-making at the 
institutions of governance, local actors frequently deploy discursive 
strategies to destabilize and de-legitimize, or in some cases to co-opt, 
international statebuilding. They employ symbols and symbolic 
practices to contest the internationally-led cultural reconstruction 
efforts. It is argued that these disruptive techniques and the ensuing 
interactions translate into conflictual and symbiotic dynamic between 
internal and external actors. Although the interactions between 
internal and external actors frequently result in conflict, a closer look 
at the dynamic reveals a mutual dependency whereby the contentious 
activities of local actors and coercive statebuilding measures of the 
international officials maintain one another.  The thesis makes a 
conceptual and empirical contribution to the analysis and 
understanding of the hybrid nature of post-conflict statebuilding. It 
begins developing the notion of contention and a set of mechanisms 
derived from contentious politics scholarship as a way to capture and 
trace local practices challenging internationally-led statebuilding 
measures. Empirically the study adds to our knowledge of local 
agency in societies emerging from conflicts. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
‘We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not…we 
cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights 
within other countries if we want still to be secure’.  
 
‘….we may be tempted to think back to the clarity and simplicity of 
the Cold War. But now we have to establish a new framework. No 
longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are 
guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral 
purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and 
interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, 
the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our 
national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. 
 
 
Tony Blair 1 
                  
     
 
 
Blair’s famous Chicago speech articulating a doctrine of liberal interventionism may not 
have been based on novel ideas, but it nonetheless signaled a renewed vigor in the 
attempts to formulate an international society based on liberal values. At the same time, 
the ideas expressed in the speech provide a good reflection of the post-Cold War 
zeitgeist; Western liberal norms and values did not only overcome the authoritarian 
alternatives but also hold the promise of peace and prosperity for others willing to adopt 
them. Yet, in many ways the most striking aspect of the above excerpts is the intimate 
connection Blair constructs between the propagation of such values and international 
security. Such logic essentially securitizes conflict, disorder and underdevelopment. 
                                               
1
 Tony Blair, speech Chicago 22 April 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-
june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html (accessed 13 June 2011) 
11 
 
Following the ostensibly pacifist potential of democracy and open economy, it is then in 
the Western interest to democratize and free-marketize troubled parts of the globe. A 
considerable stumbling block in such processes has, however, been state failure and 
weakness as well as ‘bad governance’; weak states are seen as unable to build and 
maintain the institutions necessary for political and economic liberalization and tend to 
become havens for anti-democracy forces. In policy terms this has translated into 
internationally-led statebuilding missions in states deemed fragile or failing as 
statebuilding can no longer be left to chance.2 These internationalized statebuilding 
projects have become the mainstay of 21st century international politics as international 
post-conflict or post-regime change operations in countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, 
Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently Libya continue to top the policy agendas. Even 
though many of these operations are still on-going, it is clear that the current 
statebuilding missions are less likely to repeat the success of the post-World War II 
Marshall Plan than initially thought. Although the context of each statebuilding case is 
unique, most of them have experienced a set of similar challenges ranging from ad hoc, 
uncoordinated international engagement to the presence of local actors challenging the 
externally-driven process. On paper statebuilding was epitomized in limited and short-
term operations kick-starting democratization and economic development, but in 
practice statebuilding operations have turned out to be something quite different: 
complex long-term projects relying on methods coercive enough to ‘make liberals 
blush’,3 invoking uncomfortable echoes of colonialism. This has been particularly the 
case in the post-regime change societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan where military 
clout has played a formidable role in the international statebuilding venture. Beyond 
Iraq and Afghanistan, alternative forms of coercion have marked international peace 
interventions in post-civil war societies. Although military power in the form of keeping 
and enforcing peace has been a frequent feature, aid conditionality and coercive 
political power have underwritten international peace interventions from Bosnia to East 
Timor and Kosovo. For students of International Relations such ventures have provided 
a fruitful ground for the study of the era coined as ‘the end of history’.4 Not only has it 
                                               
2
 Mark Duffield  ’Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of 
Global Liberal Governance’. Development and Change, 33 no.5 (2002),1049 
3
 As noted by Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Julian Glover 
‘King Paddy’ The Guardian.11 October 2002. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/oct/11/foreignpolicy.uk. Accessed 25 November 2010.  
4Francis Fukuyama  ‘The end of History’. The National Interest, no. 16. (1989) 
12 
 
provided ample opportunities for the empirical study of the nexus between democracy, 
free markets and peace, but also re-invigorated debates on contentious concepts such as 
sovereignty and legitimacy.  
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to such scholarship by generating knowledge on 
encounters between internationalized forms of statebuilding and local statebuilding 
agents, practices and ideas in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia). 
It does so through an investigation into local agencies who deploy a set of techniques in 
an attempt to mediate and re-negotiate the internationally-driven statebuilding process. 
Rather than focusing on the everyday forms of resistance that have recently elicited 
attention in the critical post-conflict literature,5 the objective of the analysis is to 
understand the parallel, disruptive practices that directly challenge the international 
statebuilding project. The existing accounts on local agency and resistance have largely 
overlooked this rich array of local practices. These particular forms of local agency are 
important as they explicitly engage with the coercive power of international 
statebuilding. In addressing this limitation in the post-conflict research, the study 
borrows concepts and mechanisms from the contentious politics research. This 
Introduction and the Chapter that follows set up the intellectual, analytical and 
conceptual foundations of the thesis. 
 
 
Building Peace, Nations or States? 
 
To begin with, some conceptual clarification is in order. While statebuilding and the 
discourses of good governance and capacity-building have become the lingua franca of 
international security and development discourses, it is fair to say that the statebuilding 
lexicon has suffered from a considerable confusion over its concepts and terminology. 
Disagreement over the terms ‘nation-building’, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘statebuilding’ 
                                               
5
 Oliver Richmond ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the 
Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding’ Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 3 no 3 (2009), Oliver Richmond ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’. Millennium – 
Journal of International Studies, 38 no. 3 (2010), Stephanie Kappler and Oliver Richmond‘Peacebuilding 
and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina : Resistance or Emancipation?’ Security Dialogue, 42 no 3 (2011), 
Audra Mitchell ‘Quality/Control: International Peace Interventions and the ‘Everyday’. Review of 
International Studies 37 no 4 (2012),  David Roberts ‘Beyond the metropolis? Popular peace and post 
conflict peacebuilding’. Review of International Studies, 37 no 5 (2011) 
13 
 
exists alongside coterminous usage of the terms. However, it is possible, and certainly 
useful, to distinguish between the terms in question. Nation-building denotes an attempt 
to overcome obstacles to common nationhood and create loyalty to the nation-state.6 
Some question the usefulness of ‘nation-building’ as a concept altogether; while 
Newman suggests that the very notion of nationbuilding is an ‘historical aberration’, 7 
Call and Wyeth in turn argue that the term nation-building is somewhat outdated in the 
context of today’s post-conflict peace operations as peoples’ identification with the state 
is no longer a prerequisite for a stable, functioning  state and multicultural states have 
become the generally accepted norm. 8 The prevalent idea of the 1960s nation-building 
efforts suggesting that identity can be manipulated by external interveners has become 
implausible. The attempts to forge a common identity in post-conflict space have been 
replaced by the efforts to transform the norms, values and behaviors of target 
populations. Although the above authors are correct in arguing that attempts to build a 
shared sense of unity or common identity may not be at the forefront of international 
policies in post-conflict states, dismissing nation-building dimension as irrelevant may 
result in overlooking salient statebuilding dynamics. The Bosnian case is indicative of 
the locally-driven post-conflict statebuilding processes that entail ‘identity-building’ 
dimension. This is interesting from the point of view of capturing statebuilding 
dynamics as nation-building projects seeking to create or strengthen 
communal/exclusive identities may be oppositional to the process of creating 
functioning and homogenous statehood.9 
 
Peacebuilding, in turn, refers to international and national efforts to bring about peace in 
post-war societies. Embodied in the concept is the notion of peacebuilding serving as a 
solution to violence and its root causes. Out of the three concepts it is the broadest, 
encompassing a wide range of methods such as civil society-building, economic 
development, electoral democracy and so forth.10 Statebuilding, on the other hand, 
                                               
6
 In the American jargon nationbuilding is used conterminously with statebuilding  
7
 Edward Newman 'Liberal' Peacebuilding Debates’ eds. in  Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver 
Richmond New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009), 
30. 
8
 Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth Building States to Build Peace. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 10  
9
 Marina Ottaway ‘Nation-building and State Disintegration’ in eds. Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril 
Daddieh, State Building and Democratisation in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities ( London; 
Praeger, 1999), 83 
10
 Zoe Scott ‘Literarature Review on Statebuilding Governance and Social Development Resource 
Centre 2007, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hd528.pdf (accessed 26 January 2009) 
14 
 
refers to creating, reforming or consolidating the state and its relation to the society.11 It 
is usually understood in terms of institutional capacity building and organizational 
design. While the former alludes to the ability of the law enforcement or the tax 
collecting agencies to carry out their duties, organizational or state design refers to how 
these powers are allocated and arranged.12 In reflecting a common understanding in the 
post-conflict scholarship, Manning suggests that peacebuilding and statebuilding are 
intimately related. For her peacebuilding is dependent on statebuilding.13 Peacebuilding 
is an endeavor to consolidate peace, whereas statebuilding strengthens the political 
system; they formulate a symbiotic relationship where both elements are necessary. 
While intuitively appealing, such logic is problematic from a critical perspective that 
sees statebuilding and peacebuilding as projects premised on different objectives. 
Richmond and Franks differentiate between peacebuilding as a practice guided by 
Galtungian notions of positive peace and statebuilding as a neo-liberal project 
prioritizing good governance.14 They argue that the two concepts co-exist rather 
uncomfortably. These contradictions in many ways mirror the wider IR debates on order 
and justice; whereas peacebuilding seeks to create peaceful conditions and 
reconciliation, statebuilding is solely concerned with institutions and stability.  
 
There is much to be said for this problematization of building peace through building 
states. Historically state formation processes have entailed considerable contention as 
social groups have sought to protect their interests and negotiate the state-society 
relations.15 Even if the historical state formation and contemporary statebuilding 
ventures are not entirely analogous, cases such as Bosnia draw our attention to the 
processes of contention and societal re-negotiation characterizing the current, 
internationalized projects of statebuilding. By deploying a set of contentious political 
techniques, local actors seek to alter the scope and form of the emerging state. 
Crucially, the processes through which the parameters of the state are negotiated may 
not necessarily be conducive for the aim of building peace and healing the war-time 
                                               
11
 Call and Wyeth, Building States, 5 
12
 Ibid, 9 
13Carrie Manning ‘Local Level Challenges to Post-conflict Peacebuilding’. International 
Peacekeeping 10  no 3  (2003) 
14
 Jason Franks and Oliver Richmond Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh  University Press, 2009)  3,13 
15
 Charles Tilly Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000 ( Cambridge: Cambridge 
University 
Press, 2004)  
15 
 
traumas. In the Bosnian case these processes have entailed regular reproduction of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, thus emphasizing difference rather than creating a sense of unity among 
Bosnians. 
 
 
From Peacebuilding to Stabilization 
 
Perhaps the best way to understand the concepts of peacebuilding and statebuilding is to 
trace the evolution of the two concepts; what began as a peacebuilding project based on 
social principles has evolved over time into a statebuilding impetus with more technical 
aims and less concern for issues such reconciliation.16 While nation-building was 
extensively discussed in the 1950s and 1960s and again in the 1970s with reference to 
Vietnam, it was only two decades ago when the mainstream approach to statebuilding – 
initially conceptualised as peacebuilding - began to take shape. This development took 
place in the context of the end of the Cold War and the ensuing disorder as civil wars 
erupted in various regions around the world. The fall of the Iron Curtain enabled the 
promotion of a specific type of domestic political and economic arrangements which 
represented a departure from the United Nation’s (UN) role during the Cold War, 
limited to neutral peacekeeping missions.17 This reflected the widespread optimism and 
profound belief in Western values. This development occurred in tandem with the ‘good 
governance’ agenda and the increase in number of peace operations in the 1990s. 
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace,18 the 2000 Brahimi Report19 and Annan’s report 
‘Prevention of Armed Conflict’ 20 set the scene for some of the most significant 
                                               
16
 Meera Sabaratnam ‘The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict 
Management, 1990-2010’ In Susanna Campbell, David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam, A 
Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding. (London: Zed Books, 2011), 24. 
What we are currently witnessing is thus best understood and conceptualized as statebuilding 
which is the term adopted in this thesis. 
17
 Roland Paris (2004). At War's End : Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 15 
18
 United Nations General Assembly, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the 
Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, (A/47/277-S/2411),  17 June 1992 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/259/61/PDF/N9225961.pdf?OpenElement 
 (accessed 24 May 2012) 
19
 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 
(A/55/305-S/2000/809) 21 August 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ 
 (accessed 24 May 2012) 
20
 United Nations General Assembly, Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-
General,  (A/55/985-S/2001/574), 7 June 2001,http://ods-dds 
16 
 
transformations in the nature of peace operations. Particularly the Agenda for Peace 
represented a significant re-orientation of the UN’s role in the world, as Sabaratnam 
observes: in conceptualizing conflict with tacit references to Galtung’s structural 
violence, the proposed solution of peacebuilding - which was to ‘address the deepest 
causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression’ 21 - 
represented an attempt to transform the UN into an effective, and indeed progressive, 
peacemaker.22 In what De Waal characterizes as ‘mandate creep’, the focus of the UN 
peace missions shifted from keeping peace between warring parties to multi-
dimensional peace-building operations aimed at building liberal peace through 
democratization and marketization.23  In keeping with such a paradigm shift in the 
practice of peace interventions, scholars attempted to identify the symptoms that peace 
operations in general should address, the concepts and tools that peacekeepers have at 
their disposal and the most effective way and time to utilize them.24  
 
The post-9/11 securitization of development that linked the peripheral conflict to the 
security of the developed world brought to the fore concerns of state failure and 
weakness both in academic and policy circles. This effectively signaled the end to the 
progressive peacebuilding framework articulated in the Agenda for Peace in which 
‘peace’ was the defining concept.25 Such developments saw the transformation of 
peacebuilding into what became known as statebuilding; the building of efficient 
institutional infrastructure in which the state could flourish. In adopting the 2005 Paris 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, the OECD notes that 
‘the long term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national 
reformers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions’.26 This, for many 
critics of statebuilding, has led to various moral problems, most notably the lack of local 
                                                                                                                                          
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/404/64/PDF/N0140464.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 24 May 
2012 
21
 An Agenda for Peace, art.15 
22
 Sabaratnam the Liberal Peace?, 14-15  
23
 Alex De Waal ‘Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace’. 
International 
Affairs, 85 no. 1(2009), 100 
24
 Alex Bellamy & Paul Williams ‘Introduction: Thinking anew about peace operations. 
International 
Peacekeeping, 11 no 1 (2004) 
25
 Sabaratnam the Liberal Peace?, 24 
26
  OECD, ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States’ (2005) 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(Accessed 4 May 2011). 
17 
 
ownership and undemocratic methodology of democratization, embodied in Western 
donor conditionality and coercive measures. Perhaps more troubling has been the shift 
in focus from conflict resolution prioritized under peacebuilding initiatives to focus on 
stability and containment of conflict.27  It has stimulated academic debates over whether 
statebuilding strives to construct statehood in the Westphalian sense or to create 
administrative and technical units without any real political substance.28 Undoubtedly 
the US regime change operation in Iraq and the use of liberal discourse to justify it 
served to further strengthen the critiques of statebuilding operations as neo-imperial 
ventures.29 While currently the UN forges on with the statebuilding agenda with the 
support of its member states, it remains under fire from various quarters in the academia 
due to its questionable track record. 30  A near-universal consensus among statebuilding 
scholars exists that few cases of post-conflict statebuilding can be declared as missions 
approximating success.  
 
What the growing body of literature on international post-conflict interventions seems 
to indicate is that whilst the more abstract ideas of peacebuilding may have been based 
on liberal principles, the actual practice of post-conflict statebuilding relies on non-
liberal and coercive measures.31 In many ways, it is the stabilization of post-conflict 
spaces that regularly takes precedence over liberal principles and practices. This is 
manifested in recent policy-papers on statebuilding that indicate a discursive shift from 
statebuilding to ‘stabilization’ which is telling of the prioritization of maintaining the 
status quo over any attempts of emancipatory transformation.32 This contradiction 
between the liberal rhetoric and frequent non-liberal strategies through which 
statebuilding reforms are implemented has implications for the actual practice of 
                                               
27
 Edward Newman ‘A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda’. Third World Quarterly, 32 
no.10 
(2011), 1741, Dominik Zaum ’Beyond the “Liberal Peace”. Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organization 18 no.1 (2012), 126 
28
 See for instance, David Chandler Introduction: Peace without Politics? International 
Peacekeeping, 12(3) (2005), David Chandler International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal 
Governance (Abingdon; Routledge, 2010) 
29
 Roland Paris ‘Critiques of Liberal Peace’ in Susanna Campbel, David Chandler and Meera 
Sabaratnam,  
Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding  (London: Zed Books), 38,39 
30
 Ibid., 31 
31
 See, among others, Endre Begby and Peter Burgess ‘Human Security and Liberal Peace’. Public 
Reason 1 no.1 (2009); Dominik Zaum, Beyond the ‘Liberal Peace’; Newman, A Human Security 
Peace-Building Agenda. 
32
 Dominik Zaum, Beyond the “Liberal Peace, 126 
18 
 
statebuilding on the ground. It is evident in the discursive domain where local actors 
regularly represent international statebuilding as an illegitimate venture by highlighting 
how international statebuilding fails to live up to its values. At the same time, the key 
objective of international statebuilding to stabilize the ‘problematic’ post-conflict spaces 
generates its own dynamics which are traced throughout this thesis. Conceptualizing 
international statebuilding as a practice that entails both liberal and non-liberal methods 
is analytically expedient: it enables a move away from dichotomizing accounts that 
depict liberal international actors and practices against non-liberal local agencies.  
 
 
Problem-Solvers and Critics 
 
As noted above, the reorientation away from conflict transformation towards capacity-
building has brought into question the liberal credentials of international peace 
interventions. It is in particular the critical body of peace operations literature that has 
taken the task of interrogating the motivations and agendas underpinning international 
statebuilding.33 This line of analysis emerged as a response to the early studies on 
international peace interventions that generated policy-oriented and largely atheoretical 
accounts of peacebuilding,34 coined as ‘problem-solving’ research.35 While the divisions 
between problem-solving and critical peace operations research are extensively 
                                               
33
 For instance; Oliver Richmond ‘The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace'. 
Conflict, security & development 6 no. 3 (2006), Oliver Richmond ‘A post-liberal peace: Eirenism 
and the everyday’. Review of International Studies, 35 no. 3 (2009),  David Chandler ‘The 
uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’. Review of international studies 1 no. 1 (2010), Micheal Pugh 
‘Peacekeeping and critical theory’. International Peacekeeping, 11 no. 1 (2004), Roger Mac Ginty 
‘Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: A challenge to the liberal peace?’ Conflict, Security & 
Development  7 no. 3 (2007), Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac  ‘Framing Post-Conflict 
Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States ‘ Third World 
Quarterly 26 no. 6 (2005), Kristoffer Lidén 'Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: 
The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding', International Peacekeeping, 16 no. 5 (2009), 
John Heathershaw ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses’ Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 36 no. 3 (2008), Jenny Peterson ‘Rule 
of Law’ initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicised reform in post-conflict states’ 
Disasters 34 no. 1 (2010), Phillip Darby ‘Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the 
Postcolonial’ International Peacekeeping, 16 no. 5 (2009), Audra Mitchell Lost in 
Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in Northern Ireland (New York : Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 
34
 Roland Paris ’International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’. Review of International 
Studies 28 no. 4 (2002), 656 
35
 Alex Bellamy ‘The ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory?’ International Peacekeeping 11 no. 
1 17-38 (2004)  
19 
 
rehearsed in a number of volumes on peacebuilding and statebuilding36 and thus need 
not to be repeated at length here, the main fault line between the two approaches can be 
found in the different ontologies on post-conflict peace interventions. Whereas the 
problem-solving scholarship has produced policy-relevant research focused on 
establishing the best practices and lessons-learned of peacebuilding activities, the 
critical research has sought to ask a set of different, more theoretically-oriented, 
questions pertaining to the norms, ideas, ideologies and motivations underpinning such 
practices.37 Whilst a common concern for much of the critical literature has been the 
liberal ideology that underwrites post-conflict statebuilding, recent critical scholarship 
has diverged around different assumptions about liberalism. They are best understood as 
‘critiques of’ and ‘from liberalism’.38 ‘Critiques of liberalism’ entail two different views 
on the reformability of ‘liberal peace’; those who seek to modify it in order to manage 
the excesses of liberalism39 and radical critiques that see international statebuilding as 
more fundamentally problematic than the moderate critics would suggest.40 An 
analytical constant underpinning the moderate critiques of liberalism from Paris’41 work 
onwards has been to problematize the liberal ethos guiding peacebuilding and 
statebuilding missions. It is thus the liberalism that drives such operations that is to be 
critically interrogated. This strand of research essentially endorses the liberal peace but 
cautions against hasty liberalization which is seen as a potential source for conflict. For 
such scholars then the problem with liberal peacebuilding is too much liberalization too 
quickly; possible solutions may for instance be shared forms of sovereignty, as 
suggested by Krasner.42 The more radical ‘critique of liberalism’ eschews the liberal 
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model of intervention.43 Bellamy and Williams, for instance, highlight how liberal and 
neo-liberal intervention have ‘helped to create particular type of war economies, 
political structures, ‘warlordism’ and ‘weak’ states’.44 Others call for a more 
emancipatory or welfarist alternative, grounded in the local.45 The problem for authors 
such as Pugh and Richmond is more profound than suggested by the critics who see 
statebuilding as reformable practice; neo-liberalism that informs internationally-led 
statebuilding is fundamentally unable to meet the needs of the people.46  
 
While the above accounts represent a ‘critique of liberalism’, ‘critique from liberalism’ 
takes the rejection of ‘liberal peace’ as an analytical framework as its starting point. 
Authors writing from such a perspective argue that liberal statebuilding is liberal only in 
rhetoric; the actual motivations underpinning post-conflict statebuilding have more to 
do with stability and status quo than with exporting Western norms and values.47 
Chandler, for one, categorically refutes such analyses by arguing that ‘the post-Cold 
War post-conflict intervention can be better understood as a critique of classical liberal 
assumptions about the autonomy of the subject’.48  He points to the problematization of 
freedom and self-governance of the subjects by the international statebuilding as the key 
problematique; the autonomy of the subject populations has been transformed from 
being the natural starting point of democratization to the very problem it attempts to 
address. However, failing to identify these assumptions underpinning statebuilding, the 
‘critiques of liberalism’ have erroneously conceptualized liberal peace as a project 
based on excessive liberalism and rapid Westernization which have not generally been 
conducive for peacebuilding and democratization.49 This framework of liberal peace, as 
Chandler asserts, has identified the subaltern ‘Other’ as the main obstacle in the process 
of building liberal peace; the illiberal local subject distorts and hybridizes the process by 
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transfusing traditional forms of governance with those advocated by international 
statebuilding agencies. For Chandler this amounts to apology rather than critique.50  The 
invitation of this critique to reflect upon the very basis of liberal peace and reconsider 
its conceptual value is undoubtedly useful. The expediency of Chandler’s critique lies in 
its highlighting of post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding missions as self-
referential projects: it would be naive to perceive them solely as humanitarian practices 
with no security or material gains to the interveners themselves. It is clear, as noted 
earlier, that with the prioritization of statebuilding over peacebuilding, stability has 
become the overriding concern for the external statebuilding, more often than not taking 
precedence over the liberal principles. Much of international statebuilding has 
privileged order and stability over the realization of liberal norms. The most accurate 
way of understanding statebuilding then seems to be to view it as a conservative and 
order-prioritizing process seeking at first instance to stabilize war-torn states; liberal 
values play a role in this process but only in so far as they coincide with the aim of 
stabilization. This casts some doubt on the usefulness of ‘liberal peace’ as an analytical 
framework through which to understand post-conflict statebuilding. Indeed, what we see 
on the ground can more meaningfully be understood as hybrid forms of peace entailing 
multiplicity of actors and agendas.  
 
The analytical foundations of this analysis borrow from the above ‘critique from 
liberalism’ to the extent that it is the practice of international statebuilding that demands 
interrogation, rather than the presumed excessive liberalism of such interventions. To 
put it differently, it is not the case that liberalism necessarily has inherent weaknesses 
but rather that the praxis of international statebuilding fails to systematically abide by its 
own discourses of good governance.51 This is not to take the stance whereby all 
statebuilding efforts are underwritten by attempts to dominate and control; the 
complexity of the empirical ‘reality’ of statebuilding brings this perspective into doubt. 
Not only do the international statebuilders represent a wide range of interests, 
motivations and methods, but it is also noteworthy that international statebuilding 
practice has been largely overshadowed by the lack of political will to engage in such 
missions.52 Moreover, few agents of international statebuilding see themselves as 
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‘representatives of the community policing arm of an imperial power’.53 The 
international statebuilding paradigm has become so common-sensical, as Stamnes 
argues, that the international statebuilding agents on the ground are more likely to be 
acting upon progressive and altruistic grounds rather than as agents of control and order. 
54
 Moreover, hierarchical understandings of international statebuilding associated with 
structuralist and neo-imperialist analyses of statebuilding tend to reduce local agency 
and paint a somewhat simplified picture of reality on the ground. The case study at hand 
illustrates how the depoliticizing international statebuilding practices are confronted by 
highly politicized local agencies for whom the post-conflict statebuilding space does not 
appear to be one of restricted possibilities.55 Instead, international statebuilding practice 
in itself seems to contain a range of possibilities for local actors; the contradictions 
between the discourses and practices of international statebuilding legitimize local 
contentious practices, while its institutional infrastructure produces opportunities for 
clientelist economic structures56 and advancement of separate statebuilding and identity-
building agendas. It is these possibilities created by the external statebuilding 
intervention that this thesis is interested in.  
 
 
Key Ideas and Concepts of the Thesis 
 
The international post-conflict mission in Bosnia was one of the first large-scale 
statebuilding operations that aimed at a wholesale transformation of the society, from its 
economic and political system to the very social fabric of the Bosnian population. 
Although no recourse to large scale violence has reoccurred and the new state in its 
institutional form has been constructed, the Bosnian statebuilding experience for many 
international officials has been one of frustration. The regularly back-tracking process 
has been attributed to the presence of local nationalist and corrupt actors whose interests 
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are threatened by internationally-led progress towards more transparent and accountable 
political and economic system.57 While much progress has been achieved in creating the 
institutional infrastructure of governance, the functioning of these institutions has been 
far from smooth as politicians have used consociational veto rights, among other 
strategies, to block statebuilding measures considered detrimental to their respective 
communities. For many international officials in Bosnia, it is such local obstructionism 
that explains the continued need for international presence. Yet, a closer look at this 
contentious interrelationship between external and local agencies reveals a more 
complex, and indeed intriguing, picture of the post-conflict process and the dynamics 
underwriting it. It lends support to the critiques of problem-solving research grounded 
in the objectivist fallacy that sees international interventions as discrete and neutral acts, 
ontologically detached and distinct from their local target populations.58 The 
interrelations and dynamics uncovered in this study render mono-causal explanations 
for the slow post-conflict process in Bosnia rather limited. The thesis shows how the 
international statebuilding mission in Bosnia contains opportunities for contention and 
contributes to the persistence of local contentious practices.  
 
The central concern of this study is how international policies and practices in post-
conflict states aimed at building statehood in institutional and ideational terms are 
mediated by local agencies.  It is an investigation into actors who some have rather 
simplistically called the ‘uncivil society’ in societies emerging from conflicts; actors 
and groups advancing models of statehood different to those promoted by international 
statebuilding actors, generally conceived as ‘civil’. 59 Rather than taking this highly 
normative assumption as the point of departure, this thesis seeks to shift the attention to 
the ways in which international policies are challenged, circumvented and altered by 
local agencies. This is important in terms of formulating an improved understanding of 
interaction between multiple statebuilding agents and agendas that marks 
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internationalized statebuilding processes. The chapters to come trace the material and 
non-material forms of contention across institutional, discursive and symbolic 
domains.60 They highlight practices such as using institutions of governance to block 
decision-making, delegitimization of international statebuilding policies and 
reproduction of communal identities at the expense of an overarching ‘state identity’ 
through which local agents have sought to re-negotiate the statebuilding process. Whilst 
this thesis is anchored in the critical, ‘post-liberal peace’, scholarship on statebuilding, it 
also advocates a more relational approach to the study of such missions. This means not 
only taking local agency more seriously, but also enquiring into the interactions 
between the internal and external actors. The research principally centers on the 
following questions:  
 
• How is international statebuilding contested in post-conflict spaces?  
 
• How do the local contentious practices interact with international statebuilding 
measures?  
 
Such questions have been largely prompted by the previous analyses of local actors that 
have been somewhat unsatisfactory. On the one hand the literature on spoilers has 
deployed normatively charged categories whereby local non-cooperation has been 
judged against Western ‘liberal’ statebuilders.61 On the other, attempts to model 
interactions between different statebuilding actors, namely Barnett and Zurcher, have 
been based on simplistic and generalizing assumptions about the motivations of 
different actors, while failing to account for non-material/ideational aspects of the 
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statebuilding dynamics. 62 The alternative approach adopted here rejects the focus on the 
perceived attributes of specific actors (that is, the ‘liberal’ international statebuilders and 
‘illiberal’ local actors) and directs the analytical attention to dynamics of interaction 
between the external and internal agencies.  The study makes a contribution to the 
critical statebuilding scholarship in general and to our understanding of statebuilding as 
a mediated and negotiated process in particular. Empirically, it generates detailed 
knowledge on local agency, local statebuilding agendas and dynamics between internal 
and external actors. This yields hypotheses for further research on the hybrid nature of 
post-conflict peace. Conceptually, the thesis lays the groundwork for deploying 
contentious politics concepts and mechanisms for the study of agency and statebuilding 
processes in local post-conflict spaces.      
 
 
International and Local 
 
It is necessary to say a few words with respect to ‘international’ and ‘local’ as used in 
this study; both terms pose some difficulties for the analysis as they tend to reduce the 
complexity of actors and agendas. The distinction between local and international is 
deployed here as a methodological tool rather than an ontological statement; it is an 
analytical lens that sharpens the distinctions between local and international, but one 
that is necessary in order to produce an analysis accessible to those unfamiliar with the 
case study in question. The term ‘international’ refers to the external signatories of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the United States, Russia and various European 
governments.63 ‘International’ is a wide concept and disagreements among international 
actors have, in fact, weakened the power international actors would otherwise hold in 
Bosnia. These issues are discussed at length in Chapter 3. The term ‘local’ is used, in 
turn, to denote actors or groups comprising of Bosnian actors. For the sake of brevity it 
is used as shorthand to denote the local actors that are of interest to this thesis: those 
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who engage in contentious actions vis-à-vis the international statebuilding agencies. 
These actors have generally included, but are not limited to, politicians, interest groups, 
journalists, academics, representatives of religious communities and the military.  Not 
all Bosnian actors contest the internationally-led process; much of earlier research 
indicates the presence of local actors who fully embrace and promote the externally-led 
process. 64 While we know a great deal about these local partners, particularly in relation 
to civil society organizations,65 there is less research on how the actors that contest 
international statebuilding operate. Much of the earlier scholarship on local contention 
has focused on how to manage local ‘spoilers’ of peace rather than how they might 
interact with the international actors.   
 
 
Local Statebuilding Agendas 
 
The research indicates that parallel to the international post-conflict enterprise local 
statebuilding agendas exist. Albeit an intuitive point to make, it is one that has received 
limited attention in the literature. The multiplicity of statebuilding trajectories points to 
the fact that international statebuilding does not occur in a political or economic power 
vacuum, but in the context of pre-existing social structures and processes. Local 
statebuilding agendas thus refer to groups or networks of actors who share an 
understanding of Bosnia’s statehood with respect to its territorial/institutional 
organization. They are by no means primordial or fixed categories of local identities but 
rather products of historical forces more generally and the recent conflict, more 
specifically.  
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With the above caveats in mind, what can be understood as the Bosniak66 statebuilding 
agenda generally entails the promotion of strong central state organs that would not only 
ensure the efficient functioning of the state but one that the Bosniaks as the numerically 
largest group could in effect control. The aim of creating a functioning state is in tune 
with the aims of some of the international statebuilding actors, such as the United States 
and Turkey. The details of how to achieve this vary between political parties, religious 
actors and civil society organizations; while many advocate a negotiatory stance with 
respect to the other local groups, others have called for the revision of the peace 
agreement that created the country’s current structure. What most Bosniaks agree upon, 
however, is that the international actors have not lived up to their principles of 
promoting democracy and Bosnian statehood. They lack the political will to force 
through necessary changes and make concessions to the primary perpetrators of the 
Bosnian conflict, the Serbs. Episodes of Bosniak contention emerge then as a response 
to half-hearted international statebuilding and Bosniak critics generally call for 
intensified international involvement.67  
 
The Bosniak statebuilding agenda stands in a stark contrast to the views held by many 
in the Serb and Croat communities in Bosnia. Although there is some variation in the 
Serb views of the international statebuilding mission, the broad contours of the Serb 
statebuilding agenda entail the emphasis on the sanctity of the peace agreement that 
gave the Bosnian Serbs an entity, Republika Srpska (RS), where they form the majority. 
This has sent many Serbs onto a collision course with those international statebuilding 
actors who advocate reforming the highly decentralized system of governance created in 
Dayton. Serb contention vis-à-vis international statebuilding has then been premised on 
the perceived attempts to alter the peace agreement as well as on the alleged pro-
Bosniak bias of many international actors. In addition, the coercive and non-
consultative nature of international statebuilding features in the Serb critiques of the 
external actors. While Croats are perhaps the most divided community, they 
nevertheless share the objective of re-organization of the country’s governance. Bosnian 
Croats, as the smallest of the three constituent nations, regard themselves as the main 
victims of the DPA which forced them into sharing the Federation with the numerically 
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larger Bosniak community. 68  The reoccurring Croat grievance has centered on the 
territorial arrangement of the country that has left Croats without an entity of their own. 
Croats have challenged the international statebuilding agenda as a breach of the Croat 
right for greater self-governance.   
 
What is then at stake in local acts of contention are different ideas about the Bosnian 
state, both in institutional/organizational and ideational terms. The competing and 
contradicting visions of the institutional and organizational aspects of the state vary 
between the centralized and decentralized models of statehood, while the idea of 
Bosnianess is debated through the lens of competing national identities. The 
considerable power held by the international actors in the country has meant that the 
international community has become the central reference point in terms of making 
contentious claims and spelling out alternative visions of Bosnian statehood.    
 
 
Contention  
 
In order to trace and capture these parallel, local statebuilding agendas and agencies, 
this study draws on contentious politics. The framework is deployed as it captures the 
negotiatory nature of post-conflict statebuilding. Contentious politics studies the use of 
disruptive measures directed against authorities in an attempt to bring about a change. In 
the standard contentious politics research contention refers to the ‘collective political 
struggle’ entailing ‘episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims’.69 
At the heart of contentious politics is the notion of societal negotiation; groups – 
whether social movements, associations, interest groups - making claims on the 
authorities. Contention for the purposes of the present study is defined as the use of 
disruptive, episodic, public and collective political strategies that seek to counter aspects 
of international statebuilding.   
 
The value-added of approaching local agency via the notion of contentious politics is 
best illustrated by discussing the main alternative conceptual lenses that have gained 
much purchase in the critical statebuilding scholarship; the notion of everyday 
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resistance foregrounding the hidden and mundane forms of local agency and hybridity 
premised on the co-existence of local and international practices and modalities of 
governance.70 While the aim of the thesis is not to eschew everyday resistance and 
hybridity as concepts, contentious politics provides an alternative approach to local 
agency that contributes to our understanding of local agency as a whole. Contention as a 
conceptual lens enables us to capture forms of agency that cannot be adequately 
understood as ‘resistance’ and that engage with international statebuilders directly rather 
than through using hidden, everyday practices.  In terms of the former point, this thesis 
argues that the concept of resistance is of limited value in conceptualizing the practices 
traced throughout the thesis. Alongside practices of ‘resistance’, forms of local agency 
exist that do not engage in across-the-board rejection of the internationally-led 
statebuilding process but seek to mediate and re-negotiate aspects of it through 
contentious practices. In terms of the latter caveat, everyday resistance informed by de 
Certeau and Scott71 focuses on the mundane and indirect forms of agency. This 
approach overlooks the public and explicit modalities of agency that directly engage 
with international statebuilders.    
 
Drawing on the contentious politics not only enables capturing the explicit forms of 
agency operating in post-conflict spaces, but it also provides a starting point for tracing 
statebuilding dynamics and interrelations between internal and external actors. While 
the accounts of local agency foregrounding the ‘everyday’ center on hidden forms of 
resistance that often go unnoticed by international actors, acts of contention are 
recognized as such by international statebuilders. They often counter local contentious 
practices through a repertoire of measures. Tracing these dynamics enables us to make 
some observations with respect to interactions that underpin international statebuilding.  
The analytical purchase of contention, vis-à-vis the everyday resistance, resides then in 
providing an additional and more subtle notion of contention to capture local practices 
and generating knowledge on explicit forms of local agency that have elicited less 
attention. Moreover, given that contentious politics operates in the realm of direct and 
visible practices, it offers a useful starting point for investigating international attempts 
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counter such local practices. This is necessary in terms of developing a more nuanced 
and complete account of local agency and statebuilding dynamics in post-conflict states.  
 
As with the scholarship on the everyday resistance, the research carried out here speaks 
to the notion of hybridity; the co-existence and interaction between internal and external 
agencies, agendas and practices. In many ways the hybrid nature of post-conflict spaces 
serves as the starting point for the research. The contentious politics framework 
developed here provides specific concepts and mechanisms through which to trace the 
emergence of hybridity. Opting for the language of mediation and re-negotiation rather 
than ‘hybridization’ in the pages to come not only reflects the emphasis of the thesis on 
post-conflict statebuilding as negotiated process, but it also entails making a more 
specific claim about how post-conflict is ‘hybridized’. This thesis argues that the 
process of hybridization can more specifically be understood as one of negotiation and 
mediation between statebuilding agencies. The contentious politics framework can, 
therefore, be utilized to as a lens through which to trace the process of hybridization.   
 
As noted earlier, contention in this thesis refers to claim-making activity through use of 
disruptive, public, episodic and collective techniques directed at the international 
authorities that have de facto governed Bosnia since the end of the war. Although the 
distinctions between standard and contentious politics are arguably harder to make 
when it comes to states emerging from civil wars, it is nonetheless the case that not all 
Bosnian politics is contentious. Following the above definition, regularly scheduled 
events like elections, parliamentary debates or multi-party talks are part of what might 
be considered as ‘routine’ politics, even if they may at times prompt contentious 
activities. What is interesting in cases such as Bosnia is that practices that would be 
considered elsewhere as routine politics – such as blocking decision-making – have 
become harnessed for the purpose of making claims on the international authorities. In a 
textbook contentious politics scenario groups in a society stage protests or 
demonstrations to make their voices heard by their government. They have limited 
access to the official institutional channels and thus use extra-institutional contentious 
techniques to demand a change. The picture is somewhat different when it comes to a 
society governed from without; the claim-making relationship is not one between 
domestic actors (social group vs domestic government) but between domestic claim-
makers and international objects of claim-making. In this context the domestic 
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institutional domain and mechanisms such as veto rights become essential instruments 
in the contentious repertoire and crucial practice through which internationally-initiated 
statebuilding measures are re-negotiated on the ground. The point here is that given that 
the level of analysis in this thesis differs from the traditional contentious politics 
research, it is necessary to relax the assumption that contentious politics operates solely 
in the extra-institutional sphere. This does not render the concept of contention 
analytically meaningless as it refers to clearly defined practices (public, episodic and 
collective forms of claim-making directed at the international authorities), but rather 
reflects the power relations and claim-making dynamics in states governed by 
international actors.  
 
The thesis suggests that contention is in many ways an essential part of statebuilding; it 
serves a negotiatory function in that the shape and the parameters of the state are 
negotiated at least partly through contentious episodes. In the short-run the use of 
contentious claim-making techniques has generated a degree of instability as contention 
has fuelled inter-group tensions, but it has also represented active local participation in 
the process of defining Bosnian statehood. Although by no means the kind of local 
participation envisioned by international statebuilding actors, contention has entailed 
putting forth different visions of Bosnian statehood through primarily non-violent 
means. In the long-run contention can be conducive to gradual emergence of political 
system based on compromise and debate. This is so as contention, as noted earlier, is a 
form of societal negotiation whereby different groups in a society negotiate and bargain 
over representation, resources and other crucial questions pertaining to statehood. It is 
notable that in certain post-conflict societies, such as Bosnia, the presence of 
interventionist outside actors has distorted this process of societal negotiation in that the 
claim-making nexus has developed between local and international actors rather than 
between domestic groups. Nonetheless, with the departure of international agencies, the 
claim-making dynamics are likely to alter as domestic compromise becomes necessary 
and claim-making shifts from the local-international axis to the domestic realm.  
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Findings of the Research 
 
The central findings of the research indicate that local agency is exercised through a 
range of practices that essentially seek to affect or alter the course or the shape of the 
internationally-led statebuilding trajectory. These practices range from boycotts and 
blocking of decision-making at the parliament to verbal assaults on the legitimacy of the 
international statebuilding practices in public debates. They also contain symbolic 
practices that directly challenge the cultural reconstruction efforts and seek to maintain 
the communal identities consolidated during the war.  The following section discusses 
the domains and practices of contention crucial to the understanding of local agency in 
post-conflict Bosnia.  
 
 
Domains of Contention 
 
Where and how do the different contentious strategies operate? Systematic tracing of 
contentious actions – as defined above - carried out by this research suggests that they 
operate in three different, yet interrelated, domains; institutional, discursive and 
symbolic. These domains are what Mitchell and Richmond call ‘interfaces’ where local 
practices, interests and experiences encounter the aims, practices and norms of 
international statebuilders.72 An array of methods, responses and actors occupy these 
domains and hybridize the externally-imposed statebuilding process. In the institutional 
domain, disruptive bureaucratic and administrative actions are used re-negotiate the 
statebuilding policies and reforms. This has often meant slowing down the process or 
bringing it to a halt. In the discursive domain, local actors seek to either delegitimize 
and destabilize aspects of international statebuilding or co-opt it through other 
discursive strategies. Finally, in the symbolic domain, alternative symbolic systems are 
used to contest the cultural dimensions of international statebuilding. These rather 
different contentious strategies constitute an overall contentious repertoire, consisting of 
physical, verbal and cognitive action. The three domains are overlapping and 
interrelated. Actions taken in the institutional domain are, for instance, regularly 
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rationalized and legitimized with discursive practices drawing on democracy, human 
rights and other international norms. Other practices in the institutional domain are 
closely linked to identity-related questions as for instance the practice of 
bureaucratically undermining refugee returns in order to maintain the ethnic 
homogeneity of towns and municipalities. Thinking contention in these terms provides 
an analytical and heuristic map that helps us to navigate the complex terrain of local 
contentious practices and make sense of them in a meaningful way. It also enables an 
analysis attentive to both material and non-material aspects of contention and 
interactions between the internal and external statebuilding actors. 
 
 
Institutional Domain 
 
Institutions are understood here in the organizational sense of the concept as 
organizations, bodies and procedures. While building and consolidating the institutional 
infrastructure of the Bosnian state has been the primary strategy of international 
involvement in Bosnia, local agencies have frequently used these institutions to re-
negotiate the shape and form of Bosnian statehood. In doing so local actors have 
deployed a range of techniques such as boycotts, walk-outs, refusals to cooperate, 
protests and blocking of decision-making. These acts of contention have operated in the 
state-level powersharing institutions. At the municipal level, contentious actions have 
entailed the maintenance of parallel structures of governance and the use of mono-
ethnic municipal administrations to delay and obstruct the cornerstone of international 
post-conflict strategy, re-establishing the multiethnic demography of the country 
through minority refugee returns. The investigation into the institutional domain 
underscores the complexity of statebuilding dynamics: while much of local contention 
stems from local attempts to protect and promote their respective statebuilding agendas, 
the coercive and non-consultative nature of international statebuilding practice 
contributes to the persistence of contentious activities. Even if not always resulting in 
outright success, these practices have decelerated aspects of the statebuilding process 
(the Constitutional Reform, for instance) as well as altering the scope of others (such as 
the police reform).  
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Discursive Domain 
 
The discursive domain is understood here as the realm in which public statements are 
made. Local contention in the discursive domain entails communicative forms of 
challenging international statebuilding, or ‘talking back’ to authority as Steinberg puts 
it.73 These practices draw on the existing international narratives and utilize them to 
level critique against international statebuilding methods or to seek directly to change its 
course. The most frequent form of contention in the discursive domain is that of de-
legitimization and destabilization of international statebuilding practice through 
recourse to the international normative framework. This means drawing on the very 
concepts – democracy, human rights, the rule of law, local ownership – that necessitated 
and justified international intervention in post-Dayton Bosnia and highlighting the 
contradictions between international rhetoric and practice. The basic tenet of local 
contentious discourses have been to emphasize how international statebuilding violates 
the human rights of the group in question and compromises democracy, the rule of law 
and local ownership in Bosnia. This translates into de-legitimization of international 
statebuilding as profoundly undemocratic and coercive practice that violates human 
rights, the rule of law and sovereignty rather than protecting them. These de-
legitimizing narratives function, at the same time, to legitimize local statebuilding 
agendas. This entails self-representations by local actors as the defenders of democracy 
and human rights of their respective communities. Alongside the de-legitimizing 
discourses, local narratives that seek to appeal to international statebuilders also exist. 
As with the delegitimizing discourses, these narratives draw on the already existing 
international discourses. In the case of the Bosniaks, this has meant framing the post-
conflict process in Bosnia as a dangerous project that requires extensive and prolonged 
international presence. Bosniaks have also regularly engaged in moral framing by 
suggesting that the international community has the responsibility to remain in Bosnia 
and transform it into a functioning state. This is predicated on the fact that the 
international community failed to act in the face of Serb aggression against the 
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Bosniaks. Another local discourse appealing to the international community deployed 
by Croats and Serbs, has been to appropriate the war on terror-discourse by framing the 
actors in question as valuable partners for the international actors in Bosnia.  
 
 
Symbolic Domain 
 
While the investigation into institutional and discursive domains tells us how the 
institutional structures, administrative processes and international discourses are 
deployed to contest the post-conflict process, focus on the symbolic domain tells us how 
symbols and other signifiers of identity are utilized to contest aspects of international 
statebuilding. Symbolic domain thus refers to the cultural realm of society where claims 
about the distinctiveness of cultures and nations are made. These practices are often 
directed towards international attempts to reconstruct the cultural space of pre-war 
Bosnia and they entail the rejection of the symbols of Bosnianess stipulated by the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), renaming towns and streets in accordance 
with exclusive (rather than shared) histories and identities, refusals to restore the 
architectural signifiers of multi-culturalism and multi-confessionalism, the promotion of 
separate languages, the separate (rather than shared) practices of commemoration and 
national holidays. These acts not only represent the rejection of externally-driven 
attempts to build a ‘state identity’ and at least some sense of Bosnianess but they also 
provide an alternative cultural agenda promoted through exclusive symbolic systems. 
These practices are of interest to this study as questions of culture and identity - whether 
expressed through emblems, language or architecture - have acquired distinctly political 
meaning and become features in the collective political struggle in post-war Bosnia. 
Moreover, these cultural components of contention have elicited little attention in the 
study of local agency in post-conflict spaces which further adds to the salience of such 
line of enquiry.   
 
Dynamics of Statebuilding 
 
In addition to exploring the domains and practices of contention, the thesis makes some 
claims with respect to interactions between the internal and external statebuilding 
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agencies. It finds that while local actors use various administrative practices, deploy 
international discourses and local symbols in order to contest aspects of international 
statebuilding, international officials counter these actions with measures relying on 
coercion, capital and discursive decertification. Coercion has been embodied in the 
extensive military presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) troops in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, but perhaps more importantly in the use of political 
coercion enabled by the executive authority granted to the OHR. The use of capital by 
international actors has in turn meant refusing donor funds from local actors considered 
obstructionist. Decertification, on the other hand, refers to the international practice of 
discursively marginalizing non-compliant local agencies.74 Interactions between the 
internal and external actors have resulted in two contradictory dynamics that have 
marked the post-Dayton statebuilding process. On the one hand, as the empirical 
chapters demonstrate, this dynamic has been one of conflict and contention created by 
the encounters of different statebuilding agencies and agendas. At the same time, 
however, these interactions and encounters have distinctly symbiotic logic. International 
statebuilding agencies continue to hold executive power over Bosnian affairs as long as 
the local actors they consider as threats to the statebuilding process exist. Yet, it is often 
(if not always) the case that the nature of the international presence in the country 
perpetuates local opposition. Indeed, acts of local contention are often prompted by the 
use of coercive international measures or international entanglement in the domestic 
political affairs. The continued extensions of international agencies’ mandates have 
created opportunities for local statebuilding actors to continue representing themselves 
as the defenders of their community against external domination rather than focusing 
their attention on urgent social and economic issues. In this way then the ostensibly 
conflictual relationship between external and internal statebuilding agencies is 
underpinned by mutual dependency. 
 
 
The Bosnian case and a Note on Research Methods 
 
Although it can be argued that all individual cases of post-conflict international 
interventions are to a certain degree sui generis in that the causes of conflicts, histories 
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of states and other contextual factors vary a great deal, it is possible to develop a 
framework that enables us to systematically trace and analyse modalities of contention 
across cases.  In order to begin doing so, the Bosnian post-conflict experience provides 
a rich case for investigation.  Not only has it been one of the first cases of extensive and 
heavy-handed international intervention with billions of dollars in its disposal (over $14 
billion according to MacMahon and Western),75 but it has also been relatively long in 
duration and is, indeed, still on-going seventeen years after the end of the war. This 
provides a comparatively long time span within which to investigate local practices of 
contention and interactions between actors. Bosnian political landscape consists of a 
number of different and competing statebuilding and identity-building agendas which 
adds to the richness of the case. At the same time, the conflictual nature of the 
interrelations between international and local actors renders Bosnia a fertile ground for 
studying statebuilding dynamics; for many commentators it is the presence of 
‘obstructionist’ local agency that largely explains the slow progress and continued need 
for international engagement.76 The difficulties of statebuilding in Bosnia have become 
a cautionary example for international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
It is useful here to briefly recount the key events of the Bosnian War in order to 
contextualise the post-conflict process thereafter. The war that tore Bosnia apart was set 
in motion by the unravelling of the Yugoslav Republic which Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
been a part of since the end of the Second World War. While the collapse of the 
Yugoslav state was an outcome of a number of factors, the growing economic hardship 
and austerity measures that saw a dramatic fall in living standards, coupled with the 
death of the country’s strong man-leader Josip Broz Tito plunged the country into 
political turmoil.77 The end of Yugoslavia began to materialise with the secession of 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Whereas the issue of Slovenian independence was 
relatively bloodless affair due to the absence of significant non-Slovenian populations in 
the territory, the presence of sizeable Serb minority in Croatia meant that Croatian 
independence became fiercely contested. This resulted in an armed conflict fought 
                                               
75
 Patrice McMahon  and Jon Western ‘The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart’. 
Foreign Affairs 88 no 69 (2009), 69 
76
 See for instance,’ Bosnia’s Lesson’ The Washington Post.  20 September 2009. Accessed through 
Nexis UK  3 July 2010; ‘Bosnia’s Gridlock: Two Visions for Bosnia. The Economist. 13 April 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/04/bosnias_gridlock (accessed 2 August 2012) 
77
 Susan Woodward Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. (Washington D.C: The 
Brookings Institute, 1995) 
38 
 
between Croatia and Croatian Serbs backed by Serbian troops. Following the secession 
of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian Muslim and Croats began to call for Bosnian 
independence. Bosnians voted overwhelmingly for independence in the 1992 
referendum. Crucially, the referendum was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs who regarded 
Bosnia as a republic of Serb-dominated Yugoslav state rather than an independent 
entity. As the war in Croatia had demonstrated, independence of republics with multi-
national populations was likely to be a violent process. This was particularly true when 
it came to Bosnia that was a microcosm of Yugoslav multi-confessionalism and multi-
nationalism: it consisted of three constituent national groups, the largest of which were 
the Muslims (44% of the population). Approximately 31% of the population regarded 
themselves as Serbs and 17% as Croats.78 When Bosnia declared independence in April 
1992, Bosnian Serbs initiated armed violence which signalled the beginning of the 
Bosnian War.  
 
The war was marked by changing alliances between the three groups, brutality against 
civilians and ethnic cleansing. What was initially a joint Muslim-Croat effort to fight 
against the Bosnian Serb Army turned into infighting between the Muslims and Croats 
as the latter established Croatian republic ‘Herceg-Bosna’ in Western parts of Bosnia. 
At the same time the Bosnian War became synonymous with rape and genocide 
perpetrated against civilians as paramilitaries and regular soldiers sought to ethnically 
cleanse areas under their control. The UN sought to alleviate the suffering of civilians 
by delivering humanitarian aid as well as establishing the now-infamous safe areas in 
order to protect non-combatants. The latter policy brought the UN mission into 
disrepute as safe areas were overrun by the Serb forces and in the case of Srebrenica, 
civilians under the UN protection became victims of a genocide. Given the mandate of 
UN peacekeepers that prohibited the use of force to protect the civilians, the Dutch 
troops tasked with keeping peace became bystanders in the genocide. Alongside the 
failure of the UN safe areas-policy, the organisation was subjected to extensive criticism 
for attempting to maintain its impartiality in the face of a highly asymmetrical conflict 
where Serbs were regularly attacking civilians and breaking ceasefire agreements. 
Parallel to the UN’s humanitarian efforts, the international community sought to bring 
an end to the fighting through several rounds of diplomacy prior to and throughout the 
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war. International diplomacy (and to a degree, military coercion) finally came into 
fruition in November 1995 when the DPA was signed at the US-military base in 
Dayton, Ohio.  
 
The DPA not only ended the armed conflict but Annex 4 also set out the core of the 
Bosnian Constitution. The agreement divided the country into two entities, the Bosniak-
Croat controlled Federation79 (51% of the territory) and Serb-dominated Republika 
Srpska (RS) (49% of the territory). In the spirit of consociationalism, the Dayton 
agreement created highly decentralised governance structures. The relatively weak 
central state entails the tripartite Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary 
Assembly and Constitutional Court. The Assembly consists of two chambers (the House 
of Peoples and the House of Representatives) and all legislation requires the acceptance 
from both Houses. The joint, state-level institutions are responsible for foreign policy, 
foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, international and inter-entity law enforcement 
and transportation.80 Entities, consisting of their respective elected officials, are in 
charge of all other policy areas. The decentralised nature of the Bosnian state is seen as 
a mechanism that protects the rights of all the national groups through the high degree 
of self-governance: the devolution of power can prevent legislation that might be seen 
as favouring one group over another.81 At the state level majority domination is curbed 
through the ethnic key principle that enables the protection of ‘vital interests’ and 
guarantees equal representation of all the three groups. In terms of the latter, seats in the 
joint, state level institutions are allocated along the lines of group membership. The 
three-member Presidency, for instance, consists of a Bosniak, Croat and Serb 
representative, the chair of the organ rotating among the representatives. In terms of 
protecting ‘vital interests’, full consensus is required for decision-making. This provides 
a veto-right that can be used to prevent decisions deemed harmful for the interest of a 
given group.82 In many ways the complex governance structures represent an attempt to 
establish the sovereignty of the Bosnian state while managing inter-ethnic tensions.  The 
DPA also envisaged a significant (albeit short-lived) role for external actors in the 
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monitoring and implementation of the agreement. The International Force under NATO 
command was tasked to monitor the implementation of the military aspects of the DPA, 
while the OHR was to oversee the civilian aspects of the post-conflict process. The UN 
undertook the role of training police forces across the country, while the Organization 
for Stability and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) was tasked with holding elections and 
monitoring the human rights situation in the country. What was seen as a short-term 
international engagement turned into long-term presence in the country in the face of 
slow progress towards self-sustaining peace.        
 
 
 Research Methods  
 
Having established the context for the case study, a few words are in order on the 
methods deployed to study the Bosnian case. The analysis represents an interpretative 
study of agency, contention and interrelations between international statebuilders and 
local statebuilding agendas in post-Dayton Bosnia deploying qualitative research 
methods. The study is concerned with the start of the ‘post-conflict’ operations in 1995 
up until the October elections in 2010. The single-case study design is chosen with the 
aims of the research in mind. One of these objectives is theory-building through in-
depth research: the aim in this regard is to contribute to our understanding of negotiated 
forms of statebuilding that mark post-conflict spaces. Another, connected, objective is 
to provide empirical and detailed tracking of contentious dynamics of statebuilding in 
Bosnia and to investigate the complexity of post-conflict space. In many ways single 
case is the most useful way of capturing at least partly the nuances of ‘reality’ (and the 
different variations of it) on the ground as well as to provide some answers to the ‘how’ 
questions this thesis explores (that is, how local contention operates).83 
 
The research is based on extensive primary material. Information on local practices of 
contention has been gathered from news items and reports authored by international 
non-governmental organizations and think tanks.84 The majority of news items were 
accessed through the Nexis UK database which entails news from the major 
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international news agencies. Bosnia-related news items published between 1995 and 
2010 were systematically examined for contentious episodes.85 This provided 
information particularly on the contentious practices in the institutional and symbolic 
domains. Another major source of information with respect to day to day events in 
Bosnia has been the press monitoring service of the OHR which has provided 
translations of the main news as reported by media outlets in Bosnia during the period 
2000-2005.86 Further material such as speeches and media interviews (given by 
representatives of the OHR, the EU, the OSCE, local politicians, representatives of 
religious organisations and civil society activists) have been used in the course of the 
research in order to identify and trace policies, discourses and perceptions. The research 
also draws on approximately 50 semi-structured interviews of local actors (politicians, 
journalists, civil society activists) and representatives of the international community in 
Bosnia carried out by the author in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar in 2009 and 
2010.87 These discussions have mainly been used as a way to build background 
knowledge and to ascertain the general interpretations of the post-conflict process of the 
different actors involved.    
 
 
The Structure of the Thesis  
 
As noted earlier, the objective of the thesis is to explore how local contention operates 
and interacts with international statebuilding practices. The main aim of the empirical 
chapters is to establish how local actors exert agency in the internationally-led process 
of statebuilding. This introductory discussion is followed by Chapter 2 that sets out the 
analytical and conceptual foundations of the thesis. It provides a detailed critique of the 
existing accounts of local agency and makes a case for approaching local actors and 
practices via the concept of contention. Chapter 2 also discusses previous analyzing on 
interactions between actors in post-conflict societies and argues that these accounts 
offer a limited view on interrelations and dynamics. Finally, it sets out the conceptual 
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tools borrowed from the contentious politics scholarship that allow us to capture the 
above dynamics. Chapter 3 continues to set the scene: it provides a detailed tracing of 
policies of the key international actors during and after the conflict in Bosnia. The 
Chapter foregrounds the multiple statebuilding projects within ‘the international 
community’. The key contention here is that there is no single, unified international 
statebuilding trajectory, but rather a range of contradicting and dynamic projects based 
on different agendas and statebuilding methods of the external governments involved. 
This has opened opportunities for local actors to exploit the tensions amongst the 
international statebuilding actors. Moving onto the case study, post-Dayton Bosnia, 
Chapter 4 provides an account of contentious local practices in Bosnia by engaging in 
detailed tracing of contention at the institutional domain. It shows how aspects of 
international statebuilding are contested through a repertoire of actions ranging from 
boycotts, protests and withdrawals from institutions to administrative delays and 
refusals to co-operate. The Chapter demonstrates how international attempts to counter 
local practices of contention have further fuelled contention.  While Chapter 4 focuses 
on tangible practices of contention, Chapter 5 engages with its discursive aspects and 
investigates how aspects of international statebuilding are contested through discursive 
strategies. The focus on the discursive realm stems from the assumption that 
statebuilding is not merely a process of rebuilding state institutions, but it is also a 
verbal process in which certain ideas, agendas and actors are legitimized.  The analysis 
argues that the verbal acts of contention have primarily centered on two practices: one 
that de-legitimizes international statebuilding by re-framing its narratives and concepts 
and another that taps into international discourses in order to appeal to international 
actors and thus affect the process. The chapter is indicative of how the contradictions 
between international statebuilding rhetoric and practice enable the formulation of 
contentious discourses by local actors that essentially delegitimize the external actors.  
 
Chapter 6 turns the attention to the symbolic domain and traces acts of contention that 
deploy symbols or symbolic actions pertaining to identities. Symbolic activities are 
important to our understanding of local agency in post-conflict spaces as they make 
highly visual claims pertaining to statehood, nationhood and identity in societies 
undergoing state formation process. The chapter identifies a repertoire of local activities 
– such as the use of alternative state symbols, renaming of public spaces, 
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commemorative practices and language politics – that seek to challenge and undermine 
aspects of international statebuilding. These practices are political techniques that 
directly challenge the international identity-building measures aiming to consolidate 
Bosnian statehood. The final discussion in Chapter 7 brings the different strands of the 
analysis together. With the aim of highlighting the dynamics and interrelations 
underpinning post-conflict statebuilding in Bosnia, it argues that the conflictual 
relations between the internal and external actors have paradoxically resulted in a 
symbiotic relationship. The presence of non-conforming local actors justifies the 
extension of international mandates while the continued international presence 
generates further contestation. In reflecting upon the findings of the study it reiterates 
the case for understanding local contentious practices as a way of re-negotiating the 
shape and the course of the post-conflict process. The chapter raises the question of 
whether dismissing such acts of contention as obstruction of the peace process 
overlooks the negotiatory functions contention might play in post-conflict societies. 
Contention is essentially a part of the societal negotiation process of state formation 
whereby the different interests and points of view present in a society are put forth. This 
process might have taken ethno-nationalist form following the end of the war, but the 
eventual departure of the international officials may pave the way for the start of politics 
on social and economic, rather than on ethnic, grounds. 
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Chapter 2 
Local Agency and Statebuilding Dynamics:  
Analytical and Conceptual Foundations 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
This thesis as a whole sets out to argue that international peace operations do not 
operate in a void; multiple and alternative local statebuilding and identity building 
agendas encounter the exigencies of internationally-driven statebuilding in post-conflict 
spaces. Although some of the local agendas and practices coincide with those of the 
international statebuilders, others represent and advance different configurations of 
statehood and nationhood. It is in the latter practices that the interest of this study 
resides. The thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of post-conflict statebuilding 
as a mediated process. It does so through investigating local agency and dynamics and 
interactions between internal and external actors. The research draws on contentious 
politics concepts and mechanisms in order to explain and understand modalities of local 
agency. ‘Contention’ refers to the use of explicit and disruptive political techniques vis-
à-vis the authorities to bring about a change. Mechanisms of contention – political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing – on the other hand turn our 
attention to the way in which contentious practices operate and persist. The research 
also accounts for the ways in which international statebuilding actors counter local acts 
of contention; most common strategies are those of coercion, capital and discursive 
decertification. The aim of this chapter is to set out the above framework. In doing so it 
engages in dialogue with some of the earlier research on local agency and local-
international interactions. The central argument advanced in this chapter is that the 
existing formulations of local agency seeking to contest international statebuilding have 
overlooked the rich repertoire of practices that directly challenge the internationally-led 
statebuilding processes. It is this lacuna that the present study addresses. By 
investigating the variety of such practices the thesis is also able to provide an account of 
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interactions and dynamics between internal and external agencies that is attentive to the 
processes through which statebuilding is mediated.  
 
While aiming to make an empirical and conceptual contribution to our understanding of 
statebuilding as a negotiated process, the analysis in many ways intersects with, and 
indeed speaks to the rapidly growing body of literature on hybrid forms peace in post-
conflict societies. The knowledge generated by the thesis - the empirically-rich 
understanding of local agency and statebuilding dynamics - enables more refined 
hypothesizing on a range of practices and interfaces where multiple actors and agendas 
encounter one another. The chapter begins by discussing different ways of approaching 
local agency and suggests that the existing accounts have overlooked a range of 
practices representing local agency. It then moves on to discussing how the literature 
has approached interactions and dynamics between internal and external statebuilding 
actors with focus on the notion of hybridity. Finally, the discussion sets out the 
conceptual framework of the study and makes some claims with respect to the 
international responses to local contentious practices.  
 
 
Local Agency in Post-Conflict Spaces: Partners and Spoilers 
 
The introductory chapter reflected upon some of the core debates in recent 
peacebuilding and statebuilding research. It took the view that understanding 
international statebuilding as liberal peace is problematic; it uncritically assumes that 
international statebuilding is exclusively based on liberal norms and practices and thus 
tends to render all local actions that question it non-liberal. As Zurcher puts it, concepts 
such as ‘liberal’ are ‘normatively charged’ labels rather than ‘ready to use analytical 
categories’. 88 These intellectual points of departure conceptualised statebuilding as an 
interactive process between international statebuilders driven by the need to create 
stability in post-conflict spaces and local statebuilding projects based on a range of 
ideas and agendas. If internationally-led post-conflict interventions are essentially more 
complex practices than implied by the view of statebuilding as a hierarchical project, it 
is then necessary to touch upon the issue of local agency. While the initial problem-
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solving scholarship had the tendency to epistemologically privilege the international 
community, its peacebuilding strategies and their effectiveness, critical theorizing has 
often devoted itself to macro-level structural analysis and top-down conceptualisations 
of power in statebuilding spaces. 89 Scholars have gradually begun to address the local 
populations and their responses to international peacebuilding and statebuilding. This is 
a welcome turn in theorizing – both problem-solving and critical - that had not taken 
local agency seriously.  The existing formulations of local agency have to a large degree 
converged around three central themes: categorisations of locals as partners, as spoilers 
and as the embodiment of ‘everyday’ forms of resistance directed towards the 
statebuilding agencies. It is worth discussing these earlier conceptualizations of local 
agency further in order to highlight the analytical mileage gained from approaching 
local agency through the contentious politics lens. Studies centering on local partners of 
internationally-led statebuilding have, for instance, explored the variety of local 
advocacy organizations that act as outposts of ‘liberal peace’ and counteract the 
‘uncivil’ tendencies of warlords and criminal networks. These local partners are seen to 
reside almost exclusively in the realm of the civil society; as Reich argues, ‘peace 
constituencies are not institutionalised elites’.90 Caparini suggests in similar vein that 
civil society is the ‘primary source of local ownership and legitimacy’ in post-conflict 
states and the key to the sustainable development of political and economic structures. 91 
Actors unaffiliated with political interests or state structures are seen to share the norms 
and values – democracy, pluralism, non-violence - of the international statebuilders. 
Civil society is then divorced from the explicitly political realm: it is the civil society 
where the liberal potential of the local space is assumed to lie.92  
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While research on local actors has become increasingly centered on the notions of 
empowerment and participation of local civil society actors, another strand of research 
has focused on local actors resisting peace – and post-conflict processes. The 
scholarship on ‘spoilers of peace’ is concerned with those local groups and individuals 
who seek to obstruct peace processes and post-peace treaty implementation phases. The 
notion of spoilers was pioneered by Stedman’s seminal article in International 
Security.93 He defines spoilers as leaders whose interests are threatened by peace 
process and constructs a typology of spoilers based on their position in the peace 
process, the number of spoilers, the intent of spoiling and whether the spoiling is carried 
out by leaders or followers. Stedman sees spoilers as one of the central reasons why 
peace processes fail and thus the main objective of generating knowledge on spoilers is 
to formulate more effective techniques of countering spoiler-activity.94 Key to 
successful spoiler-management by international ‘custodians’ of peace, according to 
Stedman, is to correctly identify the type of spoiler and to deploy an appropriate 
counter-strategy.  
 
Stedman’s work has provided the foundations for a number of studies on obstructionist 
actors in peace processes. Menkhaus, for instance, suggests on the basis of his case 
study of Somalia that spoilers might tacitly support statebuilding and reconciliation in 
general, but oppose specific mechanisms that consolidate the state due to the fears of 
that the newly formed government may become repressive. 95 Greenhill and Major, in 
turn, propose the reversal of Stedman’s model. 96 They suggest that the existing 
opportunities and the relative power of the parties involved determines the course of 
peacemaking; spoilers do not, therefore, determine what kind of outcomes are possible, 
but the possible outcomes of the negotiations determine what kind of spoilers might 
emerge. Zahar also suggests a revision to Stedman’s typologies. She argues that no 
fixed categories of spoilers exist in practice: the strategies spoilers choose are dependent 
upon opportunities and capacities of the actors in question. 97 Zahar makes a case for 
shifting the analytical attention away from actors to the conditions in which spoiling 
becomes possible.  
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The notion of spoilers has been subjected to a considerable critique.98 The most relevant 
of those critiques for the purposes of this study is the highly normative nature of the 
concept. It is grounded in an assumption of international statebuilding as the sole 
legitimate process for societies emerging from conflicts.99 The terminology of ‘spoiling’ 
is highly subjective in that it conveys a moral judgment framing ‘them’ against ‘us’. 
Newman and Richmond argue that anyone opposing Western models of governance or 
the free market becomes a spoiler in the liberal statebuilding register. 100 It is thus a 
concept that gains meaning only in relation to the liberal rhetoric of international 
statebuilding.101 This implies that the act of labelling a group or an individual a spoiler 
cannot be divorced from the normative context of ‘the liberal peace’.  Another 
limitation of the spoiler framework is that it is geared towards material forms of 
challenging peace processes. What this research finds in relation to the Bosnian case is 
that a range of discursive and symbolic practices are frequently deployed in an attempt 
to shape the course of the internationally-led post-conflict process. This suggests that it 
is necessary to develop an account of local agency that is attentive to wider range of 
practices through which international statebuilding measures are contested. It is also 
noteworthy that the object of interest of this thesis is somewhat different from the aims 
of many spoiler studies. While much of spoiler research is concerned with local actions 
that aim for and result in violent reversal of peace processes, this research centres on 
acts of contention that seek to affect, alter and mediate the post-peace treaty process by 
challenging international policies. Although some contentious practices in Bosnia may 
have the potential to reignite armed confrontation, it does generally not appear to be the 
aim of contentious acts.   
 
In reflecting upon the above accounts of local agency as ‘partners’ and ‘spoilers’, the 
common theme is that they are both premised on the attributes of local actors, as defined 
with reference to the liberal peace. These categories of local agency are seen as static 
and pre-determined entities existing independently of international 
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statebuilding/peacebuilding practices. Whilst the Bosnian case shows that the 
international statebuilders’ categorizations of locals as ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’ are 
less fixed than often assumed, little consideration is granted to the aspects of 
international involvement that generate or sustain local contention.102 Although we 
should be weary of making sweeping statements and generalizations in the face of a 
highly complex relationship between external and internal statebuilding agents, the 
Chapters ahead suggest that elements of the international intervention in Bosnia enable 
and facilitate local contention. The Dayton Peace Agreement, based on 
consociationalism, created a highly decentralized system of governance that now 
functions as an infrastructure through which the internationally-led statebuilding is 
effectively contested. At the same time, contradictions between the international 
rhetoric and practice have enabled local actors to tap into the ‘liberal peace’ narrative 
framework in order to portray international statebuilding actors as oppressive and 
illegitimate. The point here is that in order to generate a more nuanced understanding of 
local contention, it is necessary to investigate the extent to which international practices 
and measure maintain local contentious practices. 
 
 
Local Agency and the ‘Everyday’ 
 
An alternative way to grant agency to local actors has been the notion of ‘everyday’, 
foregrounding the grassroots as an emancipatory alternative to the current international 
statebuilding operations that tend to prioritize the needs of the elites. 103 This line of 
enquiry takes a cue from Scott and de Certeau.104 Scott’s central idea is that peasants 
lack the resources and opportunities to engage in direct and open resistance vis-à-vis the 
authorities; for this reason everyday, mundane activities become signifiers of defiance. 
For Scott, ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, 
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slander, arson and sabotage’ among other practices become ‘weapons of the weak’ 
against the authority.105 Scottian forms of resistance are thus indirect, hidden and 
unorganized, embodied in random acts of resistance. De Certeau, in turn, is interested in 
how people are creating their lives through everyday practices, rather than focusing 
directly on resistance. In such accounts individuals adjust and adapt institutions of 
power in accordance with their everyday lives. A number of commentators have 
formulated their critiques of statebuilding through recourse to the ‘everyday’. 
Richmond, most notably, has approached international post-conflict interventions 
through the notion of ‘everyday’ and discovered a range of grassroots practices that 
challenge elite-led statebuilding measures. 106 He sees the everyday as a distinct space 
from the Western-designed civil society, as a realm in which the ‘local-local’ is more 
authentically represented. It is in these everyday spaces where local actors and 
communities formulate political strategies - grounded in the traditions, needs and rights 
of respective communities – that aim to resist the statebuilding strategies formulated by 
the international statebuilding bodies.107 Mundane, everyday practices grant meaning to 
life in post-conflict societies and should therefore be the foundation upon which post-
war peace is built.108  Richmond’s work is in many ways motivated by a call for a more 
ethical peacebuilding which he argues can be achieved through recognizing the needs 
and customs of the everyday spaces. As noted above, this search for emancipatory 
alternative to the current peacebuilding and statebuilding practices foregrounds the 
hidden transcripts as the elite-dominated ‘public transcripts’ are seen as 
unrepresentative of the people.109 This line of argumentation thus partly intersects with 
the accounts of statebuilding articulated by many international statebuilding actors that 
identify the unrepresentative elites as the key problem post-conflict states face. 110 
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While the research on the everyday has contributed to our understanding of grassroots 
processes in post-conflict states, it has provided a rather narrow account of local agency 
and attempts to mediate international statebuilding measures. This thesis argues that 
focusing solely on the hidden, ‘off-stage’ transcripts111 overlooks a set of important 
dynamics operating ‘on-stage’.  This study therefore foregrounds the array of direct and 
open forms of action, ranging from protests and boycotts in the institutions of 
governance to discursive de-legitimation and rejection of internationally-imposed 
signifiers of identity and belonging. These explicit expressions of opposition have been 
mainly understood as obstructionism or spoiler behavior that requires improved 
international spoiler-management techniques. Much of such theorizing has centered on 
the reactionary agendas of local elites, while less has been said about the acts of 
contention themselves. The central contention here is that rather than focusing solely on 
attributes or motivations of actors – which are highly debatable at best – it is more 
useful to generate knowledge on how local contention operates and interacts with 
international statebuilding practices. This is important as direct forms of opposition 
explicitly challenge the coercive power of the international statebuilding enterprise.  
 
In order to begin tracing such activities from an alternative angle, the analysis deploys 
the concept of ‘contention’, as noted in the introductory Chapter. Contention refers to 
the use of disruptive, episodic, public and collective political strategies that seek to 
counter aspects of international statebuilding. It serves as a conceptual lens through 
which to track the forms of action the research seeks to capture. Whereas everyday 
resistance, in the Scottian sense, focuses on the individual, hidden and random acts, 
contention shifts attention to collective and direct practices. Although contention in the 
case study in question does not always amount to officially-organized or structured 
activity, it nevertheless exhibits some sense of coherence embodied in the presence of 
political, economic, social and religious groups that organize and engage in acts of 
contention.  It is not across-the-board ‘resistance’ to the external power, but rather 
episodic, selective critique and challenge to statebuilding practices that are deemed 
harmful. Given the interest of this thesis on dynamics and relations between local and 
international statebuilding actors, the issue of recognition becomes crucial: hidden, 
everyday modalities of resistance ‘make no headlines’ and often go unnoticed by the 
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object/s of the action.112 Contention, in contrast, is mutually recognized as such and 
often results in counter-measures taken by international actors. This is important in 
terms of identifying and tracing international attempts to deal with local contention. 
This alternative way to approach local agency should not be taken as a rejection of the 
everyday accounts of resistance but should be seen as complementary to the analyses of 
local agency informed by the notion of ‘everyday’. Understanding the direct methods of 
contention is a necessary piece in the jigsaw of local agency and one that opens avenues 
for future research on the dynamics between hidden and open techniques of negotiating 
international statebuilding measures. Moreover, while the quest for more contextually-
aware and ‘empathetic’ peacebuilding focuses on the everyday, the potential for societal 
negotiation and compromise at the formal level ought not to be dismissed as a form of 
negative peace. The formal political processes and forms of statehood they result in can 
play role in creating positive peace if institutions are designed to serve the populations 
in a meaningful way. 113     
 
 
Local-International Interactions 
 
The conceptualization of local agency sketched above suggests that agency matters; 
international statebuilding operations do not operate in ground zero of statebuilding but 
encounter and interact with local actors, agendas and practices. This prompts us to ask 
questions about interactions and interrelations between internal and external actors. In 
this regard, the notion of hybridity provides a useful corrective to studies 
conceptualizing international statebuilding as a hierarchical project and shifts attention 
to statebuilding dynamics and interactions.114  Hybridity in the context of post-conflict 
development alludes to the multiplicity and co-existence of actors, agendas and 
practices. From this point of view, post-conflict statebuilding is a process that is not 
exclusively dominated by the international statebuilding actors but where various 
agencies and agendas (internal and external) co-exist. Hybridity is generally understood 
as the interaction of different institutions and actors in post-conflict spaces. Belloni, for 
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instance, refers to hybridity as ‘institutional multiplicity wherein different sets of rules 
of the game often at odds with one another, coexist in the same territory’ and 
‘coexistence and interaction of the international and the local’. 115 He adds that 
hybridity is more of a ‘condition of tension and even antagonism’ and less of a fixed 
system of adaptation between liberal and illiberal elements.116 For Höglund and Orjuela 
hybridity denotes the amalgamation of actors, institutions and norms in post-war 
societies and is embodied, in the Sri Lankan case study, in the mixture of traditional and 
modern forms of governance. 117 Krause, in turn, discusses hybridity in terms of local 
disruption and fusion of external actors’ goals which results in ‘new forms of 
governance’. 118 He notes that a simplified version of the concept refers to a bargaining 
process; in a more complex, and undoubtedly useful, conceptualization hybridity he 
argues that  
 
‘hybrid peace reflects the way peacebuilding efforts construct and 
reconstruct new networks of power and governance in post-conflict 
settings, in which the border between external and internal is 
unclear and intertwined and in which top-down institution-building 
projects intersect with the micropolitics of local and bottom-up 
actors’ .119  
 
 
It is easy to concur with above the conceptualizations of hybridity as a highly complex 
set of interactions and dynamics between different statebuilding actors; particularly 
salient here is the difficulty in demarcating between ‘international’ and ‘local’ as 
international statebuilding bodies, such as the OHR in Bosnia, have become intimately 
intertwined in the local political interactions. It is also worth noting the point made by 
Strazzari and Kamphuis who argue that hybridity not only emerges with the arrival of 
international statebuilders; in most instances local actors have been connected to 
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international regulatory frameworks prior to the conflict. 120 This is true for Bosnia, 
particularly when it comes to economy; as a condition for receiving IMF loans countries 
like the former Yugoslavia were forced to deregulate and privatize which significantly 
contributed to the emergence of informal shadow economy providing alternative social 
protection for the population.121 
   
Hybridity has also been conceptualized as a ‘political order’ on the one hand and a 
modality of ‘peace’ in post-war states on the other. Boege et al discuss ‘hybrid political 
orders’ which stand for the blending of formal and informal/indigenous logics of 
authority; their findings indicate that what is often perceived by Western statebuilders as 
a fragile state is in fact better understood as hybrid political order between Weberian 
and informal forms of governance.122 In their analysis the central problematique of 
peacebuilding is then its universalizing logic that pays little attention to indigenous 
modalities of order. Mac Ginty, in turn, conceptualizes hybridity as a process in which 
different actors ‘coalesce and conflict’ to generate ‘a fusion peace’.123 Following similar 
line of analysis, Blisemann de Guevara captures these dynamics by arguing that 
societies emerging from conflicts host both statebuilding and state formation 
processes.124 The former denotes the conscious effort to build institutions and 
procedures of governance while the latter refers to the societal process of ‘conflict, 
negotiation and compromise’ between multiple groups.125 It is the dynamics between 
statebuilding and state formation that are important for understanding hybridity. 
Blisemann de Guevara suggests that statebuilding endeavors are always distorted by 
complex state formation processes: for this reason statebuilding is an unpredictable and 
contradictory venture. Although it is premised on policies with specific aims, it often 
generates unintended outcomes, as Bliesemann de Guevara suggests.126 External 
statebuilding strategies frequently alter relations of power in the local space by granting 
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resources to specific groups in post-conflict spaces. As a result, local actors may co-
operate, resist or attempt to co-opt the international statebuilding mission. She points 
out that such responses to international statebuilding should not be normatively labeled 
as ‘spoiling’ or ‘compliance’ but ought rather to be understood as ‘the result of actors’ 
navigations in social fields whose established rules are endangered or ‘liquefied’ by 
statebuilders trying to modify the rules according to their ideas’.127  As the brief 
overview implies, the analytical purchase of hybridity rests on its attention to the 
complex relations of power in post-conflict spaces and highlights how international 
statebuilding processes are negotiated by local agents.128 In investigating the different 
modalities of local agency and how local agendas and practices interact with 
international statebuilding practices and ideas, this thesis generates empirically-
grounded knowledge on the attempts to re-negotiate the scope and the shape of post-
conflict statebuilding in Bosnia. This can provide hypotheses pertaining to the processes 
of hybridization in post-conflict statebuilding processes.    
 
 
Existing Studies on Hybridity and Interactions between  
International and Local Agencies 
 
It is useful to map the terrain of the existing scholarship by exploring some of the earlier 
studies that have developed frameworks for capturing interactions between internal and 
external actors. To begin with, Barnett and Zurcher’s ‘the Peacebuilders’ Contract’ is 
concerned with strategic transactions rather than hybridity as such, but it is nonetheless 
relevant to our understanding of interactions between actors.129 The study, one of the 
first systematic attempts to interrogate the relations and interactions that mediate 
international statebuilding in local spaces, suggests that the most frequent outcome of 
the interplay between actors is compromised peacebuilding. In conceptualizing 
peacebuilding as a strategic game, Barnett and Zurcher’s model entails international 
peacebuilders, state elites and sub-state elites who make strategic calculations on how to 
preserve their respective interests; for peacebuilders these interests are liberalization and 
stabilization while the state and local level elites seek to preserve and consolidate 
                                               
127
 Ibid 
128
 Mac Ginty ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace’, 391 
129
 Barnett and Zurcher, the Peacebuilders’ Contract 
56 
 
political and economic power. The central problematique for Barnett and Zurcher is the 
fact that peacebuilding needs the cooperation of the national elites in order to be 
successful; thus the most frequent outcome of the strategic interactions is compromised 
peacebuilding whereby the process is jointly driven by the interests of local and external 
peacebuilders. With the similar objective of assessing outcomes of interactions, 
Reisinger provides an alternative reading on international statebuilding efforts in Liberia 
and Mozambique through a focus on dynamics between different actors involved. 130  
Reaching conclusions similar to those of Barnett and Zurcher, he argues that 
interactions are best conceptualized through the following categories: cooperation, 
contention, toleration and infiltration.131 The above studies have substantially added to 
our understanding of interactions between the different peacebuilding actors and how 
such games consolidate weak statehood. Yet, important caveats merit attention, 
particularly those to do with epistemology.  Whereas studies based on game theory 
allow us to account for a range of actors in addition to the international statebuilders, 
they tell us little about how the compromised peace – or indeed the process of 
compromising - might look like as it primarily aims to identify outcomes of interactions. 
The above studies also make specific, and indeed static, assumptions about the 
motivations of actors which may in reality be more diverse than suggested. Moreover, 
agency understood solely in terms of rational choice offers an overtly narrow view that 
overlooks values, identities, culture and discourses, which play an integral role in the 
statebuilding as the subsequent chapters will show. 132 The above studies then fail to 
capture local acts of contention, such as discursive de-legitimation or the use of 
alternative symbols of identity. These practices are important not only in terms of 
interrogating local responses to international statebuilding but can also potentially tell 
us a great deal about the nature of international statebuilding.  
 
Other studies seeking to formulate frameworks for capturing interactions and dynamics 
between local and international actors have taken a more processual approach. The most 
relevant to this research is Hagmann and Peclard’s investigation on how a range of 
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actors engage in statebuilding activities through negotiation in Africa. 133 They develop 
a heuristic framework for capturing the key elements in the process: actors, negotiation 
‘tables’ and objects of negotiation. The first category identifies the actors engaged in the 
statebuilding process and the resources they have at their disposal. These resources refer 
not only to the physical assets and organizational capabilities but also to what the 
authors call ‘symbolic repertoires’.134 This means the deployment of specific narratives 
and concepts that enable local actors to legitimize their authority vis-à-vis their rivals. 
The second category alludes to sites where statehood is negotiated. The authors suggest 
that this is an important feature in the process as locales of negotiation condition actors’ 
inclusion or exclusion from the process. Locales range from formal negotiation tables 
such as diplomatic meetings to informal sites such as meetings between village elders. 
In addition to negotiation tables, Hagmann and Peclard also identify more abstract 
‘negotiation arenas’, such as political structures based on single party-dominance, that 
essentially refer to social relations between groups. The final category focuses on the 
issues at stake, from the point of view of different actors involved. A frequent subject of 
negotiation between actors pertains to the provision of services such as security in the 
absence of effective state institutions. Moreover, the configuration of statehood is a 
further object of negotiation commonly observed in statebuilding processes. According 
to Hagmann and Peclard this generally means struggle between centralized and 
decentralized forms of state, but also contains debates about what counts as nation.135  
This is a powerful insight that resonates with the experience of post-conflict 
statebuilding. Hagmann and Peclard’s framework is important for the research carried 
out here as it provides the foundations for interrogating different dimensions of societal 
negotiation that occur in post-conflict spaces. While the above study is largely premised 
on the investigation of the ‘institutionalization of power relations’ in post-colonial 
African states and is focused primarily on the dynamics between domestic actors, 136 
this thesis seeks to extend similar line of analysis to statebuilding contexts where 
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external actors play the agenda-setting role. In this regard the study carried out here can 
provide hypotheses on how international statebuilding agencies counter local 
contention.  
 
Beyond the above studies, a compelling analysis of interactions between international 
and local agencies is provided by Divjak and Pugh.137 Pugh argues (in his later work) 
that liberal peace – primarily concerned with turning post-conflict spaces into modes of 
the global capitalist markets – is fundamentally unable to deal with the ‘everyday’ life 
of post-conflict societies and impose its ideals on the grassroots.138 International 
statebuilding is hence unable to overpower local traditions and customs. In tracing this 
empirical reality of statebuilding, Divjak and Pugh unpack the economic structures of 
statebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia. They contend that the institutional design of the 
country laid out in Dayton, coupled with the international neo-liberal statebuilding 
policies, have created opportunities for corruption. Clientelism, dating back to pre-
conflict era, has been institutionalized by the DPA; the highly decentralized structure of 
the state has enabled local elites to maintain control over the lives of the citizens living 
in their respective cantons/municipalities, resulting in a system reminiscent of feudal 
order.139  The effect of the international presence has been to create opportunities for 
war entrepreneurs who have often simultaneously co-opted and opposed strategies of 
liberal peace. Rather than prioritizing measures promoting transparency and rule of law, 
international officials have backed the moderate and non-nationalist political forces 
whose corruption has been covered up.  Corrupt, yet moderate, elites have been 
supported financially by the international statebuilders which has further added to the 
problem of corruption, as Divjak and Pugh argue.  In the hybrid economic system, 
shadow economies have provided Bosnians with goods and services as well as income, 
as the neo-liberal economic policies have been unable to replace the Yugoslav system 
based on welfare. The authors suggest that these informal economic practices – 
reproduced by the constitutional arrangements of the country as well as the neo-liberal 
economic policies of liberal peace – have enabled an effective local resistance vis-à-vis 
the international agents of statebuilding. Divjak and Pugh thus demonstrate how the 
economic elements of statebuilding have reproduced and maintained local resistance. In 
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many ways this thesis builds upon these findings and seeks to understand similar 
processes taking place in other – connected, yet under-researched - realms of 
statebuilding. These realms entail the political institutions created in Dayton as well as 
the discursive and symbolic dimensions of local contestation of international 
statebuilding in Bosnia.   
 
While Divjak and Pugh’s findings are telling of the hybridity arising from the (primarily 
economic) interactions between local and external statebuilding agendas, one of the 
most sophisticated attempts to unpack the political processes that translate into hybrid 
forms of peace is Mac Ginty’s  model that expounds on the encounters between ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ forms of peace.140  His framework is grounded in the 
compliance and incentivizing powers of international statebuilders as well as the 
capabilities of local actors to engage in resistance and reproduce alternative forms of 
peace.  Compliance power refers to the array of compliance mechanisms that generate 
local acquiescence; this range of instruments entails military force, sanctions and donor 
agency conditionalities. Moreover, the idea that no feasible alternative to ‘liberal peace’ 
exists grants ‘moral authority’ to the interveners and leaves the local recipients with 
little choice but to obey.141 The second feature of the model is linked to the first; direct 
forms of power are coupled with softer modalities of coercion. As the international 
statebuilding narratives assert, the potential gains from such interventions are 
considerable. Whereas the most obvious moral incentive of ‘liberal peace’ is peace itself 
and the promise to become – or to reclaim the status of - a respectable member of the 
international society, material incentives in the form of loans and grants are an 
important mechanism in getting locals to embrace liberal peace. Capitalism, too, is 
important here in terms of the potential of the free market system to generate growth 
and lift populations out of poverty.   
 
The third factor in Mac Ginty’s model of hybridization pertains to the degree to which 
local actors are able to challenge and subvert internationally-driven statebuilding. This 
is important in foregrounding the active agency of local actors. The extent to which 
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such actors can exert change or undermine the externally-led process hinges upon a 
range of variables: the degree to which local actors retain power during the post-conflict 
peacebuilding and statebuilding project, the existence of pre-war political institutions, 
the extent to which local actors can garner resources and finally, the degree to which the 
international statebuilding agencies are dependent on local actors. Mac Ginty notes that 
also the degree to which the international peacebuilding and statebuilding agencies are 
willing to impose their statebuilding strategies has implications on the room for 
maneuver that the local actors are represented with.  
 
The fourth factor in the hybridization model is the degree to which local actors are able 
to maintain alternative forms of peace in the face of the ‘hegemonic’ liberal peace that 
seeks to marginalize alternatives.142  Mac Ginty suggests that the self-identification of 
‘liberal peace’ as the only model of post-conflict political and economic reconstruction 
leaves little room for differing conceptualizations of peace and socio-political 
organization.143 Echoing the idea of ‘everyday’ in peacebuilding settings, Mac Ginty 
diverts attention to a micro-level analysis that reveals spaces left unaffected by liberal 
peace; it is in this spaces that ‘people may be able fashion alternatives to the liberal 
peace…’, whether due to distance and disconnect from the centers of liberal peace or as 
a deliberate challenge to the internationally-led project. 144 While Mac Ginty’s model is 
undoubtedly useful in making general observations on variables across cases that affect 
the relations between local and international statebuilding actors, the analysis developed 
here aims to offer more specific mechanisms for capturing local practices and 
discourses of contention. In contrast to the cross-case research design employed by Mac 
Ginty, an in-depth case study, as carried out here, benefits from the detailed and 
empirically-grounded tracing of relations between international statebuilders and local 
actors.  Using the above mechanisms allows us to provide some more specific answers 
to the ‘how’ question of local contention and understand in an empirically-grounded 
way the dynamics between internal and external actors. 
 
The above accounts represent an important addition to our understanding of interactions 
between actors, whilst reinforcing many findings of this thesis. It is useful, however, to 
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briefly recapitulate how the account provided by this study can add to the above 
analyzing. Firstly, this thesis takes local agency and local statebuilding agendas as its 
starting point rather than approaching post-conflict statebuilding dynamics from above. 
In doing so, it provides an alternative reading of internal-external interactions that is 
more attentive to local processes of statebuilding and identity-building that are products 
of both historical forces and contemporary events. Secondly, this research argues that 
rather than merely exploring material capabilities and modalities of contention, 
discourses and symbols of identity ought to be given analytical currency. Post-conflict 
statebuilding is a process of (re)constructing the institutional infrastructure of the state, 
but it is also a verbal and ideational process. The Bosnian case is indicative of 
discourses that frame the post-conflict reality in a specific way and alternative symbolic 
systems deployed by local agents to directly contest the internationally-led process.  
Whilst Hagmann and Peclard briefly address this issue, they offer little insight into the 
way in which these aspects of contention operate.  
 
This leads to another, related caveat in the existing research; while earlier studies have 
identified the range of different outcomes that often result from the interactions and 
dynamics between internal and external actors, the interactions themselves have elicited 
less attention.145 Research carried out here focuses on the practices and processes 
through which statebuilding policies are mediated by local actors. This thesis begins 
developing a set of mechanisms that allows us to trace how contention (that is, the 
attempt to re-negotiate the parameters of the statebuilding process) operates and is 
sustained. In other words, in addition to asking ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘why’,146 this 
research inquires into what contention is and ‘how’ it operates. In addition, the analysis 
makes some claims as to how international statebuilders counter local contentious 
practices. Although Mac Ginty accounts for the compliance and incentivizing powers of 
international statebuilders in a more general way, the conceptual framework deployed 
by this study enables a more specific operationalizing of these aspects. In this regard the 
processes of coercion, capital and discursive decertification are employed to capture 
how international statebuilding actors deal with local contention and how the use of 
these methods mobilizes and legitimates further practices of contention.  
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Concepts and mechanisms of Contention 
 
As suggested above, existing studies on interactions between local and international 
agencies have focused on the outcomes of interactions between internal and external 
actors, establishing the actors, negotiation ‘tables’ and issues at stake and identifying the 
factors that determine how successful local agencies are in hybridizing the process. The 
objective of this thesis is to add to such scholarship by approaching local agency and 
statebuilding dynamics through the conceptual framework of contentious politics. 
Contentious politics tells us about how actors use disruptive measures and techniques, 
vis-à-vis the authorities, to make their voices heard. As such it can provide analytical 
tools that enable us to study local agencies and their interrelations with international 
actors in a more systematic way.147 Perhaps more importantly, contentious politics 
research directs us to factors that are important in explaining how local contention 
operates and is sustained. Mechanisms of contentious politics draw our attention to how 
aspects of the political environment enable or constrain contention (‘political 
opportunity structures’), how contention is organized and information disseminated 
(‘mobilizing structures’) and how the objects of contention are represented, problems 
defined and solutions proposed in public discourses (‘framing’). The remainder of the 
chapter focuses on the above aspects in setting the conceptual framework of the thesis.  
 
Contentious politics scholars study disruptive, extra-institutional, political behavior, 
ranging from protests to revolutions. At the heart of contentious episodes are demands 
for social change put forth by a group in a given society. For McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, contentious politics begins when people make collective claims on others outside 
the agreed institutional channels of decision-making. 148 The ‘collective struggle’ 
entailing ‘episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their 
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objects’ labeled as contentious politics also involves at least one government149 as a 
claimant, object of claims or a party to the claims.150 As noted earlier, contention is 
understood here as the use of disruptive,151 episodic, public and collective political 
strategies that seek to counter aspects of international statebuilding. Contentious 
practices are an essential part of the continuous state formation process in that they 
represent the on-going negotiations between different groups in society seeking to 
protect and advance their visions of statehood.  While in the historic sense of state 
formation contentious politics has mainly entailed national actors, in the current global 
order - where weak statehood is securitized - the process of statebuilding is 
internationalized. Yet, this does not mean that mechanisms for societal negotiation (or, 
contentious politics) have been significantly altered, even if the process now has a 
distinctly international dimension. Groups of actors continue to operate within 
structures of political opportunities that are contingent on the international authorities’ 
unity and ability to deal with contentious practices, among other determinants. 
Moreover, those actors continue to frame international policies and actions considered 
detrimental in ways that resonate with their audiences and mobilize support. In the quest 
to understand the contemporary internationalized statebuilding processes, these 
mechanisms can tell us a great deal about not only political opportunities, mobilization 
and frames but also of how the narratives and practices of international statebuilding 
contain and create opportunities for contestation.  The key point here is that these 
mechanisms are not dependent upon the context of each post-conflict case but relate to 
the nature of international involvement and to aspects of verbal communication and 
organization of contention. While they cannot provide a prediction of outcomes of 
interactions, they can tell us where to look in order to understand how contention 
operates and are sustained. 
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Mechanisms of Contention 
 
The deployment of mechanisms developed by contentious politics scholars is premised 
on the objective of understanding how local agency operates and interacts with external 
statebuilding agencies. These mechanisms are political opportunity structures, 
mobilizing structures and framing, as noted earlier. Although further development and 
testing of this conceptual framework in the context of international statebuilding is 
undoubtedly necessary, the aim here is to lay the groundwork for more systematic study 
and understanding of how international statebuilding is negotiated in local spaces.   
 
Political Opportunity Structures 
 
Political opportunity structures refer to the ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people 
to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure’.152 
This context for action entails the formal structures and institutions of the government, 
authorities’ responses to contentious claim-making and the presence of potential allies 
or rivals.153 In terms of operationalizing political opportunity structures for the purposes 
of this research, it is germane to view them as international political opportunity 
structures given that Bosnia is de facto run by international officials. With reference to 
Tarrow’s154 and Eisinger’s155  work on the mechanism, international opportunity 
structures in the Bosnian case consist of the following factors: the institutional 
structures of governance,156 unity/division among the international statebuilding actors, 
allies within the international community and the strength and the nature of repression 
of local contention by the international officials. These factors are vital in understanding 
how the structures of governance and international presence in the country enable or 
dis-incentivize acts of contention.   
 
                                               
152
 Sidney Tarrow Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Cambridge: 
     Cambridge University Press, 1994, 189 
153
 McAdam et al, To Map Contentious Politics 
154
 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 85-86 
155
 Peter Eisinger ‘The Conditions of protest behaviour in American cities’. American Political Science 
    Review, 67 no.1 
156
 Refers to the degree to which claim-makers ‘are likely to be able to gain access to power and to    
manipulate the political system’ (Eisinger, 25) 
65 
 
It is useful to briefly outline how these different dimensions of international political 
opportunity structures have played out in the case study at hand. With respect to the 
governance structures of Bosnia, the political system created by international officials in 
Dayton has created opportunities for contentious actions. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the peace agreement that ended the armed conflict put in place a political 
system based on consociationalism. Each constituent group holds veto rights that enable 
the blocking of any decisions that threaten the interest of the group and a system of 
quotas ensures that constituent groups are equally represented across political bodies. 
These mechanisms designed to protect the interests of the three constituent groups have 
rendered internationally-imposed statebuilding measures subject to frequent blocking.  
The unity or division among the authorities determines, in turn, the degree to which the 
international actors can take coherent and concerted action against local contention. 
While the relations between international statebuilding actors have varied over years, 
disagreement over statebuilding policies and practices within the ‘international 
community’ has rendered it difficult for international actors to operate as a coherent 
force. This has particularly been the case with Russia that publicly critiques the OHR 
and the heavy-handed interventionism of other external statebuilding actors. Divisions 
between the international statebuilding actors have also allowed local agencies to seek 
tacit alliances with international actors advocating policies similar to their own. These 
issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
The strength and the nature of international repression of local contention refer to the 
degree to which international responses to contention deter further similar acts. In this 
regard the use of Bonn powers is particularly instructive. The Bonn powers allude to the 
extension of the OHR’s mandate to dismiss elected Bosnian officials and to impose 
legislation rejected by Bosnian politicians. Bonn powers have been frequently deployed 
to deal with local acts of contention, as illustrated in the core chapters. This has made 
participation in contentious activities potentially costly and, thus, limited opportunities 
for contention. Crucially, however, the coercive and repressive nature of such measures 
has served as a formidable mobilization and framing tool for local actors, as shown in 
Chapter 5.  It is also notable that beyond these factors shifts in both the quantity and 
quality of international statebuilding instruments have been mirrored in the statebuilding 
dynamic. These changes are the reduction of international military presence, reduction 
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in the political credibility of the international community’s main peace implementation 
agency the OHR and shift in the international attention to other crisis areas.  
 
Given that the intention of the research is to account for non-material and ideational 
aspects of contention, it is expedient to incorporate discursive dimensions of political 
environment that may help or hinder contention and pay attention to the broader 
discursive environment in which contention takes place. Discursive opportunity 
structures have less to do with directly incentivizing or dis-incentivizing contention, but 
rather pertain to the way in which hegemonic discourses enable or limit contention.157  
With regards to the Bosnian case, this discursive environment consists predominantly of 
the ‘liberal peace’ discourse that the internationally-led statebuilding draws on.  As 
Chapters 5 and 6 in particular demonstrate, this has created opportunities for local 
statebuilding actors as the international statebuilding mission has failed to live up to the 
norms it propagates, regularly demonstrated in the undemocratic and coercive 
statebuilding methods.  
 
Mobilizing Structures 
 
If the international political opportunity structures are crucial in understanding the 
complex relationship between external and internal statebuilding agendas, mobilizing 
structures and framing are equally important in terms of understanding how contentious 
practices are organized, legitimated and sustained. Mobilizing structures refer to the 
formal organizational means as well as informal social networks available to actors 
engaged in contention.158 It alludes to the process of creating structures that can 
effectively mobilize action and carry out claim-making activities, whether protests, 
boycotts or demonstrations. Mobilizing structures also disseminate information, in 
addition to stimulating coordination, communication and commitment of actors.159  In 
the case of Bosnia the party political structures as well as ethnic and religious networks 
are crucial in mobilizing support and carrying out contention. Given the political 
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opportunity structures created at the Dayton peace conference, which gave the country a 
complex power-sharing system of governance combined with the considerable political 
and economic power held by the political elites, it is hardly surprising that political 
parties (particularly SDA, HDZ BiH, SDS, SRS, SNSD160) are at the forefront of the 
contentious politics. They have efficient organizational structures which can be 
deployed to organize protests, demonstrations, press conferences as well as 
spokespersons and press offices to communicate and circulate their interpretations of 
events. Perhaps more crucially, political parties control large parts of the media.161 This 
has not only allowed them extensive access to their respective supporters but also 
enabled them to maintain the media segregation whereby each national group has its 
own media with few independent or critical alternatives. This is particularly the case in 
the rural areas where nationalist-controlled TV provides the main source of information 
to people. 
 
Alongside the party political structures, interest groups, advocacy organizations and 
religious bodies have played a role in the disseminating information and organizing 
protests and rallies. Member of the Catholic clergy have, for instance, taken an active 
role in propagating the narrative that highlights victimization of Bosnian Croats by the 
external statebuilding actors and demanding more adequate recognition of Croat rights. 
Interest groups, particularly those representing former soldiers or victims of war crimes, 
have also played a part in mobilizing contention through protests, events and 
declarations. At the same time, cross-border mobilizing structures are important when it 
comes to understanding particularly the early forms of contesting international 
statebuilding. Both Zagreb and Belgrade were known to support the secessionist 
ambitions of their ethnic kin in Bosnia. This generally translated into financial and 
political support. When both Tuđman and Milošević no longer occupied their respective 
offices in the early 2000s, support for Bosnian Croat and Serb cause has been 
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considerably reduced. This has weakened in particular the Bosnian Croat project of 
creating a third entity in the country.162 
 
Framing 
 
In order to broaden the explanatory scope, the analysis also draws on the mechanism of 
framing. The act of framing, as understood here, denotes the  
 
‘selecting of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them 
more salient...in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described’.163  
 
Benford and Snow define framing similarly as  
 
‘an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world 
out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, 
situations, events, experiences and sequences of action’. 164 
 
 
Actors engaged in contention are thus viewed as ‘signifying agents’ actively involved in 
production of meaning for their supporters, the objects of contention and bystanders.165 
Framing entails then the creation of interpretations and constructions of reality that 
differ from the existing frames and often challenge them. The process of framing draws 
on the existing ideas, beliefs, practices, values, myths and narratives specific to the 
given context of contentious politics. Culturally resonant frames have credibility in the 
sense that the actions and rhetoric coincide and are further reinforced by events in the 
real world.166 Collective action frames, shared understandings of the situation and 
proposed solutions, have diagnostic and prognostic elements.167 Diagnostic frames 
identify problems and attribute blame or responsibility. The most common diagnostic 
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frame is the injustice frame which is also frequently used by local actors in the case of 
Bosnia; it entails the identification of victims of a given situation and intensifying their 
victimization. Prognostic framing, on the hand, entails the assertion of a solution to the 
injustice at hand. Collective action frames are generated through the processes of frame 
articulation and frame amplification.168 Frame articulation involves connecting events 
and experiences and fashioning them into a coherent package, while amplification 
denotes emphasizing certain issues, events or beliefs as being more important than 
others. Frame creation within groups is itself often contested; as Benford and Snow put 
it ‘all actors...who engage in this reality construction work are embroiled in the politics 
of signification’.169 In other words, actors cannot simply impose their interpretations of 
events and situations on the populations. Actors seeking to frame specific issues are 
faced with various challenges not only from different factions within their own group, 
but also from the objects of contention. Counter-framings seek to debunk, undermine or 
decertify the claims or actors behind them. These frame contests are a common place in 
Bosnia where international officials are particularly inclined to use decertification 
strategies,170 aimed at invalidating local critical frames by labeling the claim-makers as 
‘irresponsible’, and ‘backward’. Moreover, frame contests within local groups are a 
regular feature of the local statebuilding agendas, generally entailing internal power 
struggles between ‘moderates’ and ‘hardliners’. What the thesis finds with respect to the 
Bosnian case is that the local re-framing of ‘liberal peace’ concepts and norms has been 
a frequent practice; this has meant delegitimizing international statebuilding by 
highlighting the contradictions between international statebuilding rhetoric and practice.    
 
The above mechanisms of political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and 
framing are intimately interlinked and intersecting. As noted earlier in relation to 
political opportunity structures and framing, the extent to which political opportunity 
structures limit or facilitate contention depends at least in part on how actors frame their 
environment. While framing processes also encourage mobilization by interpreting the 
current system as illegitimate, the lack of any mobilizing structures, whether formal or 
informal, would in all probability limit the number of people to which the critical 
frames would be disseminated to. It is also worth pointing out that some mechanisms 
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are more pertinent than others when it comes to interrogating different contentious 
practices; whilst political opportunities and mobilizing structures are helpful in 
interpreting institutional repertoires of contention, framing is best suited to tracing the 
discursive and symbolic repertoires. 
 
Coercion, Capital and Decertification: International  
Responses to Local Contention 
 
Given that the aim of the analysis is to engage in an analysis of interactions, it is 
necessary to make some claims as to how the international agents statebuilding might 
counter contestation. The thesis suggests that international statebuilders generally 
respond with practical or discursive means.  The toolkit of practical measures entails 
coercion and capital.  Coercion, in the form of using NATO troops or more commonly, 
threatening with prosecution has featured often in the international responses to local 
contention. This was particularly true in the early years of the international intervention 
when approximately 60,000 international troops were stationed in Bosnia. The 
substantial international military presence provided unfavourable opportunity structures 
for contentious claim-making, particularly with violent means. In so far as engagement 
in violent contentious practices was out of question, the utilisation of institutional means 
of challenging the international intervention flourished in the first few years after the 
war. To counteract institutional repertoires of contention, the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC) in charge of monitoring the peace process granted the OHR in 1997 the 
authority to dismiss local officials and impose legislation. The so-called Bonn powers 
have in effect functioned as a form of political coercion; in numerous instances actors 
engaged in contentious practices have been sacked and legislation opposed by locals has 
been imposed. According to Szewczyk, the Bonn powers have been used nearly 900 
times for legislative and disciplinary purposes from 1997 to 2010. 171 Statebuilding 
measures enabled by the Bonn powers have been crucial in consolidating the central 
state structures by creating a host of new state bodies, while making it more costly to 
local actors to challenge or undermine international statebuilding. Yet, at the same time, 
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the widespread use of coercion has provided local actors narratives through which to 
critique and portray international statebuilding as a form of external domination.  
 
Capital as a means to deal with contentious local actors has also been frequently utilized 
to counter local contention; in practice it has meant ‘paying off performances of’ the 
‘opponents’.172 In Bosnia this has translated into using loan and aid conditionality. The 
US administration, for instance, refused to donate post-conflict reconstruction funds to 
the RS due to Bosnian Serb refusals to hand Karadžić over to the Hague, while 
international officials have on several occasions threatened the suspension of aid to 
Bosnia if local actors do not support and implement international statebuilding 
reforms.173 When Bosniaks refused to use the new state insignia chosen by the High 
Representative in 1998, the US administration cut off funds through which the Bosniak-
dominated Bosnian Army was equipped and trained.174 Local compliance, on the other 
hand, has been rewarded with aid packages. This was, for instance, the case when 
Milorad Dodik came to power in the RS and pledged to co-operate with international 
actors.175 The international administrators have also employed the mechanism of 
decertification; that is, invalidation of actors, their performances and their claims.176 
Decertification of local actors in response to acts of contestation has generally featured 
narratives framing the local actors as ‘irresponsible’ and their actions amounting to 
‘betrayal of the electorates’ trust’.177 Decertification has entailed the creation of 
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discursive binaries between self-interested elites and suffering non-elites. In this way 
international actors have sought to delegitimize local actors engaged in contention. It is 
through the above framework – the mechanisms of contestation and the international 
attempts to counter these practices - that the statebuilding dynamic in Bosnia is 
analyzed. As with analytical frameworks in general, it does not claim to represent a 
rigid model of reality but rather an attempt to simplify complexity so that it can be 
studied in a meaningful manner. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In moving away from a conceptualization of post-conflict statebuilding as a hierarchical 
project, this research builds upon the emerging notion of statebuilding as a contested 
process. Liberal peace is more accurately understood as a Weberian ideal type rather 
than a useful framework for understanding the actual practices on the ground. 
Statebuilding processes in post-conflict states do not start with the arrival of 
international agencies but rather take place in the context of local statebuilding and 
nationbuilding projects.  With the aim of contributing to our understanding of local 
agency and the dynamics between internal and external actors, this study appropriates 
concepts from the contentious politics scholarship. These concepts allow us to better 
understand how local agency operates and interacts with the external actors.  The notion 
of contention directs our attention to the direct and explicit forms of agency that exist in 
parallel to the hidden, everyday practices. Through the deployment of political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing a more nuanced picture of 
local agency can be constructed. These practices do not go unnoticed by the 
international statebuilders who use coercion, capital and discursive decertification to 
counter local contention. Yet, in many instances the use of coercion in particular 
enables local actors to mobilize for further contention on the grounds of repressive 
international presence. Prior to engaging in a more detailed analysis of such aspects of 
contention, the following Chapter takes stock of the international presence in Bosnia. 
This is necessary not only to contextualize the study but more importantly to highlight 
the existence of multiple, and at times competing, statebuilding projects among the 
international statebuilding enterprise. The Chapter to come reveals an array of different 
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international understandings of the Bosnian war and its aftermath, as well as the new 
state and the role of the international actors in building it.    
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Chapter 3 
Thinking the International in Post-Conflict 
Bosnia: External Statebuilding Methods, 
Agendas and Ideas. 
 
    ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia provided a litmus test for the new, post-Cold War, order. 
It was a test that the chief actors involved failed: it revealed a weak and divided Europe 
and hesitant United States. 178 The war in Bosnia also cast serious doubt on the 
credibility of the UN as a result of the failure of its peacekeeping mission to protect 
civilians in safe havens, most notably in Srebrenica. Following the DPA, international 
actors took the leading role in the high-profile post-conflict reconstruction process: 17 
donor governments, 27 international organizations, 18 UN agencies, approximately 200 
non-governmental organizations 179 and 60,000 NATO troops were to help Bosnia to get 
back on its feet. In financial terms the international donor funds to Bosnia far 
outstripped the US assistance to Europe after the end of the Second World War.180 
Following the immediate post-war years, the international presence both in military and 
humanitarian terms has been reduced. Yet, almost two decades after the end of the 
armed hostilities, external governments - primarily those of the EU states, the United 
States and Russia – continue their engagement in Bosnia. The primary tasks of 
providing of security and humanitarian assistance in the early years of the post-conflict 
mission have now been replaced by efforts to strengthen the Bosnian state in order to 
meet the conditions of the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  
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The aim of this Chapter is to focus on the ‘international’ in Bosnia and outline the 
practices and ideas it entails. This is expedient not only as a context for the study but 
also in moving away from reductionist analyzing of international statebuilding as a 
single, coherent force. The predominant theme in the international statebuilding 
enterprise in Bosnia is the absence of a commonly agreed international statebuilding 
policy. Although international actors share the overall objective of stabilizing Bosnia, 
little agreement on how it can – and should – be achieved exists. By appropriating 
Richmond’s notion of graduations of liberal peace,181 the Chapter highlights the 
demarcations between conservative and orthodox statebuilding methodologies. It also 
touches upon the different perceptions and representations of the conflict and its victims 
and perpetrators held by external actors that inform post-conflict policies. The 
multiplicity of international statebuilding policies and methods opens opportunities for 
local agencies to align themselves with international actors pursuing similar policies. 
The discussion is organized along the following lines. The first half of the Chapter 
provides a brief overview of the international engagement in post-Dayton Bosnia more 
generally, before outlining the interventions of the United States (the US), European 
governments and Russia. The second half of the Chapter discusses the fault lines 
between international statebuilding actors and practices; it does so by touching upon the 
diverging notions pertaining to the role of international actors in the statebuilding 
process and on the different accounts of the Bosnian War. 
 
International Community?  
 
Pertinent to our discussion of the multiplicity of statebuilding practices among the 
international actors is the notion of international community, an umbrella term for 
external actors that undertake post-conflict reconstruction activities.  Various definitions 
of ‘international community’ range, by and large, from conceptualisations of the 
international community as a shared vision for better world for all to a Western-
dominated group of the wealthiest states.182 While this reflects some of the debates 
discussed in the Introductory Chapter, what is crucial for the purposes of the present 
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discussion is the terminology depicting international actors as a community. The key 
contention of this Chapter is that while international actors involved in post-Dayton 
Bosnia share the objective of stabilizing the country, their engagement in Bosnia is 
premised on different judgements about the conflict, the warring parties and on the 
desired policies and methods of statebuilding in the aftermath of the war. Rather than 
thinking of international actors as a community in the Bosnian case, they are better 
understood as nexus of states engaged in the post-conflict process. This point is 
important in terms of thinking the dynamics between internal and external agencies. 
Tensions between different international statebuilding policies and strategies make it 
difficult for international actors to act as a unitary force and facilitates tacit alliances 
between local and international actors. The presence of various international 
statebuilding agendas and methods is also relevant to our understanding of the condition 
of hybridity that marks post-conflict states: international statebuilding is hybridized 
from within in that no single and coherent ‘liberal peace’ project exist. 183  
 
This study focuses primarily on states, governments and inter-governmental bodies. 
Even though non-state actors are important in implementing some of the statebuilding 
policies on the ground, the international signatories of the DPA – the United States, 
Russia and the EU – are central in determining the strategies of statebuilding in Bosnia. 
This is done through the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC was formed in 
1995 to provide financial and material assistance to the reconstruction project and to 
implement the DPA, while also supervising the OHR. Although the PIC consists of 55 
countries, in practice the agenda-setting and decision-making is carried out in the PIC 
Steering Board. Tasked to provide the OHR political guidance, it consists of Canada, 
Italy, France, Germany, Japan, United States, Russia, Turkey and representatives of the 
EU. It is largely the European governments, the US and Russia that have taken the 
leading role in the process. 
 
From the Push of Dayton to the Pull of Brussels  
 
The track record of almost two decades of statebuilding in Bosnia has been mixed: 
much has been achieved in terms of building the institutional infrastructure and ending 
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large scale violence, but less in building sustainable peace and reconciliation. The 
international involvement following the Dayton peace conference began as a short-term 
reconstruction mission; the goal was to build self-sustaining peace within the first year 
or so and exit following the first democratic elections.184 NATO was tasked to monitor 
the implementation of the military aspects of the DPA; this meant monitoring the 
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign military forces, in addition to de-
mobilizing and de-arming the warring factions. The civilian aspects, coordinated by the 
OHR and carried out by international organizations (most notably the UN, the OSCE 
and the IMF), focused on refugee returns, freedom of movement in the country, 
organising elections, establishing the fate of missing persons, amongst a wide range of 
tasks.  
 
It became quickly apparent that the initial timeframes were overly optimistic and 
international presence was to be extended in order to prevent recourse to violence. The 
electoral victory of nationalist parties in the first post-war elections in 1996 added 
urgency to the demands for prolonged international presence.185 International efforts in 
the immediate aftermath of the war focused on urgent physical reconstruction tasks and 
confidence-building measures. It was the Bonn powers awarded to the OHR in 1997 
that enabled a fully-fledged statebuilding mission to commence. The controversial Bonn 
powers gave the High Representative the right to dismiss elected officials deemed to 
obstruct the implementation of the DPA as well as impose legislation.186 Internationally-
led statebuilding began with the endeavour to construct Bosnian ‘state identity’: 
common currency, passport, flag, anthem as well as other emblems of statehood were 
decreed by the OHR following the failure of local actors to agree upon them. From then 
on, the heavy-handed interventionism of the two consecutive High Representatives, 
Petritsch (1999-2002) and Ashdown (2002-2006), was crucial in building the state 
capacity. Petritsch and Ashdown imposed a series of decisions that created additional 
state-level institutions, ranging from the joint defence and intelligence structures to the 
state-wide value-added tax. The rationale was not merely to build a state, but to build an 
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EU memberstate.187 Becoming European was framed as the only way to become 
peaceful, prosperous and modern state. This represented a gradual shift towards EU-
driven statebuilding: the pull of Brussels was envisaged to replace the push of 
Dayton.188 
 
A watershed moment in the international involvement came during the period of 2005-
2006 which marked the end of the statebuilding impetus from without. Not only was the 
growing international Bosnia-fatigue evident, but the OHR lost both of its international 
and local credibility in the police reform debacle. The OHR sought to unify Bosnia’s 
separate police forces under centralized command. It represented the reform as a 
precondition for the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and, in 
effect, for Bosnia’s EU membership. This was despite the fact no agreed EU framework 
for policing exists; different policing models across the current EU member states are 
the norm.189 Thus, the OHR framed the police reform as a technical requirement, while 
in reality it was an attempt to curtail the competencies of the entities, particularly aimed 
at the RS.190 The RS called the OHR’s bluff by categorically rejecting the idea of 
unified police. The OHR was eventually forced to negotiate a watered-down agreement 
on police reform. Prior to the police reform process, the use of Bonn powers had relied 
on the political credibility of the OHR and on the local co-operation. It became apparent 
following the police reform that the OHR had run out of its political capital.191 This 
gave local agents seeking to contest the internationally-led statebuilding ample 
opportunities: as the use of Bonn powers became contentious even among the 
international statebuilders (as discussed elsewhere in this Chapter), consequences of 
local contentious activities became less certain. Schwartz-Schilling, who followed 
Ashdown as High Representative, took a non-interventionist approach by declaring his 
intention of not resorting to the Bonn powers. His policy was essentially to bring about 
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the closure of the OHR. His tenure, however, was short-lived as the US disapproved his 
non-interventionist approach.192 The subsequent High Representatives, Miroslav Lajcak 
and Valentin Inzko, reverted back to a more interventionist policy that has entailed the 
use of Bonn powers. 
 
Beyond the diminished political capital of the OHR, the post-2006 international 
engagement in Bosnia has centred on various internationally-led attempts to reform the 
country’s Constitution which has become to be regarded as the key obstacle in the Euro-
Atlantic integration. This has been largely driven by the idea that the only way to foster 
progress and non-nationalist forces is to alter the country’s governance in a way that 
does not incentivize ethnicization of the political life. Moreover, a stronger central state 
is seen as conducive for more efficient decision-making and functioning of the 
country.193 The first attempt to revise the Constitution was the 2006 April Package 
(named after the month it was voted on in the Parliament). It aimed to reform the 
election of the Presidency and reduce its powers, create two new ministries (agriculture 
and technology), add new competencies to the central state, increase the number of MPs 
in the Parliament and consolidate the Council of Ministers. The process was largely 
driven by Washington, with an unclear EU stance. The Package did not pass the vote in 
the House of Representatives. Many Bosniaks were particularly dissatisfied with the 
scope of the reforms which were seen as being more cosmetic than anything else and 
voted against the Package. In 2008, a locally-driven initiative, the so-called Prud 
process, sought to find a compromise on the Constitutional reforms and resolve a 
number of outstanding reforms relating to state property and fiscal matters among other 
stipulations set by the OHR. Although some success was achieved in that constitutional 
amendment on the status of the Brčko district and state budget were signed, no 
agreement on fully-fledged Constitutional reform was found. A year later the US and 
the EU took the lead in an attempt to reinvigorate the reform process.  Named after the 
military base where the negotiations took place, the Butmir talks were based on 
stipulations of the April Package. According to Bassuener and Weber the talks were 
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underpinned by different imperatives of the US and Europeans; while the US sought to 
get Europe’s backing on Constitutional reform, Europeans were primarily interested in 
brokering a deal that would fulfil conditions necessary for the closure of the OHR. 194 
‘While projecting a common front’, Bassuener and Weber observe, ‘each sought to bind 
the other into backing its agenda’. 195 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the talks finished without 
agreement on Constitutional reforms. Some Bosnia observers have called for renewed 
international engagement in Bosnia; the lack of consensus and reform of the 
Constitution is seen to jeopardize the EU accession process and the political climate is 
poisoned by the continuing inter-ethnic tensions.196 
 
 
Key International Statebuilding Actors   
 
The United States 
 
The US interventions in Bosnia during and after the war have been the result of 
perceived European inability to find effective solutions to Bosnia’s troubles. Following 
the failed European attempts to halt the violent unravelling of Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s, the US stepped in and took the leading role in negotiating the peace treaty. From 
the beginning of the post-conflict process until the early 2000 the US took part in the 
post-conflict process. Its policy on Bosnia was largely predicated on military 
considerations and aid conditionality. As the 9/11 attacks turned the US attention 
elsewhere, the EU shouldered a greater role in the Bosnian statebuilding process. It 
integrated the EU Special Representative (EUSR) with the OHR and replaced the 
NATO troops with EUFOR forces. The central incentive underwriting EU statebuilding 
in Bosnia was that of EU accession. However, the prospect of EU membership as the 
engine of statebuilding has proven less attractive than envisaged by Brussels and the 
process has largely stalled. 197  This, in turn, has meant renewed US engagement in 
Bosnia in the late 2000s. In practice, the American approach to statebuilding in Bosnia 
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has been guided by interventionism and hard-hitting diplomatic pressure. The US vision 
of Bosnian statehood has largely coincided with the Bosniak statebuilding agenda, even 
if more tacitly than in the case of Moscow’s patronage of the RS. 198 This has meant 
advocating the strengthening of the central state structures.199 While this Chapter 
highlights how perceptions of the conflict and victimhood are important to 
understanding some of the post-conflict policies, it is also crucial to think how policies 
of external actors in post-conflict states may relate to the wider global issues. Some 
have suggested that the US support for Bosniaks is at least partly connected to the 
wider, global war on terror.200 Not only does it allow the US to retain friendly relations 
– and influence - with a country that had, and according to some reports still has, a 
sizeable number of Mujaheddin fighters in its territory. Moreover, Bosnia represents an 
opportunity for the US to support a Muslim cause which may allow it to undo some of 
the damage done to its image in the Arab countries by the US foreign policy in the 
Middle East and beyond.   
 
European States  
 
Kissinger famously asked who to call if one wanted to talk to Europe; decades later his 
point remains valid with regards to the EU’s foreign policy.  While the EU has been 
heavily involved in Bosnia for more than two decades, it is difficult to discern a unified 
EU policy on the country. Not only does the EU lack a unified diplomatic representation 
in Sarajevo (where many individual member states have their own ambassadors, who 
make their own statements and at times, policies), Bosnia is no longer the priority in 
Brussels and consequently, majority of the EU member states have shown little interest 
in the country.201 As Allin and Jones note in relation to the EU’s role in the recent 
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intervention in Libya, it is more meaningful to discuss of Europe rather than the EU as a 
set of actors in peace operations. 202  While the stabilization of Bosnia and political and 
economic liberalisation are publicly endorsed by all European countries, there are 
differences in policy when it comes to the methods of post-conflict intervention. On the 
interventionist end of the policy spectrum, the UK and the Netherlands have aligned 
themselves with Washington in calling for a hands-on approach in forcing the 
statebuilding process ahead, namely the use of the disputed Bonn powers. 203 
Particularly the Conservative government that came into power in the UK in 2010 has 
taken a strong stance against local obstructionism to the DPA.204 At the other end of the 
continuum, France, Germany, the Nordic countries, Spain and Italy reject 
interventionism and demand the immediate closure of the OHR.205  This has translated 
into calls for hands-off, light-touch approach to Bosnia. The notion of Brussels-led 
imposition of reforms required for the EU accession process sits uneasily with the 
voluntary nature of the EU membership. It is largely the latter approach that has gained 
ground in the European attempts to formulate common positions on Bosnia.  
 
Russia  
 
Even though the key international agents in Bosnia comprise of Western governments, 
omitting Russia from the analysis would mean overlooking how wider international 
dynamics are often intertwined in the politics of statebuilding. Although Russia is one 
of the signatories to the DPA, some see it as the ‘spoiler’ within.206 The mainstay of 
Russia’s post-Dayton Bosnia policy has been to act as a counter-weight to the Western-
led statebuilding efforts. This has been manifested in public expressions of 
dissatisfaction over the role of NATO and the OHR in Bosnia. When the conflict in the 
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former Yugoslavia began in earnest, Russia was in the processes of reinventing itself as 
a credible successor to the USSR in the global arena.207 Moscow’s Bosnia policy during 
the war was largely in sync with the Western countries: Russia, for instance, voted for 
sanctions on Belgrade at the UN Security Council and dispatched peacekeepers to 
Bosnia. However, support for the Western policy on Bosnia was short-lived. Opposition 
at home accused Yeltsin of conducting unbalanced Balkans policy and by doing so, 
betraying Russia’s traditional ally, Serbia.208 Opposition parties in Kremlin highlighted 
the similarities between the Russians and the Serbs who were not only fellow Slavs, but 
were both dealing with secessionist ambitions following the collapse of their respective 
multinational states.209  
 
The shift in Russia’s policy was hastened by the mounting anger over the treatment of 
Russia by the Western countries involved in Bosnia. Particularly offending in this 
regard was the fact that the NATO carried out operations against Serb targets without 
prior notification of Moscow.210 Russia has protested against the NATO-led arrests of 
war crime indictees which are seen as ‘thoughtless actions that undermine stability in 
Bosnia’ as the arrests are a ‘clear violation of legal norms and the powers of 
peacekeepers’.211 According to Moscow, such actions decrease the trust that the 
Bosnian population has in the international military presence.212  Beyond Bosnia, the 
process of NATO enlargement has threatened Russia’s sphere of influence and identity 
as a major player in international politics.213 Moreover, complicating the relations 
between the Western statebuilding agents and Russia further are Russia’s own conflicts 
with the former Soviet republics. The EU involvement in these hotspots, such as 
Georgia, has considerably strained relations.214 It is clear that Bosnia has become one of 
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the arenas where wider disagreements between the West and Russia have been acted 
out.  
 
 
Fault Lines within the International Statebuilding Mission: the Role of 
International Actors 
 
These different policies and practices of statebuilding that the ‘international’ entails 
echo what Richmond calls graduations of peace. 215 He identifies three main versions of 
post-conflict operations: the conservative, orthodox and emancipatory versions of 
international engagement. The conservative graduation denotes top to bottom strategies 
on coercive power, conditionality and ‘dependency creation’.216 Peace is regarded a 
byproduct of diplomacy and use of force. The orthodox graduation, in turn, stands for 
peacebuilding predicated on a mix of top-down and bottom up strategies.  It relies on 
negotiation and demonstrates a greater consideration for local ownership while still 
using conditionality. Finally, the emancipatory approach prioritizes grassroots strategies 
of peace and social justice and welfare, thus coinciding with Galtung’s positive peace. 
217
  Whilst it is difficult to make a case for Bosnia (or any statebuilding mission for that 
matter, as Richmond points out) as an exemplar of emancipatory practice, the 
conservative and orthodox graduations hold explanatory power. In relation to Bosnia, 
Richmond suggests that the approach taken by the international actors has shifted from 
the early hyper-conservative practice towards conservative graduation.218 Yet, the above 
continuum of statebuilding practices does not only capture the shift in the overall 
international engagement in Bosnia, but it also represents the fault lines within. 
Statebuilding actors such as the US and Turkey have often operated closer to the 
conservative end of the spectrum, whereas many (if not all) European governments have 
taken a more orthodox position on the statebuilding project in Bosnia. It is noteworthy 
that these categories are better understood as a continuum rather than static policies, as 
implied above. Washington has, for instance, shifted over time from conservative 
understanding of peace towards a more orthodox position. Europeans too have 
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vacillated along the analytical spectrum and often no unified European policy has 
existed.  
 
In reflecting the conservative and orthodox graduations of international intervention, 
some governments have advocated heavy-handed interventionism while others have 
called for light-touch approach. This was particularly pronounced in the early post-
peace treaty years. Whereas the Americans saw the international engagement in post-
war Bosnia mainly as military engagement, Europeans sought to prioritise political and 
economic reforms.219  These differences were clearly manifested in the U.S–initiated 
‘Train and Equip’ program. Born out of the notion of building peace through strength, 
the U.S provided military training and supplied equipment to the Bosniak-dominated 
Bosnian army.  This created considerable tensions between Europeans and Washington. 
Washington perceived the program as deterrence strategy integral to its plan to exit 
Bosnia as soon as possible. It was also crucial for incentivizing the Bosniaks to deport 
the foreign Mujaheddin fighters who had arrived in the country to fight the Serbs.220 
Member of the European negotiating team at Dayton and the first High Representative 
Carl Bildt noted that Train and Equip was ‘a strange concept when it comes to uniting a 
nation’.221 The opposition of the Europeans to the program did not remain merely at the 
rhetorical level; Europeans, reportedly refused to give permission for the Bosniak army 
to train on NATO training grounds, while the Belgian government refused to sell 
material for NATO-style helmets that were to be made for the Bosnian army.222  As 
Bildt notes, ‘there was a deep gulf between European and US perceptions on what 
peace implementation really meant’. 223 
 
Beyond the disagreement over ‘Train and Equip’, tensions soon emerged between 
American/NATO-led military-dimension of the reconstruction mission and the 
European/OHR-led process of implementing the civilian aspects of the peace treaty. In 
the early post-war years the military strand of the mission was successful in carrying out 
the tasks it was assigned to. At the same time, the civilian implementation, led by the 
OHR, achieved little due to lack resources. This led to publicly voiced critique by 
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NATO officials of the OHR. A NATO commander, for instance, lamented in 1997 that 
the OHR had failed to create real peace, despite the fact that ‘we gave’ them ‘the time 
and space to carry out the Dayton agreement...nothing has been accomplished’.224 Such 
comments were bitterly resented by the European civilian reconstruction team whose 
efforts were seen to be undermined by US officials. According to Bildt, the US took 
over fully equipped UN facilities while barring the Europeans from such convenience: 
the OHR was forced to beg for properties and telephone connections when setting up its 
offices.225 The work of the OHR was also undermined by substantial gap in funding. 
Although these tensions gradually gave away to increased cooperation between the 
military and civilian reconstruction efforts, they are nevertheless telling of the 
continuing disagreements on whether Bosnia could be solved by force, pressure and 
intervention or by mediation and ‘soft-touch’ policy.226 
     
If the beginning of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in Bosnia were 
underpinned by the tensions between the conservative and orthodox conceptualisations 
of post-conflict engagement, such differences have resurfaced in relation to specific 
statebuilding reforms. In this regard it is useful to return to the aforementioned 
Constitutional reform as it provides a compelling example of different statebuilding 
strategies adopted by Americans and Europeans. Bosnia’s constitution is based on the 
DPA: it divided the country into two, self-governing entities, with joint institutions 
possessing limited powers at the state level. While the Serb-run entity, the RS is 
relatively centralised, the Muslim-Croat-dominated Federation is composed of ten 
cantons with complex power-sharing provisions ensuring the representation of the 
minority Croats. Similar rules apply to the joint, state level institutions occupied by the 
three constituent groups. The absolute sanctity of the DPA underwrote the international 
policies until the end of 1990s; the consociational guarantees of equal representation 
were seen to provide the framework that held the fragile peace together. Peace, indeed, 
was feeble at the time; not only were the Croats and Bosniaks unable to agree upon 
many issues the Federation, the RS regarded the DPA with deep hostility. It was due to 
the significant international military presence that large scale acts of collective violence 
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were avoided. However, following a power struggle in the RS, where the Western-
backed Biljana Plavsić defeated Radovan Karadžić as the prime minister of the RS, the 
Bosnian Serb perceptions of the DPA began to change. As a result, Bosnian Serbs 
became the primary supporters of the DPA: it had, after all, given them an entity of their 
own.227  
 
While still in the late 1990s most international statebuilders’ statements and policy 
documents repeated the mantra of implementing rather than changing the DPA, from 
early 2000s the notion that the DPA can be amended through local negotiation has 
gained ground. Arguing that ‘Dayton is the floor, not the ceiling’, many international 
actors involved in Bosnia began to regard the Constitution as a problem that needed 
fixing.228 This is reflected in the often-repeated caveat that the DPA is a successful 
peace agreement as it brought an end to large scale violence, but is unworkable as 
Constitution.229  Holbrooke, one of the key architects of the DPA, noted in 2003 that 
Dayton should be taken as a framework; ‘it is not a perfect document and there are 
many ways it can be improved. I fully support this and I believe that we should go 
on’.
230
  Not only is the DPA seen as a structure that enables the blocking of decision-
making but the decentralisation of governance has meant that there is no single 
interlocutor at the state level that could deal with the EU.231 The Dayton Constitution is 
thus seen as a major stumbling block in Bosnia’s route to Brussels. However, the idea of 
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amending the Constitution has resulted in considerable disagreement and conflicting 
messages from the international actors. Although there is a general consensus among 
the international statebuilders that any amendments to the DPA should not be imposed 
externally, considerable pressure has been exerted on local political actors to negotiate 
the reform. This has been the modus operandi of US officials in particular. While 
Washington is by no means the only government using pressure and imposition as 
statebuilding strategy, it has taken an interventionist approach in an attempt to force 
through a reform. In the case of the 2006 Constitutional Reform negotiations, for 
instance, American officials tended to impose solutions and set the agendas rather than 
relying on negotiation.232 The EU position in the talks was unclear; while it gave some 
support to US-led initiative, the Europeans expressed concern over the heavy-handed 
US approach.233 Despite considerable arm-twisting the 2006 constitutional reform 
package failed; other similar processes have followed with equal results. Brussels has 
since announced that constitutional reform may be necessary but not a precondition for 
Bosnia’s EU membership.234  
 
The Euro-American differences over the question of revising Dayton reflect the wider 
trans-Atlantic dynamics evident in the reconstruction of Bosnia: namely, that of 
differences over methodology (interventionism vs light touch) rather than the overall 
agenda itself. The European approach is premised on the EU accession process as the 
driver of statebuilding in Bosnia which is a voluntary, rather than imposed, process and 
follows the template of transitions carried out in the Eastern Europe.235 In Washington 
such an approach is seen as profoundly unproductive. This was illustrated in 2009 when 
following a joint visit to Bosnia the US Vice President Joe Biden and the EU’s foreign 
policy chief Javier Solana gave contradictory estimates of the political situation in the 
country. Whereas Solana saw the country moving to the right direction in that less direct 
international intervention was needed, Biden told Bosnian MPs that the current situation 
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in the country was dire as little progress had been achieved.236  Not only have such 
differences in outlook and policy made it coordinating international efforts difficult but 
it has also provided opportunities for local agents of statebuilding to draw on one of the 
various international approaches in order to justify their own statebuilding agendas.237 
They have also added to local perception of international policy as incoherent and 
contradictory.238    
 
 
The role of the OHR 
 
Another divisive issue has been the role of the OHR. What began as a body with little 
American support, evolved via the 1997 Bonn meeting into an organisation with 
considerable authority as it could force through statebuilding measures. 239 During the 
peace negotiations European negotiators demanded the establishment of a civilian peace 
implementation body; while the US diplomats rejected outright calls for the UN 
leadership,240 they agreed to a body that would coordinate the civilian post-conflict 
efforts.241 Annex 10 of the peace agreement stipulated that the High Representative was 
to ‘facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the 
activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace 
settlement’.242 Crucially, it also gave the High Representative ‘the final authority to 
interpret’ the civilian aspects of the agreement.243 As noted earlier, the mandate of the 
OHR was extended in 1997 by granting it executive powers. However, as the use of 
Bonn powers became increasingly contested among the key international actors 
following the police reform, the PIC set a deadline for closing the OHR in July 2007. 244  
Yet, meeting in June 2007, the PIC Steering Board expressed ‘grave concern’ over the 
‘deteriorating political atmosphere’ resulting from inflammatory exchanges between 
Serb and Bosniak politicians and lack of progress in carrying out statebuilding 
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reforms.245 It decided to postpone the closure of the OHR until 2009. A year later, the 
PIC abandoned the 2009 deadline altogether and set a number of conditions that the 
needed to be fulfilled for the OHR to close. 246 This was due to continued local attempts 
‘to progressively weaken the institutions and the legitimacy of the state’. 247  
 
The role of the OHR has become a bone of contention among the international actors. 
Russia has emerged as the harshest critic of the organization. Moscow has regularly 
voiced concerns over the interventionism of the OHR and sided publicly with the RS in 
times of confrontation between Banja Luka and the OHR. For example, during the 
police reform process the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia publicly supported the RS by 
releasing a statement that highlighted the Serb concerns over the police reform and 
declared that the High Representative had no powers to impose changes to the policing 
structure.248 Russia also refused to sign a joint PIC communiqué on the issue. During 
the police reform process anti-international community protesters in Banja Luka 
brandished pictures of Putin as the defender of Serb rights.249 More recently, Russia has 
called for the closure of the OHR. In 2007 when the OHR’s mandate was extended, 
Russia argued that the activities regarded as nationalism represent legitimate protection 
of Serb interests. The Russian Ambassador to Bosnia noted that the situation in the 
country has become stable enough for the OHR to terminate its presence. Clear 
evidence of this, according to Russians, was the establishment of new governmental 
bodies at the state level.250 Couched in the language of orthodox peace, Russia has 
frequently argued that local stakeholders should ‘take the country’s destiny into their 
own hands’.251 The continued and heavy-handed intervention by the OHR, according to 
Moscow, has became an impediment rather than the engine for progress as the OHR has 
regularly interfered in the work of democratically elected bodies and enabled the 
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situation where local negotiations have become unnecessary.252 This line of critique has 
continued through to the late 2000s. In 2009 Bosnian politicians refused to renew the 
mandates of foreign judges and prosecutors involved in war crimes prosecutions; the 
OHR used the Bonn powers to force through the decision to keep international judges in 
the Bosnian judicial system. Russia reacted by accusing the OHR of creating new crises 
in Bosnia. In echoing the legalist stance taken by the RS to contest the use of Bonn 
powers, Moscow declared the OHRs actions illegal.253   
 
While less hostile to the OHR than Moscow, many European governments have also 
advocated the closure of the OHR.254 The OHR has performed a dual-role as both the 
High Representative of the international community and the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) since 2002. The initial plan was to gradually replace the OHR with the EUSR, 
but the continued local contention and blocking of statebuilding reforms has halted the 
handing-over process. With respect to the closure of the OHR, the Council of Europe’s 
2005 Venice Commission255 report on the powers of the High Representative 
represented a European attempt to speak with one voice. The report acknowledged the 
progress the OHR had achieved by using its executive authority, but crucially concluded 
that the Bonn powers could only be used as emergency powers and thus, not as a 
permanent statebuilding instrument.256 The Venice Commission noted that while the 
High Representative’s decisions to dismiss elected officials have been predicated on 
legitimate aims and serious grounds, the High Representative does not represent 
independent judiciary nor grant right to appeal his decisions. Instead, the report notes,  
 
‘he pursues a political agenda...it seems unacceptable that decisions 
directly affecting the rights of individuals taken by a political body 
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are not subject to fear hearing or at least the minimum of due 
process and scrutiny by an independent court’.257  
 
 
The report concludes that although the High Representatives have clearly acted in the 
best interest of the Bosnian people, the Bonn powers are ’fundamentally incompatible 
with the democratic character of the state and the sovereignty of BiH’.258 Similar 
sentiments were echoed by an EU delegation representative in Bosnia who noted that 
whereas ‘in the beginning Bosnia was an unborn state, now it needs a different 
doctor’.259 Washington, in turn, regards the closure of the OHR as too risky. American 
officials fear that closing the OHR might lead into renewal of armed conflict; this is a 
narrative that is regularly echoed by Bosniaks in order to maintain international 
engagement in the country (discussed in Chapter 5). Similar view is taken by Turkey. 
Ankara sees itself as the protector of Muslims in the Balkans: this has translated in the 
growing Turkish involvement in the region. In an attempt to promote the interests of the 
Bosniak population, Turkey has demanded the continued involvement of the OHR in 
Bosnia’s affairs. Both the US and Turkey see the EU as weak actor in Bosnia and thus 
prefer to extend the OHR’s mandate.260 
 
 
Fault Lines within the International Statebuilding Mission: Understanding the 
Conflict and Its Aftermath 
 
As noted above, it is possible to discern the conservative and orthodox graduations 
among the key international actors when it comes to methods of statebuilding. Another, 
related fault line lies in the diverging perceptions of the Bosnian War, local victimhood 
and guilt. The central idea here is that the key international actors, with specific focus 
on the US and the Europeans, held diverging understandings of the nature of the war in 
Bosnia and the local warring parties. This led to different views on what was possible, 
and indeed desirable, course of action during the conflict. These different accounts have 
at least partly carried over to the post-war phase. Although post-conflict statebuilding is 
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essentially a stability-prioritizing practice and the role of perceptions and moral 
considerations should not be exaggerated, it is nonetheless an element that ought to be 
considered in thinking fault lines within the ‘international’.   
 
While the violent unravelling of Yugoslavia gained momentum in Croatia in 1991, 
growing calls for Bosnian independence translated into an independence referendum in 
Bosnia. For Bosnian Serbs, opposing independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, 
this was tantamount to a declaration of war.  When Muslims and Croats in Bosnia voted 
for independence, Serbian nationalists launched a military campaign against non-Serbs 
in Bosnia that quickly escalated into a full-blown war. The seemingly wanton nature of 
the violence that followed in the periphery of Europe – often depicted as the worst of its 
kind since the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis – necessitated simple explanations. This 
became what Hansen calls the ‘Balkan’ narrative of the conflict. 261  The Balkan 
discourse was grounded in the notion ancient, ethnic hatred, thus essentialising 
identities and ethnifying the conflict.262 This discourse depicted the Balkans as an 
inherently violent place where century-long feuds between different ethnic and religious 
groups regularly boiled over into armed conflicts.  Not only did it render international 
intervention futile in that there was little outsiders could do to alter the deep-seated, 
conflictual identities, but it also entailed an understanding of the conflict as a civil war 
with equally guilty parties. This understanding of Bosnia stood in marked contrast to 
what Hansen labels the ‘genocide’ discourse.263 It represented Bosnia as a tolerant, 
multi-cultural society that fell prey to virulent Serb nationalism and the genocidal 
policies of Bosnian Serb extremists supported by Belgrade. This implied that 
international aggression against Bosnia, rather than civil war, was a more accurate 
description of the conflict. Although policy-makers were careful not to utter the word 
‘genocide’ due to the obligations associated with it, those espousing the narrative called 
for international action on moral grounds. 264    
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How did the primary agents of the post-conflict reconstruction project interpret the 
conflict? 265 The US policy on Bosnia at the outset of the war was largely dictated by 
the logic of interests; given that it had no direct interests in the country, Washington was 
keen to  ‘Europeanise’ the problem.266 The nascent European Community would take 
the responsibility for resolving the Balkan problem. However, as the Europeans proved 
unable to bring an end to the conflict despite a number of negotiation rounds and as the 
war became a ‘global media event’, Washington was compelled to take more active part 
in the international response to the conflict. 267  In the course of the war – and as a result 
of highly polarised debates in the US political establishment - the US understanding of 
the conflict shifted from the Balkan discourse to the genocide narrative.268 This change 
in the US interpretation of the conflict coincided with the Democrats taking over the 
White House, but also stemmed from televised massacres of Bosnian civilians by Serb 
forces.269 In a shift towards the genocide discourse, the events unfolding in Bosnia were 
reconceptualised as Serb aggression. This understanding of the conflict had implications 
on the ground. The British commander of the UN peacekeeping forces during the war, 
General Michael Rose, saw the US engagement as heavily biased. He notes that when 
debates were conducted between international diplomats over using military force to 
bring an end to the conflict, Washington was seeking to use any opportunity to bomb 
the Serb positions and felt reluctant to engage in any military action against the Bosnian 
Muslim Army even if it was breaching UN-brokered ceasefires.270 The genocide 
discourse continued to inform the US stance at the peace negotiations. In a telling 
remark on the perceptions of victims and perpetrators, the US negotiator at Dayton, 
Richard Holbrooke noted that ‘the key voice’ in the negotiations had to be given to ‘the 
primary victims of the war’, the Bosnian Muslims.271  
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While different understandings of the conflict were evident in Europe,272 Western 
European countries (that the European Community was comprised of) by and large 
grounded their response in the Balkan interpretation which framed the war in terms of 
ancient hatreds.273 Although Serbs became to be seen as the main perpetrators of 
violence in Bosnia, blame was assigned to the other two parties, Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats, too. Corollary to this view was the notion that the international community 
could not remain in Bosnia indefinitely and thus the warring parties had the 
responsibility to stop the fighting. While this meant that European troops would not 
intervene in order to put an end to the violence or interfere any way other way, 
peacekeeping troops would be deployed in order to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and 
suffering of the victims. 274 
 
These Euro-American differences in understanding the war were reflected in policy. 
The most prominent example was the American opposition to the European-drafted 
Vance-Owen peace plan. The plan that envisioned the de facto partitioning the country 
was dismissed by Clinton as overtly pro-Serb blueprint that effectively legitimised the 
ethnic cleansing. Clinton suggested, in turn, a ‘lift and strike’ strategy that would lift the 
arms embargo thus allowing the Bosnian Muslims to arm and using NATO air strikes 
against Serb positions.275 The Europeans objected as ‘lift and strike’ would have been 
tantamount to escalating the war which was diametrically opposed to the efforts of the 
Europeans.276 Further tensions were created by the US encouragement of the Bosnian 
forces to fight for more land as the rest of the international community regarded the 
cessation of hostilities the most urgent policy objective.277 Given that Washington was 
unwilling to provide ground troops, Clinton’s strategy of maximizing Bosnian Muslim 
negotiation positions through successes in the battlefield was eventually triumphed by 
the European quest for an immediate cease fire. While the Europeans realised that 
settlement might be unfavourable to Muslims in Bosnia, the realities of the situation 
                                               
272
 This is particularly when it comes to political decision-makers and media. Shiraev and Terrio show 
that for instance in the UK, much of the media adopted the genocide discourse while both the Labour 
opposition and the Conservative government relied on the Balkans narrative.  
273
 Hansen, Security as Practice, 124 
274
 Ibid, 125 
275
 Warren Bass ‘The Triage of Dayton’ Foreign Affairs 77 no.5 (1998) 
276
 Mike Bowker ‘The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community’. Europe-Asia 
Studies 50 no.7 (1998),1250 
277
 Ibid. 
96 
 
were seen to take priority over notions of justice.278 In many ways then the main 
differences between the US and European approaches to the conflict centred on whether 
the conflict should – and could – be resolved by foreign military action or whether the 
international community should remain impartial interlocutor and mediator between the 
parties.   
 
Euro-American differences in the interpretations of the conflict have partially carried 
over to the post-conflict phase and given rise to different policy prescriptions. Many 
officials representing European governments appear to continue interpreting the post-
conflict process through a narrative similar to the Balkans discourse.279  A European 
diplomat for instance argued that ‘nobody has all the guilt on his side, there is always 
two to tango. We have to see it from the outside and not interfere.’280 As during the 
conflict, European states contributing to the reconstruction of Bosnia tend to use 
ambiguous language when referring to the conflict, thus avoiding the allocation of 
blame directly to a national group. Although the primordial ‘ancient hatreds’ narratives 
are now rarely articulated in public, ideas such ‘the Yugoslav mentality’281 or ‘Bosnians’ 
inability to let go of the past’282 have emerged to account for the pathologies of the 
statebuilding process.283 Historical continuities, rather than the international intervention 
itself, account for the stalling process. In the words of the High Representative Inzko, 
the ‘dependency syndrome’ of Bosnians - that is, the reliance on external authority to 
govern - dates back to the Ottoman days.284 Such statements serve to naturalise the 
troublesome post-war process and frame it in the context of the country’s past. As 
Carlos Westendorp, the second High Representative noted, the tendencies to live 
separately in Bosnia are ‘natural’.285 The American policy in post-conflict Bosnia 
reflects the genocide narrative in that it has taken a strong stance against the RS, seen as 
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the perpetrators. Although the US approach to post-conflict Bosnia immediately after 
the war was premised on ensuring security by dividing the key antagonists of the war 
into separate entities, it has tacitly supported the political prerogatives of the Bosniaks. 
Particularly the early years witnessed a hard-line US policy on the RS. While nationalist 
parties from all different constituent groups were part of the political system, 
Washington singled out those from the RS (who did not cooperate with the Hague 
Tribunal) and refused to establish contact with them or RS governments that contained 
nationalist parties. Although the initial US stance has become gradually less dogmatic, it 
still regards the RS as the primary obstacle to peace in Bosnia.286 
 
Although these diverging understandings of the conflict, its victims and perpetrators are 
unlikely to be the sole determinants of different governments’ policies on post-conflict 
Bosnia, it is likely that moral considerations have informed the statebuilding measures 
and policies promoted by different states. A reoccurring example in this regard has been 
the international efforts to alter the scope of the Bosnian state. As noted elsewhere, the 
DPA created a decentralized system of governance with weak central state: this was 
done in order to alleviate fears of majority domination. Yet, by far the most contentious 
international statebuilding policy has been to strengthen the central level state. Both the 
US and European officials see it as crucial for the post-conflict process. What is 
interesting is that in many ways this shared objective appears to be underwritten by 
different rationales. Support for centralized Bosnian state by the US reflects the 
particular understanding of the war, the victims, the perpetrators and consequently, of 
post-war justice. Bosniaks as the primary victims of the conflict are entitled to strong 
central state that they could in effect govern. In making a case for extended US presence 
in the country and for more intensive capacity-building measures, President Clinton287 
noted that ‘we will never be able to forget the mass graves, the women and young girls 
victimized by systematic campaign of rape, skeletal prisoners locked behind barbed-
wire fences’.288 ‘The political agenda against the RS’, as a Western official explained, is 
based on a moral stance; ‘many people have felt ever since the conflict that the existence 
of the RS was only a necessity for Dayton and something that had to be still addressed 
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and that seems to be more than anything else driving the agenda’.289  Centralisation is, 
thus, at least partly seen as an end in itself; a compensation for suffering during the war.   
 
For the majority of the European states, on the other hand, the support for centralization 
is more pragmatic. Consolidation of the state-level institutions is seen as a step in the 
process of EU-memberstate-building. Brussels is less concerned with the degree of 
centralisation, or indeed the actual form of governance, than with efficiency.290 
Centralisation then is regarded as a means to an end, rather than the end itself. While it 
would be simplistic to see moral judgements of the conflict as the key driver of states’ 
involvement in post-conflict Bosnia, these different perceptions are nonetheless 
important in explaining some of the tensions and disagreements between international 
statebuilding actors. They also divert attention to fact that international actors engaged 
in post-conflict states may not be impartial interlocutors but hold specific ideas about 
victims, perpetrators and post-conflict justice.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The order of the post-Cold War world was defined through the Bosnian war.291  
Germany for the first time took part in a NATO operation and the UN engaged in an 
unprecedented humanitarian operation. Furthermore, Russia participated in the efforts to 
find a resolution to the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia and also took part in the 
post-1995 reconstruction of Bosnia based on Western assumptions of statehood and 
politico-economic organisation. Yet, tensions between the international actors in the 
post-bipolar world became quickly evident. As this Chapter has demonstrated, the 
NATO enlargement process and its presence in Bosnia, coupled with the 
interventionism of the OHR, have alienated Russia. In terms of the Western 
governments, different conceptualisations of the statebuilding project – less in terms of 
its fundamental tenets then its actual practices on the ground – have been apparent from 
the outset. While the war-time US policy advocated the ending of the war through 
military solutions, the robust and interventionist approach has continued to the post-war 
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phase, albeit using primarily political rather than military clout. Europeans on the other 
hand, as during the conflict, largely favour negotiation over imposition, but remain 
divided. These differences in the methodology of peacemaking in the Balkans have 
rendered international policy in Bosnia disjointed.292 The account of multiple 
international statebuilding projects and practices developed in this Chapter has 
problematized notions of international statebuilding as a single, coherent project. 
Crucially, it has implied that post-conflict statebuilding is not hybridized solely by local 
agents but also by the co-existence of different statebuilding agendas and practices 
among the international actors.  
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     Chapter 4 
The Institutional Domain 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Following the prioritization of statebuilding over peacebuilding, institution-building has 
become the key concept in the lexicon of international post-conflict interventions. It is 
through institutional infrastructure that states can more effectively fulfill their Weberian 
functions of collecting taxes and establishing a monopoly on violence. Some suggest 
that institutions are also crucial for the management of the destabilizing effects of 
political and economic liberalization of post-conflict states.293  Bosnia is no exception to 
the prioritization of institution-building in the post-conflict process. With the help of the 
Bonn powers, the OHR has strengthened the institutional capacity of the Bosnian state 
by constructing a host of new institutions not sanctioned by the DPA.294 While building 
the institutional domain has been the primary objective of the international statebuilding 
actors, this Chapter shows how the institutions and processes of governance are 
deployed by local agencies to contest the process. Local actors seeking to challenge or 
shape international statebuilding measures have used the joint institutions and the 
municipal level administrative structures. The repertoire of bureaucratic contention has 
entailed practices ranging from boycotts and refusals to cooperate to blocking of 
decision-making and administrative measures to impede international statebuilding 
policies. The central aim of these practices is to mediate the statebuilding process 
through disrupting, destabilizing or slowing down aspects of international statebuilding. 
What might be called ‘routine’ politics have in many ways then become harnessed for 
the purposes of contesting the statebuilding process.  An investigation into the 
institutional domain does not only enable us to understand how local agency operates 
via structures of governance and administration, but it also tells us a great deal about 
what is understood by international agents to be appropriate and legitimate local 
political activity in post-conflict spaces.   
                                               
293
 Paris, At War’s End 
294
 To name a few; joint defense and intelligence structures, State Investigation and Protection Agency 
(SIPA) , State-level court and joint VAT structures. 
101 
 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. It begins with a brief overview of the local state 
formation processes and agendas. This highlights the variety of motivations behind local 
contentious practices. While many Bosniaks challenge the international statebuilding as 
half-hearted and ineffective, Serbs see it as oppressive and biased. The analysis then 
moves onto discussing different modalities of contention in state level institutions, 
touching upon some of the main contentious practices such as boycotts and walk-outs 
and key events such as the defense and police reforms. The final part of the chapter 
focuses on contentious practices in the entity and cantonal level institutions.    
 
 
Local Statebuilding Agendas 
   
The previous chapter argued that international statebuilding actors in Bosnia advance 
and promote different statebuilding trajectories, rather than formulating their policies on 
the basis of a single and coherent blueprint for the country’s post-conflict development. 
Less surprising is the existence of competing and contradictory statebuilding agendas in 
the local realm. It was, in fact, the fundamentally different understandings of Bosnian 
statehood that led to the conflict. It is no exaggeration to say that such disputes have 
continued to today as the DPA did little to resolve these underlying root causes of 
conflict. Local acts of contention are intimately linked to local state formation processes 
and agendas.  The inhabitants of Bosnia have been linked to three ‘potential nations’, 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.295 The first two nations have sought to associate themselves 
with their respective kin states Croatia and Serbia, while the identity of the Muslim 
community has developed through ‘religious affiliation and territorial dimension’ 
pertaining to Bosnia and Herzegovina.296  
 
Prior to the emergence of competing statebuilding and nationbuilding agendas, Bosnian 
society under the Ottoman Empire was ordered around communal identities rather than 
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overarching citizenship. The Millet system of governance through which the Ottomans 
ruled conquered territories was based on the classification of subjects on the basis of 
their religious affiliation and on extensive autonomy of each religious group rather than 
coerced assimilation. This gave religious leaders considerable authority as they became 
the political representatives of their respective groups. Crucially, it also granted religion 
the central role in the process of identity-creation.297 It is from the late nineteenth 
century onwards that the different and at times contradictory statebuilding and 
nationbuilding projects have sought to foreground their views on Bosnian statehood. 
Before discussing the local visions of Bosnian statehood further, some caveats are in 
order. The intention is not to suggest that the three statebuilding projects examined in 
the course of this study represent their respective communities as a whole; some 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs reject the agendas promoted by certain elected leaders, 
journalists or intellectuals. Nonetheless, the fact that many local actors engaging in 
contentious activities are elected officials grants the local statebuilding practices at least 
some sense of representation and legitimacy. These statebuilding agendas are promoted 
through informal networks of actors – politicians, journalists, academics, activists, 
representatives of the military and religious organisations – who converge around an 
understanding of Bosnia’s past, present and future. The statebuilding agendas in 
question are neither static nor free from internal disagreements. Contests between 
‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ forces within the statebuilding projects take frequently place 
and therefore their respective statebuilding agendas shift in accordance with the internal 
balance of power.  
 
 
Building Centralised Bosnia: the Bosniak Statebuilding Agenda 
 
While the Serb and Croat statebuilding projects have historical continuity, the concept 
‘Bosniak’ (Bosnjak) is a recent construct. It was only during the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav state that the term became to denote Bosnian Muslims. Within the Yugoslav 
federal system, the Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a national group as late as 
1961; however, by 1980s they had become the largest national group in the republic. 298 
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Many in the Muslim community began increasingly to regard Bosnia as their national 
territory, given that both Bosnian Croats and Serbs had their external homelands beyond 
the borders of Bosnia.299  Following the war fought over the different visions of Bosnian 
statehood, the Bosniaks have called for strong, central authority and unitary state of 
Bosnia that they could, as the numerically largest group, govern. As the first High 
Representative Carl Bildt suggested, the Bosniak-Croat Federation created in Dayton 
was regarded – and to some degree still is - by the Bosniaks as an entity of their own.300 
This has been further reinforced by the dominant position of Bosniaks in the institutions 
of the Federation.  Despite the lip service paid to the DPA and the vision of multi-ethnic 
Bosnia, voices calling for Bosniak-led national state became more vocal soon after the 
war. While many Bosniaks continued to support multi-ethnic state, the SDA301 declared 
in 1997 that it had abandoned the DPA as it was merely reinforcing the division of the 
country.302 Mouthpiece of the SDA, Sarajevan newspaper Dnevni Avaz, even wrote 
about tripartite division of the country and establishing a Bosniak state of 
Muselmania.303  The SDA engaged in what Brubaker calls ‘nationalising’ policies 
aimed at creating a Bosniak-dominated state. 304 This was particularly evident in the 
symbolic domain, as will be discussed in Chapter 6; Bosniaks actively fostered Bosniak 
identity through language politics and re-naming spaces. In the institutional domain the 
SDA regularly called for far-reaching reforms that would centralize the state. Despite 
the common goal of strenthening the central state, significant internal disagreement 
within the Bosniak community has emerged. This is primarily between SDA, on the one 
hand, prioritizing building Bosnianess on the back of Islamic identity305 and the 
statebuilding model of the SBiH-party on the other that foregrounds patriotic identity.306 
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Notion of victimhood underwrites the political goals of the Bosniaks. Bosniaks view 
themselves as the primary victims of the previous war and the genocidal politics of 
Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Based on this understanding the Bosniaks regard the 
existence of the RS as grave injustice: accordingly, the Serb entity ‘…cannot survive in 
its present form because it would represent a monument to the greatest criminals of the 
last part of the 20th century’.307 Many Bosniaks share the view that international actors 
bear responsibility towards Bosniaks as a result of the international failure to act in the 
face of genocide. This had led to the perception of the international community as the 
protector of Bosniak interests and translated into attempts to co-opt the OHR and other 
international statebuilding agencies by Bosniak actors. The central rationale for 
contesting the international statebuilding practice has been the perceived international 
failure to acknowledge the victimisation of Bosniaks during and after the war. For many 
Bosniaks the perceived international inaction against the Bosnian Serb and Croat 
flouting of the peace agreement adds an insult to injury. The international community 
failed Bosniaks during the war by watching by as the state collapsed violently and 
following the war the international statebuilding officials have shown little political will 
to build efficient and functioning statehood, the Bosniak statebuilding narrative asserts. 
It is then the international failure to build a strong, centralised statehood that gives rise 
to Bosniak contention.     
 
 
From Critics to Defenders of Dayton: Bosnian Serb  
Statebuilding Agenda 
 
The Bosnian Serb statebuilding agenda, in turn, is premised on the existence of three 
different ethnic groups and three religions; for the Serbs the logical conclusion is that a 
centralized state is simply not feasible.308  Akin to the Bosniak narrative of victimhood, 
the Bosnian Serb self-understanding is also based on the notion of suffering and 
persecution. For the Serbs the only acceptable way to ensure non-violation of Serb 
rights in Bosnia is to have an autonomous Serb territory. The main feature in this 
narrative is the genocide perpetrated against the Serbs during the Second World War. 
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Such discourse continues to play an immensely important role and provides the basis for 
the Bosnian Serb identity and consequently, for the Bosnian Serb statebuilding agenda. 
The Bosnian Serb statebuilding agenda is also underwritten by a specific understanding 
of the country’s past: the pre-war Bosnia was marked by mono-ethnic communities 
where each group lived in relative separation from the other communities. While in 
cities such as Sarajevo mixed marriages were common, the same was not true in the 
rural areas.309 The international vision of multi-ethnic Bosnia is therefore seen as a mere 
romanticization of the country’s past. Any attempts to recreate the alleged heterogeneity 
of pre-war Bosnia are based on false assumptions, according to many Serbs.310    
 
In practice the Bosnian Serb statebuilding vision in the immediate years after the war 
was to a large degree determined by Belgrade and Karadžić’s SDS (Serb Democratic 
Party). Internal divisions within the Bosnian Serb leadership resulted in split between 
hard-line nationalist positions in Pale and moderate Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka. 
Although the Bosnian Serb community did not accept the DPA in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, they soon realized the benefits of the agreement, namely the 
creation of the Serb entity. The creation of the RS represented the first step in the 
realisation of the Bosnian Serb objective of self-governance. Following the ousting of 
many of the war-time leaders from power in the late 1990s, the RS began increasingly 
to co-operate with the OHR. The RS also acknowledged the war-time crimes committed 
by Bosnian Serbs; this represented a marked departure from the early post-war years 
when the RS denied any wrong-doing during the conflict. The recent years have, 
however, witnessed growing tensions between international statebuilders and the RS as 
Banja Luka has begun claiming back some of the entity-level competencies that have 
been transferred to the state level through the OHR’s fiat. From the Serb perspective the 
gradual strengthening of the central state is threatening the very existence of the RS and 
the peace treaty signed in Dayton. The contentious practices deployed by Serb actors 
have then been mainly guided by the desire to preserve the status quo and the federal 
structure of the state. The Serb community has remained divided over whether the RS 
should secede from Bosnia or to merely ensure its autonomous position within the 
country. The perceived international pro-Bosniak bias and the attempts to consolidate 
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the state institutions at the expense of the power held by the entities have contributed to 
the popular support for the former policy; in 2010 81% of Bosnian Serbs expressed 
support for joining the RS with Serbia.311  
 
 
Quest for Third Entity: Croat Statebuilding Agenda 
 
The Bosnian Croat views on Bosnian statehood vary geographically between Croats 
living in multi-ethnic Central Bosnian areas and their counterparts living in more 
ethnically homogeneous western Herzegovina. While the former has been conditioned 
by the experience and necessity of living amidst other nationalities, the latter has a more 
narrow experience of multi-ethnicity.312 During the war these different Bosnian Croat 
perspectives were united behind the Croat war-effort, but after the conflict daily 
political issues such as unemployment, the economy and social conditions have divided 
the Bosnian Croats. The Croat political scene in Bosnia was controlled by the HDZ BiH 
until 2006 when a splinter party HDZ 1990 was formed following personal 
disagreements between leading figures in the party.313 Although the Bosnian Croat 
politics continue to be internally divided, Croat parties are united in their call for re-
organization of the country in a way that would grant Croats an entity or region to 
govern.  
 
In this regard a number of different views have emerged from the Croat community. 
The debate after the war ranged from demands of establishing a third entity to the calls 
for cantonisation of Bosnia.314  The Croat statebuilding rhetoric has gradually shifted 
towards more ambiguous calls for some type of territorial Croat autonomy in Bosnia. 
This has been mainly articulated in terms of federalization of Bosnia or establishment of 
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four entities as opposed to the current dual-entity structure. Within such structure the 
Bosnian Croats envision a Croat-dominated area. Despite the diminishing ‘homeland 
support’ from Croatia following Tuđman’s death, the quest for a Croat entity has not 
been entirely buried. Yet, direct confrontation with the international statebuilding 
efforts, as manifested in the establishment of Croat Inter-Cantonal Council in 2001, has 
transformed into contention through entity and cantonal level institutions.315 The locale 
of Croat contention has thus shifted from the central state to the entity-level. This has 
been particularly evident in Mostar where Croats have directly challenged international 
statebuilding efforts through maintaining parallel administrative structures. Alongside 
the calls for re-organization of the country, the Croat community has also been active in 
consolidating Croat culture in Bosnia. This has been particularly evident in media and 
education. The establishment of radio and TV stations broadcasting in Croatian is linked 
to the very existence of Croats in Bosnia.316 Providing education in Croatian has played 
similarly important role in the Croat statebuilding agenda; shared syllabus across the 
education system and multi-confessional classrooms have been represented as a direct 
threat to the diminishing post-war Croat community in Bosnia. 317  While Croat political 
parties have actively promoted such statebuilding agenda, also representatives of the 
Catholic Church in Bosnia, interests groups and journalists - as the empirical Chapters 
demonstrate - have lent public support for the Croat statebuilding agenda.  
 
 
Contention in the State Level Institutions 
 
Having outlined the local statebuilding agendas, the analysis now turns to empirical 
material in order to discuss the key episodes of contention in the institutional domain. 
As noted earlier, the institutional domain provides a salient site in which externally-
driven statebuilding measures are re-negotiated through disruptive techniques. This 
reflects one of the many paradoxes of international statebuilding as the very institutions 
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and processes created by international actors to consolidate Bosnian statehood are 
systematically used to challenge and alter the process of statebuilding. It is noteworthy 
that although agents from all three constituent nations engage in contentious practices in 
an attempt to affect the statebuilding process, Serb and Croat contention is more 
pronounced and frequent. This is because many Serbs and Croats perceive aspects of the 
internationally-led statebuilding process as detrimental while the international 
statebuilding efforts have coincided more closely with the Bosniak aims in that they 
have sought to strengthen the state. This is particularly true when it comes to the 
institutional domain. Given that many Bosniaks share the objective of creating a 
centralised Bosnian state, acts of institutional contention disrupting the functioning of 
the state have been few and far between. When such actions have occurred, they have 
mainly served as a protest against the perceived international failure to protect the 
sanctity of the DPA.  In 1999, for instance, Bosniaks suspended cooperation with the 
OHR Mostar as a protest against the perceived OHR inaction against the Croat violation 
of the DPA, while in 2002 one of the main Bosniak parties, the SDA, boycotted 
internationally-led constitutional reform talks as the changes were not far reaching 
enough and merely served the Serb interests.318 Institutional modalities of contention 
have primarily featured in the Serb repertoire and to some degree that of Croat actors. 
 
 
Boycotts, Walkouts and Non-Cooperation 
 
The governance structures of Bosnia consist of the joint, central level institutions, the 
entity-level bodies as well as the lower, municipal level administration.319 The first part 
of the following discussion focuses on the institutions of the central state. The most 
common, and certainly the most headline-grapping, contentious practices in post-war 
Bosnia have entailed boycotts, walk-outs and protests at the joint, central state 
institutions. Such practices have regularly featured in the Serb contentious repertoire. 
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Indeed, the deployment of boycotts and other similar methods by Serb actors have a 
history as long as the international post-conflict intervention itself. While being more 
symbolic than actually obstructing governance, the Serb boycott of the inaugural session 
of the Bosnia’s new parliament in 1996 entailing swearing allegiance to the state was a 
profound embarrassment to the international statebuilding actors and showed the local 
actors opposing the international presence an effective way to undermine and challenge 
the externally-led statebuilding trajectory. 320 Framed by the Serbs as a boycott based on 
security concerns and moral principles that would not allow the Serbs to adhere to the 
declaration read out in the inaugural session, it is also likely that a change in the 
political opportunity structures played a role in the Serb decision not to take part in the 
opening ceremony of the parliament. This change in the political environment was the 
lifting of the economic sanctions against Belgrade that was sponsoring its ethnic kin in 
the Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated entity in Bosnia. This meant that the 
international statebuilders lost much of their leverage over the Serbs in Bosnia. As the 
then High Representative Carl Bildt acknowledged, there was little that the international 
actors could do to persuade the reluctant Serbs to attend the symbolically important 
opening session of the parliament.321  
 
In 1997 Bosnian Serb boycotts continued. The Bosnian Serb member of the joint 
Presidency, Momčilo Krajišnik withdrew from the institution as a protest against an 
arrest of a Bosnian Serb war crimes indictee and death of another by Western soldiers. 
More importantly, the explicit Western support for the Serb moderates in Banja Luka 
against the official Pale-based RS government loyal to Karadžić prompted threats by the 
Serbs in Pale to boycott elections in September 1997. The Western attempts to 
marginalise the Serbs in Pale were seen to have led to a ‘crisis of the Peace Agreement’ 
as the international actors were bent on ‘wiping out the Republika Srpska’, as the 
Deputy Prime Minister of the RS noted.322 The RS concerns were echoed in Moscow; 
Russia expressed anger over Western interference in the power struggles between Serbs 
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and distanced itself from what it branded as aggressive Western peacekeeping.323 At the 
same time, the main Croat party in Bosnia, HDZ BiH,324 issued a threat of boycotting 
local elections. It argued that the election law was flawed and would not guarantee the 
equal representation of Croats.325 However, all the above boycotts were called off as the 
OHR and the OSCE applied considerable pressure on the political patrons of Serbs and 
Croats in Belgrade and Zagreb respectively.326 Again, the transnational dynamics of 
contention in Bosnia were crucial; it is likely that the lack of political support from the 
external homelands made contentious action against the international statebuilders less 
appealing. Forms of political coercion in the form of threats of sanctions and isolation 
deployed by the OHR in the neighbouring capitals had the effect of reducing support for 
Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb contentious practices. The political opportunity 
structures were thus transforming again, but this time to a more unfavourable direction, 
which signalled the return to cooperation with the OHR. This is indicative of the 
importance of the ‘transnational’ opportunity structures in the early years of the 
international intervention preceding the introduction of Bonn-powers in December 
1997. The early statebuilding dynamics were thus not limited to the local-international 
axis, but were also conditioned by mobilising structures and support networks in the 
external kin states. It is largely as a response to the intransigent local contention that the 
Bonn powers were introduced. It is clear then that interactions between the internal and 
external statebuilding agendas dramatically altered the roadmap of Bosnia’s post-war 
development.     
 
One of the most serious confrontations between the OHR and Banja Luka came in 1999 
when Bosnian Serbs staged a boycott of the joint institutions in response to the 
dismissal of the RS President by the OHR and the decision on the Brčko district. Nikola 
Poplašen, regarded as a Serb hard-liner bent on non-cooperation with the international 
statebuilders, was dismissed from the office after attempting to sideline his moderate 
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political rivals in the RS, supported by the OHR. Countering such political games again 
meant resorting to political coercion administered by the OHR. The RS National 
Assembly passed a decision declaring categorical refusal to abide by the OHR’ decision 
as Poplašen’s dismissal was regarded as unconstitutional.327 Poplašen himself framed 
the dismissal as an affront to international legal and democratic norms, to the DPA and 
to the Constitution of the country. In a letter to the OHR, Poplašen compared himself to 
the High Representative as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region, committed to 
the democratic development and prosperity of his people. He noted that ‘if peace, 
stability and economic prosperity in this region are our common goal, then there should 
be agreements, cooperation and mutual respect and not boycotts, ultimatums and 
threats’.328 Coinciding with the Poplašen crisis, the question of Brčko became topical 
almost exactly at the same time. The status of the strategically important Brčko was left 
undecided in the 1995 peace negotiations, as the parties were unable to agree whether 
the district would lie under the Federation or the RS jurisdiction. In 1999 the Brčko 
Arbitral Tribunal awarded the district special status which meant that neither the 
Federation nor the RS has exclusive jurisdiction over the area. The Serbs in particular 
were disillusioned by the decision as they had cooperated with the OHR in introducing 
multi-ethnic policing and local administration with the expectation that Brčko would 
become part of the RS to ensure the territorial contiguity of the entity.329 Again, the 
Bosnian Serb lawmakers rejected the Brčko decision and adopted a resolution calling 
for Serb officials to interrupt their participation in the joint institutions. The Brčko 
decision was framed as a verdict that in effect ‘annulled’ the DPA; the Serb member of 
the Presidency suggested that the Brčko decision would result ‘not only to a division of 
RS into two separate parts but real danger for the fate of the DPA’. 330  
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The Poplašen issue, combined with the decision on the Brčko district, resulted in 
extensive protests. While officials of the Serb Radical Party, SRS, engaged in a seven-
month long boycott of the joint institutions and Poplašen refused to be sacked, anti-
international community protests were organised in the Eastern RS. With little public 
debate in the media (controlled by the political elites) on the two issues, Serb hardliners 
found it easy to mobilise the people.331 Factions of the Serb political party machinery – 
particularly that of the SRS – provided structures for mobilising people to protest 
against the OHR’s measures. In an attempt to cash in on the view shared by many in the 
Serb community according to which international actors favour Bosniaks, the SRS took 
advantage of its organisational readiness to organise public meetings and protest rallies, 
demonstrated by the dominant presence of the SRS flags in such events.332 Moreover, 
media controlled by Serb parties was also used to mobilise and organise protests against 
the international community; for instance in Brčko the Serb-controlled radio urged all 
Serbs to take part in demonstrations against the Poplašen and Brčko decisions.333  
Protesters in the RS threw stones at international officials and attacked US troops, 
resulting in the death of a local SRS party activist. Hardliners in the Serb community 
also planted bombs in the OHR Banja Luka office and at US military office in Bijeljina. 
Protesters distributed leaflets in Banja Luka urging Serbs to rise against the OHR, and 
attack ‘the occupiers with clubs, stones and petrol bombs’ and ‘ to be ready to use 
automatic weapons’.334 The OHR responded by dismissing the authority of the RS 
National Assembly and Poplašen and by declaring non-cooperation with any RS 
government containing Poplašen’s SRS party. According to the OHR, Poplašen ignored 
the will of the RS electorate and acted to destabilise the country.  
 
Yet, the OHR needed to tread carefully as international military intervention in Kosovo 
– where the status of another Serb population was at stake – became likely. Indeed, 
shortly after the contentious episode in Bosnia, the NATO-led bombing of Kosovo 
complicated the relationship between the RS and the international statebuilders further. 
While the bombing created a serious strife between the international statebuilding actors 
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as Moscow condemned the action, it also gave Serb secessionists in the RS basis for 
demanding redrawing of borders and autonomy from Bosnia. However, the RS 
remained largely peaceful during the NATO air raids on Kosovo chiefly due to the 
presence of moderate Prime Minister and ally of the international officials, Milorad 
Dodik, who secured substantial international aid in exchange for restraint during the 
Kosovo campaign.335 Capital, as an international tool to counter contention, thus played 
an important role in preventing further disquiet in the RS. Alongside the use of capital, 
coercion also played a role. International SFOR troops held control over the bridges 
over Drina that linked the RS to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; taking control over 
these through-fares crucial to the RS economy gave the international statebuilders a 
powerful negotiating tool during the Kosovo intervention.336  
 
 
Blocking Decision-Making Processes: International Judges,  
Defence and Police Reforms 
 
If boycotts and protests represent highly visible and vocal expressions of local disquiet, 
blocking decision-making has proven to be a contentious technique that often compels 
the OHR into ‘cutting deals’ with local agents, as an OHR official put it.337 The practice 
of blocking decision-making is enabled by the power-sharing system of governance 
which grants each national group a veto right over decisions perceived inimical to their 
respective interests. These routine political processes in Bosnia are essentially used to 
disrupt the decision-making process and re-negotiate the shape and form of the Bosnian 
state.  A recent example of this was the blocking of the extension of the mandates of 
foreign judges by Bosnian Serb politicians. International judges were introduced to the 
Bosnian judicial system with the view of ensuring impartiality and independence of 
courts. The intention was to gradually displace the foreign members of the judiciary 
with national staff. The PIC declared in 2009 that the Bosnian authorities had failed to 
provide the Court and Prosecutor’s Office the financial means to recruit national judges 
and prosecutors to replace their international counterparts and thus international 
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members of the judiciary should remain pass their initial deadline.338 Bosnian Serbs 
challenged the call for extension of the mandate as unconstitutional and reiterated that 
all international judges should withdraw from Bosnia.339 RS officials consequently used 
the Bosnian Parliament and the entity voting mechanism to block the adoption of the 
legislation pertaining to the international judiciary. The OHR resorted to the use of 
Bonn powers and mandates of international judges were extended by three years.  Yet, 
the on-going Constitutional reform negotiations as well as Russian opposition to the 
extension of the mandate enabled the RS to get concessions. 340  Rather than imposing a 
fully-fledged extension of the international judges’ mandate entailing all judicial 
aspects, the authority of the international judges was limited only to war crimes.341 This 
meant that issues relating to corruption – seen by many as the key obstacle to 
statebuilding - were beyond the jurisdiction of the international judges. In essence, this 
deal meant prioritising stability over concerns of corruption and misuse of political 
office.  
 
One of the most prolonged episodes of blocking decision-making, and as such meriting 
closer attention, is contention prompted by defence reform. In the two year process, the 
Serbs blocked the defence reform initiated by the OHR and NATO, a purpose of which 
was to unite the three separate armies that had existed since the beginning of the war. 
The rationale behind the reform was articulated by the international statebuilders less in 
terms of building unified statehood but more in terms of rational, financial calculations. 
Having three armies in one state was argued to be financially disastrous.342 NATO 
membership, framed as impossible with the war-time defence structures, provided an 
additional carrot. Many Serbs opposed the reform; it was seen as an act of further 
transferral of competencies to the central, state level, allegedly controlled by Bosniaks. 
In an act of collaborative contention brokered by the SDS-party, five Serb parties agreed 
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to harmonise parliamentary activities in order to block the internationally-led talks.343 
The American Deputy Chairman of the talks, Raffi Gregorian, lamented that since the 
beginning of the defence reform talks in 2003, the Serbs refused to send a serious 
delegation to attend the talks, but have instead sent ‘observers’ who obstruct any 
meaningful reforms.344   
 
Despite the harmonisation of activities, the Serbs were divided over the issue; while 
moderate non-nationalist parties were willing to agree on the unification of the three 
armies, the radical faction led by nationalist parties declared any such action as anti-
constitutional. Moderates framed the issue in terms of the changed security situation of 
the country; the absence of the war-time security threats meant that there was no longer 
a need for the Bosnian Serb Army. It followed then that the unification of the armies did 
not represent a threat to the Serb interests.345 The radical camp was to a large degree 
mobilised by the SRS and the SDS parties and associations representing former camp 
inmates and prisoners of war. The discourses deployed to garner support against the 
defence reform represented the issue through the lens of survival of the RS and the Serb 
identity; ‘…the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is still partly Serb. However, it will very 
soon cease to be Serb and Christian; it will become a Bosniak and a Muslim army’, 
while a member of the Serb Radical Party called defence reform ‘the final stage of the 
annihilation of the Serb Republic’.346 As contentious politics scholars have found, the 
presence of a radical faction within one claim-making group is often beneficial to the 
group as a whole.347 In what is coined as a radical flank effect, radical demands often 
result in the object’s support for the moderate demands in an attempt to marginalise the 
radicals. The presence of radical factions can, therefore, provide legitimacy and 
strengthen the claims made by the moderates. While the lack of meeting transcripts 
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prevents making definitive claims, it is likely that the presence of radical factions 
enabled the moderate camp to negotiate concessions.  The bill was ultimately forced 
through by the OHR in 2005 and single defence body was created; yet, crucially the 
Serbs managed to win major concessions as the NATO dropped the requirement of full 
co-operation with the Hague war crimes tribunal, which had been the cornerstone of 
international policy on Bosnia.348 This signalled a partial relief to the Serb politicians 
for whom the issue of sending Serb war crime indictees to the Hague had been a matter 
of extreme political sensitivity.  
 
However, what is interesting here is that the political opportunity structures for 
preventing the defence reform were not favourable for those engaged in contesting the 
process; the international statebuilding agents acted as a relatively coherent actor which 
meant that no room for exploiting tensions within the international community existed. 
At the same time, the financial and political backing from Zagreb and Belgrade for 
nationalist politicians had significantly diminished following the end of the respective 
Tuđman and Milošević regimes. Moreover, constellations of capital and coercion used 
by the OHR and NATO collectively – aid conditionality and eventually the Partnership 
for Peace membership - proved effective in countering Serb contention. Given the 
crippling effect the existence of three armies had on the Bosnian economy, the OHR not 
only tied aid to the reform but also offered to train military forces in exchange for 
restructuring the military. NATO in turn made the unification of the country’s defence 
structures a precondition for NATO membership. The OHR also deployed coercive 
methods in abolishing the RS’ Supreme Defence Council so as to neutralise opposition 
and hasten the process. At the same time local actors contesting the process were 
politically weakened by the Orao affair in which weapons were sold by an RS 
manufacturer to Iraq in a breach of the UN sanctions. The defence reform has generally 
been hailed as one of the successes of the statebuilding process in Bosnia and it is clear 
from the above why it succeeded. 
 
If the political opportunity and mobilizing structures were unfavourable for effective 
contention, the internationally-driven attempt to reform the police represents a rather 
different example. Seen as the main source of protection for war criminals and 
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resistance to minority returnees, the OHR sought to centralise the local police forces. A 
watershed moment in the process that was systematically rejected by the RS through the 
country’s institutions came in 2005 when the OHR decided to link the police reform to 
the EU integration process. Police reform, in other words, became a precondition for the 
signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a first step on the EU 
accession path. As Ashdown notes in his memoirs, ‘I rang Chris Patten in late October 
and asked if he could weigh in as Commissioner and say that these reforms were 
required if BiH wanted to join Europe’. 349 This illustrates the arbitrary nature of the 
reform; while centralised police forces are rarity elsewhere in Europe, it became a 
precondition for Bosnia’s accession in order to force through the reform that was 
subjected to resilient local contestation.350 This linking of police reform to the signing of 
the SAA became highly problematic from the point of view of the OHR; the EU 
maintained that the accession process was a voluntary one and thus the OHR could not 
use its Bonn powers to impose the reform.351 Given that the designs to centralise the 
police were threatening the autonomy of the Serb entity, the RS yet again opposed the 
process. The OHR finally set a deadline for agreeing on the police reform. When the 
deadline passed and no agreement was reached, the OHR imposed a set of reforms in 
order to discipline the obstructing Serbs. With no local consultation the High 
Representative altered the way in which the state level executive and legislative bodies 
functioned, with the aim of making it more difficult for national groups to use the veto 
powers to protect their national interests. These measures were designed as ‘a shock and 
awe’ display of the OHR’s authority and its ability to deal with local contention. 352  
 
This plunged the RS and the OHR into further cycle of contention. Sensing a divide in 
the international community, Banja Luka mobilised Moscow’s support and Russia duly 
condemned the OHR’s actions.353 Framed as an unconstitutional and illegal decree, 
Serbs organised mass anti-OHR demonstrations in the RS, while the President of the 
Republic resigned as protest. In the face of the pressure, the OHR had little choice but to 
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negotiate with Banja Luka. Eventually, the OHR was forced to accept a watered down 
agreement bearing little resemblance to the original police reform as a face saving 
compromise.  The attempt to reform the police was not only unnecessary and too far-
reaching, but also came at the time when the status of Kosovo was a potentially 
destabilising issue.354 As many commentators have pointed out, this marked the 
beginning of the decline in the OHR’s credibility.355 It is also notable that the divisions 
among the international actors created opportunities for local contestation: particularly 
the opposition of Moscow to the OHR’s police reform venture and the ensuing 
alignment with Banja Luka meant that the Serbs could confidently challenge the 
process. Moreover, the blatant over-stretching of the OHR’s authority and mandate and 
the arbitrary punishment for questioning the process served to further mobilise Serb 
contestation. This was the case as the police reform process appeared to vindicate the 
Serb framing of the OHR as biased actor aiming to get rid of the RS through 
centralisation of the state.  
 
 
Contention in Lower Level Institutions 
 
It is not only the joint, central level institutions where local contentious techniques are 
discernible; lower level cantonal and entity institutions feature frequently as sites of 
contention. As noted earlier in relation to the Poplašen/Brčko crisis, entity level bodies 
such as the RS National Assembly have played an important role in challenging 
decisions taken by the OHR. What is striking here is that while such practices – 
challenging in representative bodies decisions taken by the executive – would generally 
be regarded as a part of the standard democratic process, in Bosnia they are seen as an 
impediment to progress by the OHR in particular. In terms of investigating the 
contentious practices operating in the lower level institutional domains, the RS has used 
the legislative process to propagate its own statebuilding agenda as well as to enhance 
its negotiation position in the externally-led statebuilding process. Most notably, the RS 
                                               
354International Crisis Group Report no.198 2009, 14 
355
 See for instance McMahon and Western, The Death of Dayton and Parish, The Demise of Dayton 
Protectorate 
119 
 
legislated a law on referendum, regarded a direct violation of the DPA by the OHR.356 
Although the law does not allude to specific questions a referendum might pose, the 
notion of RS referendum is generally understood to be synonymous with secession from 
the Bosnian state. Initially decreed in 1993 and amended in 2010, the law makes results 
of referenda legally binding for institutions of the RS. It has become, particularly in the 
recent years, the contentious practice of choice for Serb actors contesting international 
statebuilding practices and frequent negotiation leverage used by the Serbs. This 
legislative process is mirrored in the discursive domain where the RS have increasingly 
taken a legalist ground, representing particularly the OHR’s interventionism as a breach 
of Bosnian and international law. The fact that no referendum has so far been organized 
seems to indicate that it serves primarily as a negotiation tool.357  In terms of lower level 
institutions, the case of Mostar is instructive of how institutions are deployed in order to 
contest international statebuilding measures. In 2004 the OHR used its Bonn powers to 
impose a directive, ‘Mostar City Statute’, to unify the Herzegovinian town that had seen 
some of the most brutal fighting during the war and had remained divided ever since. In 
demographic terms Mostar is populated by Croats and Bosniaks; the town holds special 
meaning to Croats as the only Croat-dominated town in Bosnia and as such is seen as 
the unofficial capital of Bosnian Croats. The Mostar Statute sought to eradicate the war-
time parallel structures by creating a unified administrative system. This unified 
administration of the town has been subjected to considerable contention, particularly 
by the Croats.358 This has entailed boycotts and refusals to co-operate in the Mostari 
institutions, but also the maintenance of unofficial parallel structures, discussed later in 
this chapter.  
 
 Politics of Demography and Contesting Refugee Returns 
 
If the entity level institutions have been used to challenge international statebuilding 
measures, somewhat different methods have been used in the municipal level 
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bureaucracy.  Municipal level institutions, generally controlled by a single national 
group, have been primarily used to disrupt refugee returns.  The reversal of the effects 
of ethnic cleansing during the war through refugee returns has been one of the key 
pillars in the international mission in Bosnia. As declared in the Annex VII of the DPA, 
‘The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the 
settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.359 This was seen as a way to 
compensate the human rights violations that occurred during the war as well as to undo 
the effects of ethnic cleansing. Refugee repatriation was thus regarded as ‘essential to 
effective peacebuilding’.360  Coupled with the policy goal of turning Bosnia into 
democratic and prosperous nation, repatriation of refugees has been a constant in the 
international policy throughout the statebuilding venture.361 Yet, the effect of the 
internationally-sponsored refugee returns was initially to further institutionalise the 
segregation of the communities rather than challenging the divisions, as envisaged by 
international statebuilders.362 This was mainly due to the fact that many refugees opted 
to settle in areas where their own group constituted majority rather than automatically 
returning to their pre-war residences.  At the same time, the returns process has become 
crucial both as an object of contention and as a means through which the international 
vision of Bosnian statehood is challenged.    
 
Given that the war was fought in the name of territory and identity, refugee returns 
following the war became a highly politicized issue and both an object and an 
instrument of local contention. The attitudes of local actors towards refugee returns 
vary. It is crucial here to distinguish between majority and minority returns: majority 
returns refers to a process whereby refugees and displaced persons settle in areas 
controlled by their own group, while minority returns denote returns to areas controlled 
by another group. For Bosniaks refugee return to their pre-war homes has represented a 
welcome reversal of the war gains of its enemies through peaceful means. Many Croats 
                                               
359
 DPA,  available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=375.  
360
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Statistics Package 31 December 2010’  
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/C8DEEFACFF6821A 
802570A7004C6A42?OpenDocument  
361
 Refugee returns has been relatively uncontentious objective among the international actors. Russia for 
instance has pledged support for the policy (as for instance indicated in ‘Foreign Minister Ivanov says 
peace process in Bosnia not yet irreversible’ BBC 17 December 1998. Accessed through Nexis UK 21 
April 2010.) 
362
 Daniela Heimerl ‘The return of refugees and internally displaced persons: From coercion to 
sustainability?’ International Peacekeeping, 12 no 3 (2005), 381 
121 
 
and Serbs have, on other hand, favoured majority returns and resettlement which in 
effect meant maintaining the communities, often ethnically homogenous, formed during 
the war. Therefore, while from the Bosniak point of view re-mixing of the populations 
is essentially desirable as it could undo the effects of the war-time ethnic cleansing, for 
many Serb and Croat statebuilders minority returns threatened the formation of 
homogenous Serb and Croat municipalities. Although Bosniaks generally agreed with 
the policy of returns, they actively challenged the feature of property restitution which 
meant that returnees were given the choice of selling their properties; they feared that 
minority returnees would opt for selling rather than permanently returning to areas 
controlled by other groups.363 This resulted in administrative delays in Bosniak-
dominated areas in implementing the laws decreed by the OHR.  
 
Even if the rationales for contesting refugee returns are different, the contentious 
practices have followed similar patterns.  Local municipalities controlled by Serbs and 
Croats have challenged the international statebuilding policy of encouraging minority 
refugee returns by engaging in ‘large scale and orchestrated’ practices such as issuing 
looting and burning permits concerning houses owned by returnees, encouraging 
occupation of returnees’ properties and returns by members of their own nationality, 
refusing to evict illegal occupants of properties or provide information to returnees, 
attacking international officials present in contested regions, illegal reallocations of land 
to representatives of the majority nationality and delays and outright refusals to 
implement laws devised by the OHR in order to protect returnees, not to mention 
peaceful as well as violent demonstrations against returnees.364 The Serb and Croat 
contention of such international policy is predicated on the need to ensure the 
concurrence between territory and identity. In Croat-dominated areas the control over 
the economy has provided an efficient tool to block minority returns and encourage 
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Croat majority returns. According to the International Crisis Group, Croatian companies 
linked to the nationalist political structures in Zagreb invested heavily in Croat-
controlled Cantons in Bosnia thus incentivising majority returns by offering 
employment to Bosnian Croats.365 One of Croatia’s leading wood-processing 
companies, Finvest, became overwhelmingly dominant economic player in the Croat-
controlled Canton 10 by gradually taking over the economic functions performed 
previously by other companies, as for instance a saw mill that used to employ over 
2,000 workers before the war. Particularly in the northern parts of the Canton the whole 
economy became dependent on the company, which had close links with the main Croat 
party, the HDZ.366 Similar cases of economic and employment discrimination have been 
reported in relation to other companies in Bosnia, such as the Croat-controlled Aluminij 
in Mostar and the Serb-owned Ljubija iron mine.367 Political parties are at the core of 
the mobilising structures through which the international efforts of repatriating refugees 
are undermined.368 At the same time, media has played an important role in creating an 
atmosphere of hostility through inflammatory reporting and programming that 
reinforces the sense of victimhood of the majority national group.369   
 
The above acts of contention were met with grave concern in the diplomatic circles of 
Sarajevo in the immediate years following the DPA.370 Local contention of refugee 
returns was not only seen a threat to the overall peacebuilding venture but it was also 
regarded as a factor jeopardizing quick international disengagement from the post-
conflict process in the country. Successful repatriation of refugees was an essential part 
of the exit strategy. At the same time, the host countries of Bosnian refugees were 
anxious to see the refugees returning home.371 In an attempt to deal with local disruption 
of refugee returns, measures of coercion and capital were adopted by the OHR. 
Combined with the frequent use of Bonn powers to dismiss local officials engaged in 
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administrative forms of contesting minority returns, Reconstruction and Return Task 
Force (designed to support refugee returns) launched the Property Law Implementation 
Programme which established extensive monitoring regime tasked to supervise the 
process and discipline officials deemed obstructionist. The OHR imposed legislation 
that surpassed all municipal, entity and state-level property laws with a regular 
monitoring mechanism that allowed it to identify and punish local officials obstructing 
returns.372 A shift from supporting returns more generally to promoting minority returns 
more specifically also occurred.373 This came as a direct response to the use of majority 
returns by local actors to consolidate their control of their respective localities. As 
Heimerl argues, what initially began as a humanitarian and voluntary process of 
repatriating refugees, turned into a coercive process of assertively promoting minority 
returns. 374 
 
Alongside the use of political coercion, capital was deployed to disincentivize 
disruptions of returns. Substantial donor funds were deployed to stimulating minority 
returns and circumvent the administrative opposition. The US government, for instance, 
launched a $70 million reintegration and stabilisation program of local communities, 
aimed at facilitating the return of 100,000 individuals belonging to minority groups.375 
In 2002, €23.5million out of the €71.9million EU funding package was directed to the 
returns process.376 The key component of these programmes was the withdrawal of aid 
where local officials did not collaborate with the donor government’s policy on returns; 
the aforementioned US government initiative left three local administrations (Prijedor, 
Pale and Foča) out of the financial aid package. The correlation between local 
implementation of refugee returns and financial aid was also contracted into the 
Stabilisation and Association Process; in order to progress towards EU membership and 
the associated financial gains, the Bosnian authorities were expected to ‘ensure that the 
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refugee return is properly funded and fully operational’ as well as to ‘complete the 
process of refugee return and achieve significant progress towards their economic and 
social integration’.377  
 
Although the international measures based largely on coercion and capital were 
relatively successful in countering local contestation of the internationally-led returns 
process particularly in the early 2000s, it can be argued that they have not reversed the 
demographic effects of the war. Whilst considerable numbers of refugees and displaced 
persons have returned to their pre-war towns and villages, the ethnic makeup of the 
country has not been reversed to match that of the pre-war years. From the estimated 2 
million Bosnians who were internally displaced or became refugees due to the conflict, 
by 2010 approximately 500,000 have returned to their places of origin.378 Many of those 
returns, particularly to areas currently occupied by other national groups, have been of 
temporary nature in order to sell or exchange properties.379 The narrowly-focused 
prioritisation of minority returns with no parallel development of official socio-
economic safety networks and opportunities has rendered the international policy 
largely unsuccessful.380 This has enabled the local statebuilding actors to continue to 
encourage strategic returns whereby refugees and displaced persons have resettled in 
areas dominated by their own national group where they are less likely to face 
discrimination and more likely to find employment. It is apparent then that while 
coercion as a method of countering contention has been efficient to an extent, the 
misuse of capital in promoting returns – focusing on conditionality rather than creating 
socio-economic opportunities – has meant that relatively little sustained minority return 
has taken place.  It is also noteworthy that even though the international statebuilders 
were largely united in their intention of altering the tangible effects of ethnic cleansing, 
they were less so in terms of reaching such aims. The policies of different international 
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donor agencies – primarily international organizations and non-governmental bodies - 
have been un-coordinated 381 and frequent disagreements over returns-related issues 
have made the harmonization of the international practice difficult. 382 
 
 
Contention through Parallel Structures 
 
So far the analysis has explored contentious practices operating in the power-sharing 
institutions as well as in the municipal administrations. Contentious practices have also 
operated through a combination of existing, formal institutions and new, informal 
structures. Informal, parallel institutions have been particularly prevalent in 
Herzegovina and have featured in the Croat attempts to mediate international 
statebuilding. Parallelism, arguably a predictable by-product of civil war, marked every 
aspect of the Bosnian society following the conflict. Not only were there three armies 
and police forces, but even three international dialling codes existed in the post-conflict 
Bosnia. In effect, parallel administrative structures were formalized in Dayton which 
divided the country into separate entities where the political power resided. While the 
DPA formalized the Serb governance structures in the RS, parallel administrative 
structures not sanctioned by the agreement have persisted particularly in Western 
Herzegovina. A case in point here are the Croat parallel structures that date back to the 
Bosnian Croat statebuilding ambitions during the conflict; Herceg Bosna, a mini state, 
served as the political entity of the Bosnian Croats. Envisioned as an integral part of the 
solution for Bosnia’s post-war design, the statelet was premised on its own political, 
military, economic, educational and cultural structures.383 The parallel structures of 
Herceg Bosna have shown considerable resilience in the face of international efforts to 
do away with them.384 In practice such parallelism has meant the existence of separate, 
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Croat-dominated, structures for military and police, public utilities, health service, 
pension funds, education and even currencies.385 Reportedly the Croats even had their 
own intelligence unit, gathering information on the Federal government and 
representatives of the international community.386  Banks too have been part of the 
parallel structures; an example is the Hercegovacka Banka which had close ties with the 
HDZ and was suspected of money laundering for HDZ politicians.387 It is suspected that 
the creation of parallel financial system controlled by the HDZ was to fund the 
functioning of the future Croat entity.388   
 
Yet, not all parallel institutions carry out illegal tasks, but much of the parallelism 
focuses on day to day administrative tasks. The most explicit manifestation has been the 
town of Mostar which continues in effect to be divided between the Croats and the 
Bosniaks with few functioning common institutions. The OHR’s attempt to abolish the 
parallel structures in Mostar, the 2004 ‘Mostar statute’, proved to be a temporary 
remedy. As the International Crisis Group notes, the creation of unified public services 
in Mostar was limited to the formal level; the old parallel structures continued to operate 
separately under a common name.389 In the case of the Mostari water utility company, 
‘only the water itself is common’ while the administration of the company has been 
carried out through two separate systems.390 The Bosniak administration  of the 
company is located in the Eastern side of town – controlled by the Bosniaks – providing 
services for Bosniak clientele and controlling the Bosniak employees, while the Croat 
structures in the Western part of the town perform the same task but in relation to Croat 
staff and consumers.391  
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While the persistence of parallelism in towns such as Mostar is a reflection of the local 
statebuilding agendas, Croats have also created new parallel institutions. These parallel 
structures played an important role in the cycle of contention between the OHR and the 
main Croat party, HDZ BiH, in the early 2000s.  The starting point was the November 
2000 elections which were accompanied by referendum on Croat rights, deemed illegal 
by the OSCE. The referendum was organized as a response to the perceived threat to the 
Croat statebuilding agenda following an OSCE-imposed change to the electoral rules 
regarded as detrimental to Croat interests.392 The referendum, supported by 
organisations such as the Association of Croatian Military Invalids of the Homeland 
War (HVIDRA),393 centred on the question of whether the Croats in Bosnian should 
have their own political, educational, cultural and scientific institutions on the Bosnian 
territory and reportedly the overwhelming majority of the voters answered 
favourably.394 In addition to organising the referendum HDZ BiH representatives 
initiated a boycott of the joint institutions as a protest against the change in the electoral 
law. The OHR responded by coercion and removed Croat-held seats from Cantonal 
Assemblies. The OHR and the OSCE also continued to discursively decertify the Croat 
National Congress by asserting that ‘everybody has the right to meet but whatever they 
come up with has no legal weight and is not legally binding…’.395 Bosnian Croat 
political activists interviewed for this thesis maintained that such international responses 
reinforced the confrontational dynamic as international decertification of the Croat 
protests merely added to Croat sense of undemocratic imposition of international will.396 
 
The turbulent relations continued. In 2001 Croats attempted to establish self-rule in 
Hercegovina by relying on the parallel state structures in the Croat-controlled territories. 
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This was seen as necessary due to the detrimental status of Croats in Bosnia. 
Legitimized by the assertion that ‘the OSCE and the international community turned the 
Federation into a Bosniak entity,’ an alliance of Croat parties, the Croat National 
Congress, voted for the creation of Inter-Cantonal Council and the establishment of 
parallel Croat institutions which were envisaged to have the final authority on all Croat 
matters in Bosnia.397  The body was to protect the Croat national interest in Bosnia 
"until the full constitutional and real equality of Croat people in BiH can be 
ensured".398 The Croat members of the Federal Army also walked out as a 
demonstration of loyalty to the Croat National Congress.399 The Croat self-rule was 
premised on the establishment of presidency, legislative council and entity and cantonal 
parliaments as well as on its own taxation system. In addition, Croat national insignia 
and coat of arms were deployed in an act of contesting the Bosnian state symbols.400 
The creation of formal mobilising structures, such as the Croat National Congress and 
the Croat Peoples’ Assembly, enabled dissemination of information by issuing 
declarations as well as framing the issue at hand, the Croat status in Bosnia, and the 
actors involved.401 Other points of mobilization, such as HVIDRA as well as Croat-
controlled banks also played a role in terms of support and financial resources. The 
Croat elite-controlled Hercegovačka Banka provided financial means for the self-rule 
attempt.402 According to an international investigation, the bank had previously operated 
as a funding source for high ranking Bosnian Croat war crime indictees as well as 
campaigns to change the Bosnian Constitution to suit the Croat interests. During the 
self-rule attempt, army officials withdrawn from the Federal Army were paid from the 
funds held by the bank.403 When SFOR troops raided the bank in April 2001, large scale 
demonstrations and riots erupted, resulting in international investigators being taken 
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hostage. HVIDRA is thought to be behind the organisation of the violent 
demonstrations.404 HVIDRA also arranged the withdrawal of the Croat faction from the 
Federal army, in addition to organising anti-OHR rallies and protests. It even warned 
Bosnian Croat politicians for not yielding to the international demands of halting the 
self-rule campaign.405 Alongside HVIDRA, the Headquarters for the Protection of 
Identity and Interests of Croat People, founded in Vitez in March 2001, issued regular 
statements during the self-rule attempt. The organisation offered its support for the 
Inter-Cantonal Council. In reinforcing the Croat self-image based on victimhood, the 
organisation  appealed to the Croat public by noting that ‘we also call the Croat people 
to not allow the tearing of the Croat being, and to stand by us and all others who strive 
towards the equality of the Croat people in BiH’.406  Bosnian Croat priests from the 
Catholic Church took part in meetings of organisations involved in the self-rule attempt 
and publicly condemned the international policy on Bosnian Croats as one that ‘takes 
equality away from Croats’.407 In addition to lending support for the contentious actions 
and seeking to discursively mobilise Croats for the cause, some Catholic priests used 
religious services to reinforce the injustice frames which constructed the Croats as the 
victims and blamed the international community.408  
 
The OHR again responded to the Croat contention both by coercive and discursive 
means. In terms of the former, dismissals of the self-rule leadership as well as travel 
bans were initiated. It is likely, however, that the actors initiating the self-rule campaign 
were conscious of the likelihood of dismissals of politicians but calculated that the use 
of Bonn powers to crack down on Croats would in effect serve as a further evidence of 
the OHR anti-Croat bias.409  In terms of the discursive responses, the decertification of 
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the HDZ and other politicians involved in the action was constructed by the OHR again 
around the demarcation between the betrayed Croat population and the dangerous 
political elites. The elites, according to the OHR, were distinctly unconcerned with the 
well-being of their constituents; on the contrary, they were engaged in criminal and 
corrupt activities that were to benefit a few at the expense of the wider Croat 
community. Hence, no basis for negotiation between the HDZ and the OHR existed.410 
In this framing of the Croat contention, the OHR presented itself as the true friend of the 
Croat people and as such, tasked itself to save the population from the predatory elites. 
While on the one hand plunging the statebuilding project into a crisis, the self-rule 
campaign initiated by the Bosnian Croat statebuilder served to widen the opportunities 
for the international statebuilders to deal forcefully with HDZ BiH. Given the defiance 
of the DPA, the OHR had a well-justified reason to implement severe sanctions, 
including dismissing the leadership of the self-rule project. The failure of the self-rule 
attempt, the waning financial and political support from Croatia and tensions within the 
HDZ altered the Bosnian Croat statebuilding aims toward more moderate claims, 
namely reorganisation of the country into smaller units.  Yet, as Robinson and Pobrić 
write in an ethnographic account of nationalism in Bosnia a decade after the Dayton 
peace conference, strong support amongst the people for greater Croat autonomy and 
closer affiliation with the motherland continued to exist. 411 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
This chapter has provided an empirically-grounded investigation of local contentious 
practices and interactions between internal and external statebuilding agencies in the 
central and municipal level institutions. It suggested that rather than conceiving post-
conflict spaces as power vacuums various local statebuilding projects exist in local 
spaces. It is largely in the context of what Bose calls ‘minority syndromes’ of the 
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Bosnian constituent nations and conflicting interests that the international statebuilding 
intervention in Bosnia should be understood.412 The Chapter established a set of 
practices through which aspects of international statebuilding are sought to re-negotiate, 
ranging from boycotts and administrative measures to blocking of decision-making and 
using parallel local level structures. The central argument of the Chapter is that these 
modalities of contention represent an active local agency and are in essence techniques 
through which local actors seek to re-negotiate the process. In many ways the 
reoccurring theme in the discussion is the complexity of the statebuilding processes. 
While there is no unified or coherent international statebuilding project, local agendas 
out of which contention emerges are also different. There is, therefore, no across-the-
board or generalizable opposition to international statebuilding but it is rather specific 
statebuilding policies and strategies that prompt contention. While contentious practices 
are intimately linked to the local state formation projects, the discussion also implies 
that in certain instances the coercive nature of international statebuilding generates 
further contention. This was for instance the case with the police reform. Although the 
use of Bonn powers may dis-incentivize contention it has been unable to stifle local acts 
of contention altogether. In fact, the use of Bonn powers as a response to contention has 
in certain instances served as a mobilizing tool for further contention.  The analysis 
moves on from investigating concrete acts of contention in the institutional domain to 
interrogating non-material practices at the discursive and symbolic realms. In these 
more abstract realms rather different but equally salient modalities of contention exist 
that seek to undermine and shape international statebuilding efforts.  
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Chapter 5 
The Discursive Domain 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The overall theme of the thesis is that local actors engage in a range of bureaucratic, 
verbal and cognitive practices in an attempt to mediate aspects of international 
statebuilding. The previous Chapter traced contentious actions in the institutional 
domain and demonstrated how concrete and physical contentious practices are regularly 
used to re-negotiate aspects of the internationally-led statebuilding process. It is through 
these local practices that the statebuilding venture is mediated as local agencies actively 
engage in the process. Rather than constituting an externally-imposed blueprint for 
statehood, statebuilding appears to be an interactive process where internal and external 
agencies and agendas co-exist. This Chapter focuses on the discursive domain and 
interrogates the way in which international statebuilding is contested through verbal 
practices. The story told by this Chapter is essentially how the discursive power of the 
international statebuilding enterprise is mediated and transformed into narratives that 
challenge or seek to alter the statebuilding process. The Chapter suggests that local 
actors, possessing less material clout vis-à-vis the international statebuilding mission, 
rely on non-material methods of contention; they take advantage of the hegemonic 
discourses and through methods of re-framing and adaptation turn them into contentious 
practices that seek to undermine or alter the course of the statebuilding process.413 
While an investigation into the discursive domain tells us about non-material modalities 
of contention, it also allows us to further interrogate the relations between local and 
international actors.  The discursive power of the international statebuilding enterprise is 
exercised through the verbal exclusion and inclusion of local actors and through 
defining of what counts as legitimate forms of, and topics for, public debate in Bosnia. 
At the same time, the authority of international statebuilding actors is communicated 
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and reinforced in the discursive domain. This has meant legitimizing the international 
presence and its activities in the country with recourse to the hegemonic ‘liberal peace’ 
narrative, representing the external intervention as a force for democracy, human rights, 
good governance and economic development. Local actors regularly contest and 
problematize these meanings produced by international statebuilding actors through 
alternative narratives.  Discourses thus play a pivotal role in the production of meaning. 
It is through discourses that actors, events and processes gain meaning and through 
categorizations that the world is ordered in a specific way.  
 
The Chapter argues that the discursive acts of contention in Bosnia have primarily 
centered on two strategies: one that de-legitimizes international statebuilding through 
re-framing the ‘liberal peace’ narratives and another that taps into other international 
discourses and seeks to appeal to international statebuilding actors in order to alter the 
process. Particularly the former strategy is telling of discursive hybridity; while the 
‘liberal peace’ remains the hegemonic framework, its concepts and norms are adapted to 
produce alternative understandings of the process and the actors involved. International 
actors have countered these local practices through the strategy of decertification and 
marginalization which has been embodied in the representation of the local actors in 
question as self-interested and criminal. With the view of tracing these contentious 
practices and interactions, the Chapter begins by touching upon the salience of 
discursive repertoires of contention and then moves onto investigating the 
delegitimization strategy used by local actors. The analysis then proceeds to the 
discursive strategy of appealing to international actors through appropriation of certain 
discourses found in the international policy-making circles. The final part of the Chapter 
looks at the international attempts to counter the local discourses.  
 
 
Discourses and Contention 
 
The salience of discursive aspects of post-conflict operations stems from the assumption 
that statebuilding is not only contested practice, but it is also a verbal process. 
Discourses operate to give meaning to actions, events and actors. How the post-conflict 
process is interpreted and understood is consequential in that these representations and 
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discourses impact agencies’ understanding of what actions might be legitimate and 
appropriate.414 The continuous and contentious public narratives serve to construct 
identities (‘spoiler’, ‘partner’, ‘international’) as well as to legitimize, or alternatively 
delegitimize, actors, actions or agendas. There is no single ‘reality’ of statebuilding but 
rather competing attempts to attach specific meanings and moral judgments to actors 
and their practices. Indeed, a closer look at the discursive domain of post-Dayton 
Bosnia reveals how competing and contradictory meanings of events, actors, agendas 
and the post-conflict process as a whole are constantly reproduced in public discourses. 
Discursive aspects of contention have also caught the interest of contentious politics 
research that has largely been concerned with physical forms of contention. Steinberg, 
for one, notes that rather than focusing only on concrete acts of contention ‘we must pay 
closer attention to the voices of the actors’. 415 Koopmans and Statham go even further 
by arguing that ‘it is necessary to go beyond the image of protestors physically standing 
at the gates of institutions with their objections, protest has become more 
sophisticated...’.416 They show that discursive actions might entail rather pedestrian 
practices such as releasing public statements, but stress that claims made in this way 
gain often immediate visibility. As a part of a wider array of contentious actions 
discursive forms may then be important in communicating the demands of the group. 
 
It is necessary to say a few words with respect to the mechanisms of contention at the 
discursive domain. A theme underpinning the Chapter relates to opportunity structures 
created by the international statebuilding venture. As noted in Chapter 2, opportunity 
structures refer to the ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – 
dimensions of the political environment’ that also entail discursive dimensions 
pertaining to the way in which hegemonic discourses enable or limit contention.417 A 
salient feature of the discursive political environment in post-Dayton Bosnia has been 
the ‘liberal peace’ discourse suggesting that peace and prosperity in Bosnia can be 
achieved through democracy and the respect for human rights and the rule of law. It is 
the liberal peace paradigm that has then acted as the overarching hegemonic discourse 
that has enabled and/or limited contention. The Chapter argues that the liberal peace 
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narrative has created opportunities for local contention as the actual international 
practices on the ground have contradicted the liberal rhetoric. This has enabled the 
formulation of credible and resonant discourses portraying international statebuilding as 
an oppressive practice.  In addition to the discursive opportunity structures, framing is 
pivotal mechanism when it comes to tracing contention at the discursive domain. As 
noted in Chapter 2, framing denotes an act of interpreting reality. Following Entman, 
framing entails the highlighting of certain aspects of the perceived reality in way that 
promotes ‘a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment, recommendation for the item described’.418 Diagnostic frames 
identify problems and assign blame and responsibility. Prognostic frames, in turn, 
propose solutions to the problem in question. In Bosnia the prevailing frame has been 
one emphasizing injustice and the victimization as well as suffering of the group in 
question. According to Benford and Snow, frames are created by connecting issues, 
events or experiences into a coherent whole (‘frame articulation’) and emphasizing 
certain issues over others (‘frame amplification’). 419  Framing then, as a mechanism of 
contention, is essentially a device of argumentation that emphasizes certain aspects of 
the situation at the expense of others.  It is through framing that the discursive 
modalities of contention are formulated; in fact, as noted earlier, it is often through a 
process of re-framing the discourses of those in power that discursive repertoires 
emerge.  In the Bosnian case, as the detail below will demonstrate, local contentious 
actors tap into the existing international narratives, concepts and debates in an attempt 
to either destabilize or alternatively, alter the course of the statebuilding process.  
 
 
Frame Contests 
 
The chapter traces the contentious, verbal processes that exist in tandem with the more 
tangible statebuilding activities. While not undermining the hegemonic position of the 
‘liberal peace’ narrative, the multiplicity of competing representations of the process 
and the actors articulated through the language of liberal peace results in discursive 
forms of hybridity. Competing representations of reality have not been limited to the 
international-local nexus; ‘frame contests’ also take place within the different groups 
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engaged in discursive interactions.420 A case in point is the aforementioned fault line 
between Moscow and the Western donor governments; Russian discourses pertaining to 
the post-conflict process in Bosnia have regularly challenged the representations of 
local actors (Serbs in particular) as criminal and irresponsible as noted elsewhere in this 
chapter. Moreover, the ‘EU or isolation’ narrative favored by many Western officials in 
an attempt to counter local contention is challenged by the Russian discourse 
emphasizing peace rather than Euro-Atlantic integration as the primary objective of the 
international intervention in Bosnia. According to this view the process of fulfilling the 
membership requirements of the EU or NATO – which generally entail further 
centralization of the country’s governance - may ultimately lead to further division and 
conflict and pose a threat to peace in Bosnia.421 Frame contests also occur between local 
actors. They are noteworthy here as they represent attempts to shape the international 
officials’ interpretation of the process.  The main example here is the different frames 
pertaining to the nature of peace in Bosnia. Bosniaks regularly frame the statebuilding 
process as one of instability and danger which necessitates the international presence. 
The Serb statebuilding actors, who have called for the localisation of the process, have 
sought to debunk the perpetual crisis narrative and the subsequent demand for extended 
international presence. Responding to the Bosniak narrative, the prime minister of the 
Serb entity, Milorad Dodik, argued in the New York Times that 
  
‘Although it has become unfashionable to say so, ours is a country 
at peace…although we continue working on the institutional shape 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is absolute no threat of a return to 
violence’. 
 
‘ It should be neither surprising nor a cause for alarm that people of 
good will differ about the structure most appropriate for this new 
state. Many of us believe that a decentralized architecture is both 
more faithful to the Dayton Accords and more suitable for the 
country. We do not support the centralized model that some in the 
international community have sought to impose on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’422   
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Contra to the Bosniak discourses, many in the Serb community have argued that 
international statebuilding has in fact been successful; so much so that it is time for the 
international statebuilding officials to give up their executive powers. These brief 
examples demonstrate how different actors involved constantly engage in the 
reproduction of meaning in the discursive domain and how these understandings of the 
statebuilding process might make certain actions legitimate while ruling out other 
course of action.  
 
 
De-Legitimizing International Statebuilding 
 
Actors seeking to contest the authority through discursive means rarely opt for different 
narrative frameworks but they adapt and appropriate authorities’ discourses as they 
discover aspects susceptible for critique.423 This has been evident in the Bosnian case: 
whereas local contentious practices in the institutional domain have often tangible and 
concrete outcomes, contentious actions in the discursive domain seek to destabilize and 
subvert international statebuilding through highlighting the contradictions between 
international statebuilding rhetoric and practice. In what Steinberg calls ‘dialogic 
process’, the local discursive strategies are derived from the liberal peace and other 
international discourses.424 Yet, the adaptation of international discourses is not only a 
pragmatic or instrumental strategy, but the actual practice of statebuilding as 
implemented by international actors has enabled the formulation of credible discourse. 
This is so as the international practice of statebuilding has often fallen short of the 
rhetoric that underwrites it. To put it differently, the disconnect between international 
statebuilding rhetoric and practice has enabled the formulation of empirically-credible 
contentious discourses by local actors. In many ways the contentious discourses that are 
articulated through counter-hegemony re-politicize the statebuilding process by 
subjecting the practice of international statebuilding for public debate. It is also 
noteworthy that discursive strategies of contention are intimately linked to the more 
concrete practices, such as protests and demonstrations, in that they provide 
legitimization for engaging in such activities. While delegitimizing international 
statebuilding practices, they also legitimize the respective local statebuilding agendas. 
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The following section focuses on the first of the main discursive strategies, 
delegitimization. The international discourses that are most commonly re-framed and 
deployed to contest international statebuilding practice are those that pertain to human 
rights, democracy and local ownership.425   
 
 
International Statebuilding as Denial of Local 
Human Rights 
 
To begin tracing contentious local practices in the discursive domain, the attention is 
first turned to the human rights discourses.  The universalist narrative of ‘rights’ has 
been one of the defining features of international politics in the past decades. As Mutua 
suggests, the post-World War II can be coined as the ‘Age of Rights’.426 Unsurprisingly 
such thinking has also informed post-conflict statebuilding agendas; Boutros-Ghali’s 
1992 Agenda for Peace, representing one of the first formulations of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, referred to the protection of human rights as one of the key aspects of 
peacebuilding. In the context of post-war Bosnia, the international architects of the DPA 
enshrined the respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights in the Bosnian 
Constitution. This was based on the notion that ensuring the basic rights of Bosnians 
was one of the most essential factors in ensuring the success of the peace process.427 
Human rights have featured prominently not only in the international statebuilding 
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narratives but also in the discourses of local statebuilding agencies (particularly Serb 
and Croat) who seek to contest the international presence. The universalism 
underpinning the notion of human rights has enabled the formulation of resonant 
discourses for challenging international statebuilding. This has generally meant 
foregrounding contradictions between the empirical reality and rhetoric of international 
statebuilding.   
 
The local ‘rights’ discourses, deployed primarily by Serb and Croat actors, contest the 
international statebuilding on the basis of its failure to guarantee human rights for their 
respective groups.428   For many in the Serb community, the OHR-initiated imposition 
of laws and statebuilding measures regularly violate the rights of Serbs as enshrined in 
Dayton. The frame articulation process has meant discursively connecting the 
internationally-led centralization efforts to the political rights of Serbs. Serb rights are 
nowhere more threatened, as is often pointed out, than in the attempts to gradually 
centralize the state and thus reverse the Dayton-structure of the country.429 Interest 
groups have taken a prominent role in mobilizing and disseminating these 
representations of the international statebuilding project. The RS-based ‘Together to the 
Truth’ association, for instance, called for a Serb boycott of the country’s powersharing 
institutions as a protest against the continued violation of Serbs’ rights resulting from 
the changes to the DPA that aim to centralize the country further.430 Other Bosnian 
Serb-run associations representing victims of the conflict, war veterans, displaced 
people and refugees have similarly assumed an active role by issuing statements, 
drafting petitions and sending open letters to the High Representative calling for an end 
to internationally-imposed statebuilding measures that violate the rights of Serbs in 
Bosnia. Political autonomy, they argue, is the primary Serb right that is constantly 
threatened by the actions of international statebuilders. Alongside the gradual 
centralization, the use of Bonn powers to dismiss elected officials is seen by many Serbs 
as encroachment of Serb rights. This was particularly the case during Paddy Ashdown’s 
(2002-2006) tenure as the High Representative when the use of Bonn powers was at its 
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height.  The RS Veterans’ Association called for the removal of the HR Ashdown in 
2004 as he was seen to ‘act towards RS and Serb people in BiH in a discriminatory 
way’.431 The Serb Radical Party, in turn, chose poignantly the international day of 
human rights to issue a statement on the international community’s breach of human 
rights. The statement asserted that  
 
‘representatives of the international community in BiH advocate a 
sophisticated version of the occupying regime banning political 
parties, politicians and by infringing upon the freedom of the 
press’.432  
 
 
The claim articulated by Serbs that the international actors in general and the OHR in 
particular systematically undermine Serb rights in Bosnia has been given resonance by 
the commonly-held perception in the RS that majority of the dismissals of local officials 
sanctioned by the OHR have targeted the Serb community.433 Serb contention through 
the rights-narrative has demanded the closure of the OHR and localization of the 
statebuilding process, as will be discussed later.  
 
For the Croat community, in turn, the issue of Croat rights lies at the very heart of the 
Croat statebuilding agenda. Much of Croat contention in the discursive domain has 
centred on the current Constitutional arrangements, which left Croats without an entity 
of their own, as the principal issue. The frame articulation process has connected the 
dual-entity structure to the infringement of Croat rights in Bosnia; the lack of a Croat 
run-entity has turned Croats from a constituent nation into a minority, as the discourse 
highlights. Croat actors have consistently demanded a more extensive Croat 
representation in Bosnia, positing that ‘the basic postulates of democracy and rights of 
the Croat people in BiH have been violated’.434 More radical critics have called the 
infringement of Croat rights a political genocide. For many in the Croat community it is 
the unjust peace agreement that sustains Croat nationalist sentiment following the end of 
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the war.435 Interpreted and understood through the injustice frame, the Croat 
statebuilders argue that the international community’s policy in Bosnia is mistakenly 
guided by the ‘number of Croats’ while disregarding ‘the fact that equality is not 
measured in percentages’.436  The infringement of Bosnian Croat rights have serious 
repercussions for democracy in Bosnia as ‘the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina could only 
be democratic if the Croat Republic was established which would guarantee 
institutionalised freedom for Croats’.437 Dragan Čović, a prominent figure in the 
political life of Bosnian Croats, warned in similar vein that ‘if Croats are not an equal 
people in Bosnia, the country will be doomed to failure’.438 In the contentious Croat 
discourses the violation of Croat rights is frequently connected to the undemocratic 
nature of the High Representative’s actions. In an open letter to the High Representative 
Wolfgang Petritsch, the Croat leader Ante Jelavić - removed from the Bosnian 
Presidency by the OHR for establishing Croat self-rule – argued that the OHR’s powers 
to remove officials without a due process were not in accordance with the ideals of 
democracy for which Bosnia was striving. Neither did the OHR’s actions show respect 
for human rights of the removed individuals.439 
 
While much of the discursive contention carried out by Croat actors has been mobilised 
through political party structures (mainly the HDZ), also part of the clergy in the 
Bosnian Catholic Church has played an active role in amplifying the Croat plight and 
making demands on the international community to remedy the situation.440 While 
condemning the continued ‘silencing, marginalising and ignoring’ of Croats by the 
international statebuilding actors, they have sought to garner external support for Croat 
rights, primarily from the Vatican.441 Representative of the Catholic Church argued that 
it is the only institution actively promoting Croat rights in Bosnia as politicians are 
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constrained by the fear of dismissals by the OHR.442 Others have critiqued the DPA as 
an institution that has legalized injustice against Bosnian Croats and demanded the 
international community to protect the Croats as the smallest community.443 The process 
of frame articulation in the Croat statebuilding project has thus meant connecting the 
territorial and Constitutional arrangements created in Dayton to the institutionalized 
breach of Croat rights; discursive contention has demanded territorial rearrangement of 
the country as the only solution to the plight of Bosnian Croats. As an HDZ official 
noted in 2001, ‘we do not want third entity, but we are asking for all the rights of 
Croats to be…ensured by the Constitution and laws… and for the majority-principle to 
be eliminated’.444  
 
 
Undemocratic Democratization 
 
Intimately linked to the question of rights is democracy. Needless to say, democracy has 
formed the corner stone of the post-war international involvement, boldly stated in the 
peace accord itself and repeated thereafter in various policy documents.445 Initially seen 
as tantamount to holding free elections, the international community’s approach to 
democratisation in Bosnia went through a sea change following the 1997 Bonn meeting. 
As a result of the realisation that elections in Bosnia were unlikely to translate into a 
variant of liberal democracy, the Bonn powers gave the OHR executive powers to 
overrule local decision-making and dismiss officials which were extensive enough to 
make ‘a liberal blush’ as the former HR Ashdown acknowledged.446  
 
Local contentious discourses highlighting the undemocratic practice of democratisation 
in Bosnia have become a common place in the Serb and Croat discursive contention. 
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Highlighting these contradictions between the means and the ends of international 
statebuilding, the RS, for instance, argue that  
 
‘democracy, good governance and the rule of law cannot continue to 
develop within BiH, if the fundamental principles of democracy, 
good governance and the rule of law are repeatedly violated by the 
very international representatives who claim to seek their 
establishment’.447  
 
Whilst the use of Bonn powers is singled out by many Serb and Croat actors as the main 
threat to democracy, also the interference of international officials in the daily politics 
of Bosnia is frequently highlighted as overstepping the mandate. Examples are for 
instance refusals by international officials to work with certain parties regardless of their 
electoral mandate. A representative of the Croat party HDZ argued in this regard that 
pre-election statements made by US State Department officials pertaining to the 
desirability of a government without the HDZ constituted a danger to ‘democratic 
process in the country’.448 The Serb party SDS, regarded similarly by many in the 
international officials as a threat to the peace process, has likewise foregrounded 
international attempts to marginalise it as a caricature of democracy. As a party member 
noted, ‘the same people who are talking about the rule of law and democracy have 
violated it and placed themselves above it’.449  In 2000 the SDS urged its supporters to 
use the democratic process to defy the international attempts to disrupt Bosnian 
democracy; ‘our best response will be a massive turnout at elections’, SDS statement 
declared.450  The deployment of the ‘undemocratic democratisation’-narrative is not 
limited to actors who might be considered as ‘hard liners’. Politicians and other activists 
known for their moderate positions have also engaged in contesting international 
statebuilding as an illiberal practice.  Mladen Ivanić, from the moderate Serb PDP party 
argued that by taking over the functions of the domestic political institutions, the OHR 
has in effect invalidated democracy in Bosnia.451 Representatives of the Bosniak-
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dominated SDP party similarly deploy the contentious discourse by declaring that the 
continued role of the OHR in overriding the authority of Bosnia’s domestic institutions 
is ‘not in accordance with the established partnership relations’.452  A radical variant of 
this contentious discourse utilized by all the groups in Bosnia represents the 
internationally-led statebuilding as oppression. As public intellectual, Mohamed 
Filipović noted ‘the biggest illusion of our politicians is their belief that they represent 
and mean something and that they can influence the situation’, adding that Bosnia has 
become ‘an occupied country’.453 A leading Bosniak politician from the SDP party also 
noted that partnership between local actors and the OHR has gradually turned into one 
of domination by the latter, turning the country into an ‘unofficial protectorate’.454  
 
 
Local Ownership: International Statebuilding as  
Loss of Autonomy 
 
The analysis so far has explored how ideas of human rights and democracy have been 
deployed to challenge the international statebuilding practice. Unpacking the local 
discourses further, it is necessary to explore the idea of ownership of the statebuilding 
process and the shift that occurred in the statebuilding practice in Bosnia in the late 
1990s. In reflecting the general consensus among scholars and practitioners alike that 
peace and democracy cannot be imported from without,455 the High Representative 
Wolfgang Petritsch noted in 1999 that  
 
‘our new approach is ownership. This implies local ownership of not 
just assets, but of the problems inherited from communism and the 
war. Indeed, it implies the entire process of Dayton implementation 
and the very future of Bosnia itself’ 456 
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The logic underpinning the drastic policy change, as explained by Petrisch, was to 
overcome the culture of dependency; while the OHR actively assists locals by 
‘occasionally intervening to accelerate implementation of peace and democracy’, the 
post-war development must be firmly in the Bosnian hands as ‘this is the only way in 
which Bosnia and Herzegovina can become a democratic, self-sustaining and self-
confident state’ which is ‘the essence of Europeanisation’.457 In the subsequent years 
the notions of local ownership and responsibility for the statebuilding process gained 
considerable purchase by becoming a precondition for international exit from Bosnia 
and for EU membership.458 The lack of national responsibility has, in fact, become one 
of the key issues slowing down Bosnia on its path to EU.459 This is hardly surprising 
given that the international inability to reconcile between the ideas of local ownership 
and the interventionism of the OHR has rendered local ownership somewhat a hollow 
concept.460 The statebuilding process in Bosnia has therefore seen little translation of 
the theory into practice when it comes to local ownership. Particularly the pre-2006 
international statebuilding policies were forced through with the aid of the Bonn powers 
but with little local policy input. Rather than handing over the actual the agenda-setting 
role to the locals, it appears that the responsibility for the process - and its eventual 
outcome - is transferred to the local sphere.461  
 
This contradiction has enabled the formulation of credible discourse that casts doubt on 
the legality of the international statebuilding practice. Particularly Serb actors have 
formulated their challenges to the international statebuilding practice with recourse to 
international law. In this regard the evolution of these discourses is noteworthy. Initially 
the DPA, signed by Milošević, represented a bitter disappointment to the Serbs who 
sought full autonomy from Bosnia. The RS under Karadžić preferred the strategy of 
isolation when it came to dealing with the international statebuilding officials, while 
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using an emotionally-charged framing that depicted the international presence as an 
impediment to the unification of the Serb nation.462 Following the departure of Karadžić 
from the RS political scene and the emergence of moderate political forces, an 
increasingly legalist stand and engagement with the international statebuilding practice 
has emerged. To this end, the RS began to engage in argumentation that relied on the 
stipulations of the international law and hired a US law firm to provide an expert 
interpretation of the OHR’s use of Bonn powers. The Serb practices of contestation 
have to a large degree been represented as a defence of the peace agreement signed in 
Dayton in the face of international and Bosniak pressure to change aspects of it. In 
many ways then the Serb contestation of the international statebuilding practice has 
transformed from isolationist strategy relying on representations of the international 
community as an enemy to an active engagement based on legal argumentation.  
 
Mobilized predominantly by political parties, media again plays a role in disseminating 
the contentious narrative of illegal international statebuilding practice; newspaper op-
eds are frequently utilized by editors and academics challenging the lack of local control 
over the statebuilding process.463 The local ownership-discourse calling for localization 
of the process appears regularly in Serb discourses. The RS Prime Minister, for 
instance, argued that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina has been for years a prisoner of the 
Office of the High Representative...the situation can be described as occupation’.464 
While Serb discourses welcome the EU as a mediator and an advisory body, the OHR’s 
efforts are critiqued as focusing on ‘finding culprits rather than solutions’.465 Serbs 
claim that the OHR is a part of the problem rather than the solution; the closure of the 
agency is therefore the only way to ensure post-war development in Bosnia. This 
contentious narrative is not limited to calling for more local ownership but it also 
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problematizes Bosnian post-Dayton sovereignty. The Serb statebuilding discourse 
argues that  while ‘the Security Council has repeatedly declared, the primary 
responsibility for implementation of the Dayton Accords lies with the authorities in BiH 
themselves’,466 international statebuilders continue to ‘routinely intrude into the details 
of the domestic affairs of a sovereign state’.467 Couched increasingly in legalist terms, 
the Serb discourse frames the interventionist international presence as an affront to the 
international law.  Banja Luka states that  
 
‘As a matter of international law, the PIC has no legal authority 
over BiH, including its Entities…The PIC, including its Steering 
Board, exists as a self-organised council of states and organisations. 
It derives no powers of direct into BiH’s domestic affairs from 
Dayton Accords or from any other international legal instrument. 
No resolution of the Security Council has granted such powers to the 
PIC’.  
 
‘It is imperative that the international community now reflect 
current circumstances and respect the sovereignty of BiH, 
international legal arrangements and other principles of 
international law’.468 
 
 
Crucially, similar views have emerged from Russia. Moscow has repeatedly stated that 
it does not support the use of Bonn powers as it is not conducive for peaceful solution of 
conflicts but rather reinforces them.469 From the Russian point of view the OHR also 
operates on the basis of an anti-RS bias; commenting on the High Representative’s 
speech in the UN Security Council in 2010, the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia asserts 
that  
 
‘the speech was unobjective, biased and favoured only one side 
in BiH. What is worse, it has become practice of the Office of 
the High Representative to accuse the Bosnian Serb Republic for 
everything that is not good in BiH’.470  
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This has clearly added weight to the Serb contention and reinforced the status of Russia 
as an ally of Bosnian Serbs amongst the international statebuilding actors.   
 
The above practices of re-framing ‘liberal peace’ to highlight the contradictions in the 
international statebuilding practice of both the power and the limitations of international 
statebuilding. As noted earlier, it is telling of the fact that the concepts and norms 
associated with liberal peace remain the only language spoken by statebuilding actors, 
whether internal or external. At the same time, however, the failure to live up to norms 
and values propagated has rendered international statebuilding agencies susceptible to 
local critique based on those very same norms. Another point worth highlighting is the 
reoccurring theme of the above practices: legitimacy. What is at stake in these 
representations of the international statebuilding practices as non-democratic and 
coercive are competing bids for legitimacy. While these local actors engaged in 
contention seek to represent the international practices as illegitimate, they endeavor 
simultaneously to frame themselves as legitimate actors promoting legitimate agendas.  
 
 
Discursive Appeals to International Statebuilders 
 
If discursive de-legitimization of international statebuilding has entailed the 
representation of international statebuilding as an oppressive practice, another set of 
local discourses seeks to shape international statebuilding through a more subtle 
strategy. Local agencies have appealed to international statebuilding actors by situating 
themselves in or adopting international discourses. A particularly dominant practice in 
this regard has been the Bosniak endeavor to frame the post-conflict process as one of 
perpetual danger and risk of conflict so as to extend the presence of international 
statebuilding actors which is seen as coinciding with the Bosniak interests. This 
narrative has aligned itself with those international actors arguing for more robust 
international interventionism in Bosnia. Another discursive attempt to co-opt 
international statebuilding has sought to represent Bosnia as a theatre in the war on 
terror and Islamic extremism. This has enabled Serb and Croat actors to represent 
themselves as partners for the international community.   
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Dangerous Statebuilding  
 
Perhaps the most common discursive co-optation practice has been the Bosniak attempt 
to represent the international presence as necessary from the point of view of security 
but also due to moral considerations. To elaborate on this argument, it is useful first to 
say a few words about the wider debates pertaining to the international presence in the 
country. The internationally-led statebuilding venture in Bosnia has been premised both 
on military and politico-economic prerogatives. NATO, and later EUFOR, troops 
provided the security structures required for peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. 
International agencies and organizations focusing on the political and economic aspects 
of rebuilding of the country offered, in turn, a comprehensive set of reforms aimed at 
transforming the institutions and processes inherited from socialism. Particularly in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, the international presence was regarded necessary not 
only in terms of rebuilding the country, but also as a safeguard against return to inter-
ethnic violence. In an attempt to convince the Congress that long-term American 
involvement was needed, Clinton argued that pulling out too soon would almost 
certainly cause Bosnia to fall back into war.471 Clinton’s national security adviser 
argued in similar vein that without the continued international intervention the DPA 
would be in danger of collapsing which might result in conflict not only in Bosnia but 
also in the wider region. Crucially, this would not only have tragic human consequences 
but would also undermine the credibility of NATO.472  
 
While immediately after the war the continued military involvement was seen as 
crucial, later on calls for continued political engagement emerged. In an appeal for a 
more interventionist approach, the former High Representative Paddy Ashdown and 
American diplomat Richard Holbrooke argued that Western interventionism is vital as 
‘the country is in real danger of collapsing…it is time to pay attention  to Bosnia again, 
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if we do not want things to get very nasty quickly’.473 A year later, Ashdown and the UK 
shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague warned in a letter to the Financial Times that 
the break-up of Bosnia was a probable without intensified Western intervention.474 Calls 
for interventionism, framed as highly urgent and necessary are informed by the 
assumption that violence will follow if the international community fails to act. For 
some international actors then conflict rather than peace is understood to be the ‘natural 
default’ of Bosnia which renders the statebuilding process dangerous.475 These 
assumptions, coupled with the collective memory of the international failure to act in 
the face of brutal conflict and genocide in the early 1990s, have meant that the 
narratives of perpetual conflict have resonated well amongst the international 
statebuilders, as the continued international presence seventeen years after the end of 
the war demonstrates.   
 
In the context where the interests of the Bosniak statebuilding project coincide with 
those of some of the key international actors (namely the United States and Turkey), 
certain Bosniak actors frequently tap into the ‘dangerous statebuilding’ narrative.476  For 
many in the Bosniak community extensive international involvement is desirable not 
only due to the convergence of Bosniak and (some) international actors’ desire to 
strengthen the central institutions of the country, but also as the presence of the OHR is 
seen by many Bosniaks as a factor that reduces opportunities for contestation by the 
other national groups.477   The discourse of dangerous statebuilding is used to reproduce 
the idea of Bosnia under a constant threat of relapse to armed conflict; this is well 
illustrated by the war-time Bosniak President Izetbegovic who suggested three years 
after the war that ‘…Bosnia is neither in war nor peace…I would say that an absence of 
war is by no means peace’.478 In 2008 when the international community made public 
its plans to wind down its military presence in Bosnia, the leader of the Bosniak-
dominated SBiH-party Haris Silajdžić noted that Bosnia was facing the most dangerous 
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phase of its post-war development due to insufficient centralization of the state.479 In 
espousing the predominant panacea for conflict in the thinking of the international 
statebuilding community - that is, the state as the ultimate conflict resolution 
mechanism - the Bosniak critique has pointed to the international failure to construct a 
strong central state. Local statebuilding agents such as Silajdžić have formulated 
discourses that de-legitimize international statebuilding on the basis of the international 
community’s abandonment of its own ideals.480 The Bosniak discourse reproduces the 
direct causal links between international withdrawal and conflict, as articulated by 
Ashdown, Holbrooke and other international commentators. Silajdžić, for instance, 
called for extension of international involvement as ‘it is better and cheaper than 
risking aggression’.481 Tihić, of the Bosniak-SDA party, asserted similarly that ‘we 
warn the international community about possible consequences following 
withdrawal…the progress achieved so far could be endangered, divisions and God 
forbid conflict may occur’.482    
 
 
International Responsibility 
 
It is not only the risk of crisis that necessitates the international presence for many 
Bosniaks, but also ‘international responsibility’ to the Bosniak community.483 In this 
contentious narrative, moral considerations provide the lens through which the 
international responsibility to the Bosniaks is understood. Silajdžić notes, quoting the 
2000 UN Secretary General’s report on Srebrenica, that ‘Srebrenica crystallised a truth 
understood only too late by the United Nations and the world at large: that Bosnia was 
as much a moral cause as a military conflict’. He goes on to argue that ‘now is the time 
to right these wrongs’.484 Another Bosniak leader demanded similarly that ‘the time has 
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come for the international community to take over its part of the responsibility’.485  
According to this narrative, moral responsibility provides the basis for extensive 
international involvement and the promotion of centralised state. Reflecting the growing 
disillusionment in the Bosniak statebuilding project with the international statebuilding 
officials, Bosniaks assert that the international statebuilders have not succeeded in 
fulfilling their moral obligations to the Bosniaks. As Silajdžić noted; ‘…a part of the 
responsibility rests with the international community which simply took an easy road. 
While its officials talked about multi-ethnic and democratic Bosnia, it was preserving 
the status quo’.486 ‘Keeping the status quo’, according to Silajdžić, amounts to 
‘holocaust victims being controlled by Gestapo’.487 This has resulted in calls for more 
intensive international intervention in general and the use of Bonn powers in particular. 
It is notable that whereas the Serb and Croat statebuilders have drawn on the 
international normative narratives to legitimize acts of contestation, some Bosniak 
actors have engaged in practices that have reinforced the empirical credibility of the 
perpetual conflict discourse. Evidence of this is, for instance, the inflammatory rhetoric, 
challenging the very basis of the peace agreement. The Bosniak calls for Bosnia without 
entities have led to frequent confrontations with the RS which in turn has necessitated 
continued international presence.  
 
 
Islamic Extremism 
 
Although much of local contention has operated within the traditional liberal peace 
framework pertaining to democracy and other core norms, an interesting aspect of local 
discursive appropriation has been the deployment of the war on terror narrative. It has 
been deployed by Serb and Croat actors. While generally the Serb and Croat-initiated 
contention in the discursive domain has centered on the de-legitimization of the 
international statebuilding practice, they have also attempted to appeal to the 
international actors by representing themselves as partners in the international effort to 
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tackle Islamic extremism. This strategy is best understood in the context of the debates 
surrounding Islamic fighters and the Bosnian War. During the war fighters from Islamic 
countries joined the war effort of their fellow Muslims; estimates of the numbers of 
Mujaheddin arriving at Bosnia since the beginning of the war in 1992 range from a few 
hundred to several thousand. Following the signing of the DPA, one of the key 
conditionality for foreign (particularly American) aid to the Bosniak-Croat dominated 
Federation was the deportation of all foreign fighters. International attention to the 
continued presence of naturalised Mujaheddin488 and Islamic extremism in Bosnia was 
reinvigorated by the 9/11 attacks on the United States; Bosnia as terrorist breeding 
ground and transit hub became a regular feature in the American policy discourse in 
particular.489 While other international actors involved in Bosnia such as the EU Police 
Monitoring Mission and the OHR have noted that little evidence of Islamic extremism 
exists, regular statements from Washington portraying Bosnia as an actor in global 
terrorism have undoubtedly created discursive opportunities for Serb and Croat actors in 
Bosnia. 490   
 
Serb and Croat representations of Islam in Bosnia as a threat are by no means recent. 
They were common already during and immediately after the war. Karadžić, the first 
President of the RS, argued that the RS and the Federation are ‘Europe’s first line of 
defence against Islamic terrorism’.491 The framings of Sarajevo as the ‘European 
Tehran’ sought to counter the narratives of Bosnia as a bridge between Europe and 
Islam popular amongst many in the international community.492  Such discourses gained 
new momentum following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent shift in the 
international policy from peacebuilding to statebuilding. Bosnia found itself on a list of 
countries suspected of having Al-Qaeda cells on their territory after the September 2001 
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terrorist attacks. RS officials took the opportunity immediately after 9/11 to demand 
investigation into the war crimes committed by Muslim fighters during the Bosnian war, 
while emphasizing the links between global Islamic terrorism and Bosnia.493 In doing so 
they drew parallels between the 9/11 attacks and acts committed by Bosniaks during the 
war.494 It also meant associating Bosniak politicians with al Qaeda and Osama Bin 
Laden; Serb and Croat actors have often emphasized the personal connections 
prominent Bosniak politicians had with al Qaeda.495   
 
An integral part of the Islamization of Bosnia discourse has thus been the attempt to 
place the narrators within the framework of international security discourses and 
demonstrate their commitment to the international norms and values.496 In this way 
Bosnian Serb and Croat actors have sought to situate themselves in the ‘discursive 
community created by the war on terrorism’.497 Media have played a central role in 
disseminating such discourses. Serb newspapers such as Glas Srpske and their Croat 
counterparts Dnevni List and Vecernji List have regularly given access and visibility to 
such narratives.  Bosnian Serb leader Dragan Cavic argued that Islamic extremism was 
spreading through the Federation; while the RS ‘was ready to settle score with the dark 
side of its past in a democratic and civilized way’, certain actors in Federation were 
envisioning ‘unitary’ Bosnia governed by Sharia law, according to Cavic.498 The 
continued presence of Mujaheddins is frequently represented as dangerous in terms of 
Bosnian peace as well as the regional stability.499 Bosnian Croat politician Dragan 
Čović, for instance, appealed to the Bush administration to act more aggressively in 
dealing with the terrorist problem in Bosnia as inaction could result in wider 
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destabilization.500 Čović also suggested that ‘the fight against terrorism and organized 
crime...represents a threat to the entire civilized world’, while his Serb counterpart 
Milorad Dodik emphasized the RS’ commitment to the US-led war on terror.501  
Another Serb official noted that ‘Bosnia is part of the world front committed to 
combating terrorism and the best way to demonstrate this fight lies within our country’s 
borders’.502  
 
 
Countering Discursive Contention: International Strategy of Decertification 
 
Through the process of re-framing the narratives of ‘liberal peace’ local discursive 
repertoires have sought delegitimize and destabilize aspects of the international 
statebuilding practice. At the same time, the discursive repertoire has entailed the 
alternative strategy of discursive co-optation of the international presence. This section 
of the analysis argues that these discursive modalities of contention have not gone 
unnoticed by the international statebuilding actors. The ensuing discursive interactions 
rarely result in tit-for-tat type cycles of contention as discussed in the previous chapter; 
international actors respond in a less direct, but no less subtle, manner. International 
statebuilders engage in these frame contests through generating meaning and 
interpretations of the post-conflict process, the local actors and themselves via public 
reports, statements and media interviews. Public discourses, as the OHR acknowledged, 
are an indispensable tool for the international statebuilders in terms of sending messages 
to non-conforming local actors. It is a common practice, albeit one that evokes much 
resentment amongst the locals, for the international officials to make strongly-worded 
statements or express opinions publicly pertaining to the activities of local actors.503  
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International statebuilders regularly engage in ‘decertification’; ‘certification’, 
following McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly refers to the validation of actors, their agendas 
and practices by external authorities, while ‘decertification’ denotes delegitimization of 
actors and agendas.504 This international strategy of countering local critical discourses 
is highly indicative of the power that comes with the authority to define and label actors. 
Decertification is a reflection of the tendency by some international statebuilding actors 
to equate local critique of the post-conflict process with anti-Dayton behavior. As the 
US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon noted in 
relation to international statebuilding measures,  
 
‘…these decisions cannot be appealed or challenged…questioning 
that, challenging it and criticizing is really afront to the notion of 
Bosnia and to Dayton and that’s not acceptable to us’.505  
 
 
Decertification of local agencies has by and large converged around representations of 
the local agencies as criminal and irresponsible. Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, for 
instance, noted in response to Bosnian Serb non-compliance with international 
statebuilding measures that  
 
 
‘…there are people who are separatists, racists and war criminals 
and crooks who are trying not only to destroy the Dayton 
agreement, but take the Serb people…back into the dark ages of six 
years ago’.506    
 
 
A representative of the International Crisis Group maintained, in turn, that the 
distinction between local criminals and politicians is virtually impossible to make.507 In 
tandem with the above, international officials have discursively constructed binaries 
between the honest citizens and the predatory elites. ‘Lying and irresponsible 
politicians’, as the High Representative Petritsch put it, ‘have not fulfilled promises 
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given to you and Bosnia-Herzegovina and they have been blocking your way towards a 
better future’.508 When introducing local ownership as the key international policy in 
Bosnia, he noted the new strategy ought to reach to the people, rather than being 
focused on politicians who are ‘more often than not the problem’.509 Other international 
officials have similarly pitted ‘vulnerable people’ against ‘extreme nationalists’ in 
explaining the post-conflict environment, suggesting that the people of Bosnia remain 
prisoners of their self-aggrandizing elites.510 Extensive international involvement 
becomes then necessary, paradoxically, to protect the people from their elected leaders. 
These discursive binaries between the predatory elites and the people not only 
legitimize international intervention, but are in many ways necessary for the 
maintenance of the international legitimacy in Bosnia. Alternative representations of 
local contestation as grassroots-led and people-backed challenge to the internationally-
guided statebuilding would undermine the international self-perception as the protector 
of the people. Intimately linked to the narratives of local criminality and irresponsibility 
is the discursive construction of ‘local partners’ and ‘anti-Dayton forces’. This has 
generally meant publicly supporting certain political parties, such as the multi-ethnic 
SDP and decertifying others, namely parties considered nationalist.  While the US 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, represented the election victory of non-
nationalist party SNSD in the RS in 2000 as significant step in establishing a ‘partner’ 
for the international community in the RS,511 Washington has generally refused to 
cooperate or provide aid to Bosnian governments comprised of nationalists regarded as 
anti-Dayton actors.512  
 
The strategy of decertification has also entailed what Bain calls a ‘discourse of ability’; 
representing the local as incapable of transcending its communist past and the 
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associated mentalities.513 Local actors are framed as being unable to establish courts, 
parliaments, organize free elections or to develop economically.514 International 
officials, for instance, argued that the local dependency on the OHR has resulted from 
the local inability to operate in a political system based on consensus and negotiation, 
given the one-man rule of Tito the country was subjected to.515 At the same time, it is 
the patrimonialism inherited from the communist system that undermines true local 
ownership rather than the interventionism of certain international actors, as the 
argument goes.516 The High Representative Lajcak, in turn, assessed in 2008 that Bosnia 
is essentially ‘not ready for self-government’ due to the lack of responsibility shown by 
the local leaders and the failed Europeanization of the institutions.517 It is then the local 
lack of experience that necessitates and legitimizes international intervention.518   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has centered on the discursive domain of the statebuilding process in post-
Dayton Bosnia. Alongside the local engagement in the statebuilding process through 
bureaucratic means, discursive practices have provided further method through which 
local statebuilding agencies actively engage with the externally-led statebuilding 
process. In an attempt to interrogate the discursive repertoire of contention, the analysis 
has identified two discursive strategies of contention: the 
delegitimization/destabilization and co-optation/making of appeals to international 
statebuilding actors. The former practice has re-framed the ‘liberal peace’ discourse by 
underlining its contradictions. The latter strategy has, in turn, entailed the framing of the 
process and the actors involved in a way beneficial for the actors in question. Discursive 
modalities of contention have thus consisted of both challenging and undermining 
international statebuilding practice, while deploying other discourses in an attempt to 
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affect the course of the process.  International statebuilding actors have responded by 
decertifying and marginalizing local actors. These discursive interactions, or frame 
contests, reflect the discursive hybridity that exists alongside institutional hybridity. 
Although ‘liberal peace’ discourse may be hegemonic in the sense that it remains the 
sole discursive framework within which both internal and external actors operate, its 
key concepts are adapted and re-framed in a range of contrasting and competing 
manners. In many ways the existence of parallel discourses is telling both of the 
prominence and limitations of the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm. It is testament to the 
dominance of the liberal framework in that it represents the only context within which 
all actors – whether internal or external - articulate their claims and representations of 
the post-conflict process. In order to make credible and legitimate claims on other actors 
or agendas, liberal concepts, norms and values remain the sole ideological framework. 
The existence of discursive parallels is also indicative of the limitations to the power of 
the international statebuilding. The universal discourses and liberal concepts are easily 
harnessed to challenge non-liberal statebuilding practices that are often part of 
externally-led statebuilding processes. 
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Chapter 6 
The Symbolic Domain 
 
 
 
This thesis has so far discussed local practices of contention in the institutional and 
discursive domains. It has shown how the institutions of governance put in place by 
international actors have served as a vehicle through which local actors have slowed 
down and negotiated the process. The discursive domain, on the other hand, entails a 
range of different representations of the post-conflict process and the actors involved. 
Some undermine international statebuilding practice by foregrounding its undemocratic 
and unaccountable nature, while other discourses seek to appeal to international 
statebuilding actors. The central concern of this Chapter is how international 
statebuilding is contested in the symbolic domain. The analysis identifies a set of local 
practices that deploy symbols or symbolic practices pertaining to identity and culture in 
an attempt to contest the externally-led statebuilding process. These practices have 
entailed the use of tangible signifiers and rituals that highlight the exclusive identities, 
but also the act of creating facts on the ground through ‘appropriating geographic 
spaces’ by inscribing them as Bosniak, Croat or Serb.519 More specifically, the 
empirical material suggests that these practices consist of the rejection of the symbols of 
Bosnianess decreed by the OHR, renaming towns and streets in accordance with 
exclusive (rather than shared) histories, refusals to restore the architectural signifiers of 
multi-culturalism and multi-confessionalism, the promotion of separate languages, the 
separate (rather than shared) practices of commemoration and national holidays. 
Contentious symbolic practices overlap with bureaucratic and administrative modalities 
of contention in that they often deploy local-level institutions to pass decisions that 
facilitate symbolic actions. Yet, this symbolic domain is distinct from the institutional 
domain in that its main method of contention is not so much to block or delay decision-
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making but rather to produce alternative meanings of Bosnianess and sustain narrow 
community-based identities. The deployment of symbols (such as alternative flags) and 
symbolic acts (such as refusing to celebrate the Bosnian Independence Day) are 
essentially ‘political techniques’520 that make claims about local identities that directly 
challenge the international identity-building measures designed to consolidate Bosnian 
statehood. In doing so local symbolic practices provide an alternative cultural project 
that foregrounds the existence of distinct and separate local national groups.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first part briefly looks at the notion of Bosnian 
identity from a historical perspective. This is expedient in not only providing 
background on the local identities that underpin the symbols and symbolic practices, but 
also in contextualizing the internationally-led identity-building measures in the 
aftermath of the conflict. The analysis then moves onto mapping out the official, 
internationally-propagated, cultural narrative of the post-conflict process. The rest of 
chapter focuses on the local practices of contention through symbols.  
 
 
The Ontology of Symbols  
 
Positivist research in International Relations and beyond tends to regard symbols of 
statehood, identity and belonging as the opposite of ‘real’ politics, an illusionary and 
abstract realm bearing little importance to actual politics. Yet, much of global and local 
politics entail symbolic dimension. The blue helmets of the UN peacekeepers, for 
instance, have come to symbolize the impartiality and consensual nature of the 
peacekeeping missions.521 At the level of domestic politics, largely symbolic practices 
such as Presidential inauguration or an opening of Parliament are used by politicians 
seeking to legitimize their authority, or as Kertzer puts it, to use rites and rituals to 
create political reality for the people.522 Symbolic practices are particularly salient in 
times of conflict and in contested spaces where different actors seek to authorise their 
versions of the past, the present and the future. Although the above point may seem 
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somewhat self-evident, the post-conflict scholarship on the symbolic domain where 
identity-politics operate has remained relatively limited. Whereas burgeoning literature 
on the symbolic aspects of conflicts exists, there has been relatively little empirically-
grounded engagement with identity-building in general or its symbolic dimensions in 
particular. Some notable exceptions are Brown and Mac Ginty’s 523 analysis of public 
attitudes to neutral and partisan symbols in Northern Ireland, Mac Ginty’s 
524investigation into symbols of accord and disaccord in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa and   Jeffrey’s 525 study on symbols in the Brčko District.  Notwithstanding these 
studies, concrete and abstract manifestations of identity and belonging in post-conflict 
spaces remain an under-researched aspect of post-conflict statebuilding. Investigating 
such questions is not only important because the symbolic domain constitutes a feature 
in post-conflict statebuilding processes as this Chapter seeks to demonstrate, but also 
because these issues touch upon wider theoretical debates pertaining to self-
determination, democracy and nationalism, largely conducted through the conceptual 
prism of ethnos vs demos as the basis of statehood.  
  
If symbolic politics have elicited little attention in theorizing grounded in positivist line 
of enquiry, other disciplines, in particular the scholarship on nationalism has paid a 
great deal of attention to symbols in explaining the emergence and persistence of 
national identities. Smith, for instance, foregrounds the importance of symbolic aspects, 
‘myths, memories, traditions, values, rituals and symbols’, in the development and 
persistence of nations.526 In the ethno-symbolist approach to understanding nations and 
nationalism developed by Smith symbols are seen as ‘cultural resources’ that can 
transform group’s responses to changes in socio-economic and political circumstances 
(albeit symbols are not regarded as products of such circumstances, as suggested by 
modernist nationalism scholars).527 While identities are socially constructed, according 
to the ethno-symbolist approach, a constellation of myths, values, memories and 
symbols that constitute identity lie at the core of the constructed identities. Applying 
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similar logic to ethnic conflicts, commentators such as Kaufman have argued that rather 
than conceiving conflicting interests per se as the primary causes of war, it is the 
emotionally-charged symbolic politics through which the interests of the different actors 
are defined and acted upon that are result in violent conflicts.528 He notes that ethnic 
elites use symbols to manipulate and mobilize the masses, but this is only possible when 
a real or perceived conflict of interests and ‘mythically’ based antagonistic sentiments 
exists.529 It follows then that in order for the post-conflict interventions to be successful, 
it is necessary to understand why group member mobilize for war or alternatively, for 
peace.  
 
For others notions of ‘nations’ and their symbolic aspects function merely 
instrumentally, as tools of elite manipulation of the masses.530 While the modernist view 
of nations and nationalism entails a range of different interpretations, they share the 
view that the emergence of nations is intimately linked to modernity and symbols of 
identity and belonging are invented for the ‘imagined community’ in the process. 
Similar, instrumentalist approach to symbols has by and large been adopted by 
contentious politics scholars; groups seeking to make contentious claims on authorities 
frame meanings and symbols in a particular way so as to highlight the grievances and 
the injustice they claim to have suffered. 531 This has often entailed the mobilization of 
emotions through the use of symbols.532 In the field of conflict studies many critiques of 
ethnic conflict research have foregrounded the rational and opportunistic nature of 
violence that often has little to do with ‘ethnicity’ or other questions of identity. As 
Mueller notes, ethnicity is often better understood as an ‘ordering device’ rather than a 
cause of warfare in so-called ethnic conflicts.533 Much of empirical research indicates 
indeed that symbols in Bosnia have been susceptible for manipulation by the elites 
before, during and after the war. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to regard all 
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symbols found in the Bosnian political landscape as recently ‘invented’ or novel; much 
of the Serb and Croat symbolic framework that Bosnian Serb and Croats respectively 
draw on represent considerable historical continuity and are thus likely to be 
emotionally-charged, even if not primordial or unchanging. It is also noteworthy that 
identity-related appeals have also been facilitated to a great deal by the political system 
created by the international actors. In a system prioritizing ethnic quotas the need to 
attract voters from other national groups does not exist which dis-incentivizes political 
programmes based on multi-culturalism. In this way the institutional design created by 
international actors has created opportunities for engaging in exclusive ethnic appeals. 
Moreover, the fact that the group-specific symbols have considerable purchase to some 
of the group members is an outcome of the recent conflict and lack of meaningful 
reconciliation thereafter rather than a fixed attribute of local groups.  
 
 
Symbols and Symbolic Practices 
 
The symbolic domain is of interest to an investigation of contention in environments 
where questions of culture and identity - whether expressed through emblems, language 
or architecture - have acquired distinctly political meaning. In the Bosnian case symbols 
and symbolic practices reflecting purportedly essentialist identities have become a 
medium through which local statebuilding actors produce and maintain alternative 
cultural narratives. Symbol is taken here to denote a cognitive sign or an act that is used 
to represent something else, most often abstract concepts. The importance of examining 
the symbolic aspects of the statebuilding processes derives from the fact that symbols 
are not merely an opposite of ‘real life’; they not only play an important role in ordering 
thoughts and feelings and transforming them into action, but they are real in the sense 
that they often become tangible features in social processes.534 Symbols make moral 
claims about right and wrong and communicate the values and worldviews of the 
community in question. They draw on the‘ folk memory bank…of cultural 
references’.535  Following Harrison’s work on the political use of symbols in situations 
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of conflict, a number of strategies are available to actors wishing to deploy symbols.536  
Some of those strategies are discernible in the symbolic domain of post-Dayton Bosnia. 
One of them relates to innovation; this is manifested in the invention of tradition and 
‘competitive differentiation’ through which peoples and cultures are labeled as 
distinct.537 Mach argues in similar vein that the key function of symbols is to ‘objectify 
relationships’ between groups.538 As it is impossible to observe relationships between 
groups in concrete reality, they are given meaning by discourses and symbols. 
Relationships, as Mach notes, are thus ‘abstractions’ that gain meaning and can be 
‘seen’ through symbols.539 Symbols function to produce tangible demarcations between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, while creating a sense of unity in the ‘we’ group. Harrison notes that it 
is not only the differentiation that innovation is salient for; it is also a sign of equality 
with rival groups and their symbols.540 Another symbolic strategy is what might be 
called expansion; this is evident when group replaces the symbols of a rival group with 
those pertaining to its own culture and identity. Innovation in the Bosnian case, as the 
Chapter demonstrates, has meant for instance the development of the Bosnian language 
as distinct from Serbian and Croatian. Another example is the deployment of alternative 
rituals of nationhood at the expense of the official celebrations of Bosnianess and 
Bosnian statehood. Expansionist strategy has, in turn, been used to replace names of 
public spaces referring to rival groups with those symbolizing the current power-
holders. It has also been evident in the attempts to maintain the mono-cultural 
architectural landscape, in certain parts of the country, forged through war. Although 
symbols often justify order and authority, they can also represent a challenge to it.541 
These symbols are what Turner coined ‘anti-structural’ symbols in that they pose 
alternative visions to the existing social arrangements in times of transition or social 
upheaval.542   Symbolic modalities of contention are particularly palpable in 
ceremonies, rituals and symbols that highlight specific aspects of the group in defiance 
of the official symbolic practices sanctioned by the authorities.543  
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From Yugoslavism to Internationally-Driven Identity-Building 
 
Symbols and symbolic practices pertain, in the case study at hand, specifically to 
identities. This suggests that in order to begin analyzing local contentious practices that 
seek to provide alternative cultural narratives, it is necessary to shift the attention of the 
analysis from statebuilding in general to a specific dimension of the process, that of 
identity-/nation-building. Even though the focus of this Chapter is on a specific 
dimension of international statebuilding, in many ways it tells a story similar to that 
unveiled in the previous Chapter. In the discursive realm the different representations of 
international statebuilding and the actors involved resulted in frame contests where 
statebuilding actors formulate competing representations of the post-conflict process 
and the actors involved. In the symbolic domain similar competing claims pertaining to 
identity and culture, ‘symbolic conflicts’, underpin the interactions between internal and 
external agencies.544  
 
Perhaps the best way to start the investigation is to place the struggles over identity in 
Bosnia into historical context: this provides an insight into the local identity-building 
projects prior to the arrival of the international statebuilders. According to Magaš  a 
notion of Bosnianess as a common identity existed in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, but the subjugation of Bosnia under the Ottoman Empire meant that the idea 
of Bosnian nation did not become institutionalised in its own state.545 Bosnia was 
absorbed into the Ottoman Empire ‘before its elite had codified its history’ in way that 
could be meaningfully used by their successors in forging Bosnian nationalism.546 Later, 
in the 19th century when nationalism and modern forms of statehood and nationhood 
began to emerge in Europe, the Bosnian Muslim elites failed to foster sense of 
Bosnianess. Hastings argues that the sense of being Bosnian was also significantly 
undermined by Serb and Croat nationalisms that deployed their respective religions in 
turning Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians into Serbs and Croats.547 The Serb and Croat 
nationalisms were not evoked in Bosnia, however, with the aim of national unification, 
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but as a tool used by Croat and Serb elites in an attempt gain control over the 
strategically important Bosnian territory.548 In this sense the emergence of Serb and 
Croat nationalisms was closely linked to the statebuilding projects of the Croats and 
Serbs in the Balkan peninsula.  Another noteworthy point is that whereas the national 
identities of Croats and Serbs had institutional history embodied in the existence of 
institutions and autonomy, the Bosnian state had no such historical tradition of 
statehood based on which national identity could be forged.549 
 
The end of the 400-year long Ottoman rule in Bosnia came with the annexation of the 
country by another empire in the late 19th century. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, that 
Bosnia found itself to be a part of, sought to tame the growing Serb and Croat 
nationalism through creating a Bosnian national identity. This entailed the promotion of 
Bosnian language, newspapers and education as well as a ban on using communal 
prefixes such as ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ in names of cultural associations. The Austro-
Hungarians also utilized programmes of economic development in an attempt to reduce 
the inter-ethnic tensions in the country.550 Whilst the Bosnian Muslims embraced the 
notion of Bosnianess, both Serbs and Croats rejected the Austro-Hungarian attempt to 
construct an overarching identity. This was evident for instance in the realm of 
education where particularly Serbs were active in demanding the right for religious 
institutions to provide education.551  Ultimately the Austro-Hungarian attempt to create 
a sense of common nationhood was short-lived and unsuccessful; Vienna eventually 
gave Serbs and Muslims cultural autonomy in Bosnia in 1906 and 1909 and recognized 
Croats and Serbs as nations in 1907.552 The end of the First World War saw the creation 
of the first Yugoslav state: in many ways it was dominated by similar interplay between 
forces of centralization and decentralization witnessed in today’s Bosnia. It was the 
Serbs, however, who sought to centralize the state and Croats who strived for federal 
model, while the Muslims balanced between the two forces.553 Another attempt to create 
an overarching identity was launched by the state: predicated on the notion of 
Yugoslavism the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were regarded as tribes of a single, 
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Yugoslav nation. Although the state territory was organized on the basis of non-ethnic 
principles, thus reflecting the shared nationhood of its peoples, in practice the state 
apparatus was largely controlled by the Serbs.554 Following the relatively brief existence 
of the first Yugoslav state, the creation of Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, a Croat-led 
fascist regime during the Second World War foregrounded the sense of Croatness, at the 
expense of Yugoslavism, that encompassed Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Forced 
deportations and genocide against Serbs in Bosnia were conducted by the administration 
as Serbs were not seen as being part of the pure Croat nation.  
 
Fighting against the fascist regime and riding on an inter-group solidarity slogan, Tito’s 
Partisans provided an alternative that emphasized the equality of all the peoples in 
Yugoslavia. It was this alternative that formed the basis of Tito’s Yugoslavia, a federal 
state with Bosnia as one of the six republics, that lasted from 1945 until 1990. Under 
Tito’s rule the common Yugoslav identity was forged through socialism and 
suppression of all particular or confessional identities.555 This meant again state-control 
over religious organizations, bans on cultural associations and education systems 
premised exclusively on socialism.556 ‘Brotherhood and unity’, the political slogan of 
Tito’s Yugoslavia, was grounded in emphasizing the brotherhood between the different 
South-Slav nations and the shared interests that unify them. Most of Bosnia’s 
inhabitants came to see themselves as concurrently Yugoslavs and Serbs, Croats or 
Muslims. ‘Yugoslav’ primarily indicated the citizenship while ethnicity was defined in 
relation to the latter categories.557 The centralized system of rule that Tito constructed 
for the second Yugoslav Republic came under severe pressure from the republics; Tito 
was eventually compelled to decentralize the political system which saw the republics 
gaining considerable power. In the context of this power shift, the Yugoslav identity 
came to be regarded as a threat by the federal-level Communist Party officials who were 
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increasingly preparing themselves for a break-up of the Yugoslav state.558 It was thus 
the particular, national identities that became the rallying points in each republic. The 
conflicts that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia served to harden communal identities 
by providing a new set of memories and myths around which old and new symbols 
could be mobilized.   
 
 
Depoliticizing Identities: International Statebuilding  
Through Identity-building 
 
In the light of the above, the current international statebuilding venture appears to be the 
latest project in a long succession of external and internal attempts to reorder local 
identities in Bosnia. What has this identity-building dimension of international 
statebuilding entailed? It is interesting, first of all, to note that the international identity-
building measures in the aftermath of the conflict appear in many ways to be grounded 
in similar logic than the earlier attempts to forge common identity on the basis of 
Yugoslavism.  Although the language of ‘brotherhood and unity’ has been replaced by 
narratives of multiculturalism and individualism, both foreground higher, shared 
identity and deconstruction of seemingly atavistic, ethno-national identities. As 
Yugoslav socialism before, the international statebuilding venture assumes the eventual 
decline of the narrow, group-based identities and the emergence of non-ethnic 
association with the state as a whole. For the Yugoslav socialists the working-class 
consciousness would eventually override particular national attachments,559 while for 
the international statebuilders modernization, particularly economic development, will 
ultimately undermine ethno-nationalist loyalties. Both, Tito’s socialism and the post-
1995 international statebuilding mission have sought to construct a supranational ‘state 
identity’. In Yugoslavia this was Yugoslavism derived from ‘brotherhood and unity’, 
which in effect meant the co-existence of various identities.560 In post-Dayton Bosnia 
‘the state identity’ has being constructed on the foundation of tolerant, rational, modern, 
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European individuals by international statebuilding agencies, most notably the OHR.561 
An interesting difference between life under Tito and the current internationally-
monitored governance is the representation of identities in political life. Whereas Tito 
actively suppressed national and religious identities, the internationally-designed 
Constitutional arrangements of the country created the post-war political order precisely 
on the basis of ethnic identities, manifested in the power-sharing system of governance.  
While it may still be too early to judge the success of the current identity-building 
efforts, the Yugoslavism promoted during Yugoslavia was unsuccessful in consolidating 
and mobilising Yugoslav identities sufficiently, as the painful collapse of the state 
shows.  
 
The international statebuilding trajectory in post-Dayton Bosnia has entailed distinct, 
albeit at times contradictory, identity-building dimension as demonstrated by the 
provisions of the DPA pertaining to the symbols of the state and to national monuments 
of cultural, religious and historical importance.562 Although international officials 
interviewed in the course of this research were under no illusion that the international 
statebuilders could impose a single national identity on the people of Bosnia,563 
international statebuilders have sought to encourage a sense of loyalty to the state and 
an identity approximating overarching national identity. An EU official noted that 
contra to the commonly-held view, the Dayton Constitution is not the biggest problem 
in Bosnia; the most challenging task is to overcome the lack of identification with the 
Bosnian state. This is a crucial aspect in the post-conflict process, the official argued.564  
The aim of building common Bosnianess should of course not be exaggerated; at times 
the attempts to counter local ethnic identities have had less to do with creating 
Bosnianess than with the practicalities of statebuilding and stabilisation of the country. 
This has for instance been the case in areas of minority returns where majority symbols 
have deterred refugees from coming back. Yet, a reoccurring theme in the international 
statebuilding jargon has been the need to create ‘state identity’ in Bosnia. It appears to 
have both concrete and abstract meaning. On the one hand it refers to the concrete state 
                                               
561
 OHR, 14th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 17 July 1999. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=3678 (accessed 4 December 2011) 
562
 Annex VIII of the DPA. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 (accessed 28 
October 2011) 
563
 Interviews 1, 11, 22  
564
 Interviewee 24 
171 
 
symbols (flag, national anthem, the design of the currency and so forth) and on the other 
to the construction of ‘post-national politics’ grounded in depoliticized and multi-ethnic 
local identities.565 It is premised on the idea that ‘further progress in peace 
implementation depends upon the successful deconstruction of the politics of ethnic 
identity… they must live in multi-ethnic state…we have to counter-act the natural 
tendencies to live separately’.566 Ironically the contradictions inherent in the DPA are 
nowhere more obvious than here; while the agreement granted the ethno-nationalists 
their respective homogenous spaces, it obliged the parties to ensure that refugees were 
repatriated and thus the multi-ethnic character of the country was preserved.567 It is here 
where the explanation for the inconsistencies in the international identity-building 
measures can be found.  
 
Despite the above limitations, the internationally-led process of creating state identity 
has meant a careful balancing act, involving the encouragement and promotion of 
Bosnian nationhood as a multi-ethnic concept largely at the expense of the narrower 
ethnic and religious identities. Consequently, the grand narrative has been that of the 
multi-ethnic and multicultural statehood. Reminiscent of the modernization theory’s 
view of traditional and particularistic cultures as lacking the rationality associated with 
modern societies, ethno-nationalism has been frequently singled out by international 
statebuilders as the enemy of progress.568  In the international statebuilding narratives, it 
is not only individual freedom and democracy that are restricted by the nationalist 
ideology; nationalism also stifles the country’s integration into the global markets where 
‘absurd state-lets’ are unable to compete.569 This narrative of multiculturalism hence 
builds an image of the nationalist ‘Other’ that stands in a stark contrast to modern 
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multiculturalism purported by the international statebuilders. As the High 
Representative Petrisch noted, ‘Such obsession with ethnic identity is of course largely 
alien to modern, multiethnic Europe. It has not been a significant force in European 
politics since the 30s and 40s’.570 According to his successor Ashdown, the wars of 
disintegration in the former Yugoslavia ‘represented a return to that earlier model of 
atavistic nationalism just when the rest of Europe had finally discovered the value of 
multi-ethnicity and diversity’, but post-conflict Bosnia ‘yearns for – and needs – a 
broader political identity and that means a European identity’.571   
 
At the same time, the international trajectory of building multi-ethnic nationhood has 
been premised on de-politicization of the existing identities.572 This has meant the 
problematization of the ‘overpoliticized’ public sphere and discourses where the society 
in its totality is interpreted through ethno-nationalist lenses.573 The alternative promoted 
by the international statebuilders has been ‘Bosnianess’ styled after Switzerland and 
realized through refugee returns. Accordingly, urgent repatriation of refugees is seen as 
paramount because ‘unless we try to create a certain degree of multi-ethnicism, we will 
split Bosnia into two communities....and we cannot afford that’.574 The considerable 
emphasis placed on refugee returns, enshrined in annex VII of the DPA, represents 
perhaps the most pronounced attempt to return to the ‘imagined community of Bosnia 
under Yugoslavia. While the international policy during the war was to a large degree 
informed by the notion of ‘ancient hatreds’ immortalized in Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, 
following the conflict a revisionist version of the country’s history has gained ground.575 
In this view of the country’s past, Bosnia is represented as a beacon of multi-ethnicity 
and tolerance and such qualities should provide a guiding vision for the international 
statebuilding policies. This narrative has, however, been regularly qualified by the 
distinction between the people of Bosnia that bear the above qualities and their leaders 
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who compromise pluralism through deviant and corrupt practices.  The OHR in 
particular has embraced this renewed understanding of Bosnia’s past by frequently 
reiterating that peace rather than conflict has been the norm in Bosnia’s history.576 
Following this sea change in the international statebuilders’ perception of Bosnianess, 
refugee returns became the key nation-building policy. Indeed, for many international 
officials it has not only become a moral question to reverse the effects of ethnic 
cleansing but also a distinct possibility as demonstrated by the history of peaceful co-
existence. The wider academic and policy debates casting doubt on the forced marriage 
that the country has come to resemble are categorically dismissed by the international 
statebuilding agencies in Bosnia. Particularly the OHR has been at pains to emphasize 
that the days of map-drawing are over.577 Depoliticization of identities has also meant a 
move away from communitarianism to individualism.578 As a hangover from 
communism, the prioritizing of the collective over the individual is seen as a feature that 
is fundamentally incompatible with modern statehood. Depoliticized identities and 
individualism are thus seen as crucial aspects in the construction of the state identity. 
The OHR’s attempts to counter acts of contention in the symbolic domain, detailed in 
the remainder of the Chapter, have largely centered on the use of coercion. The OHR 
has used the Bonn powers to impose decisions on contentious issues such as the design 
of state insignia, in addition to blocking plans to rename places, use exclusivist symbols 
and erect controversial memorials. Yet, the Bonn powers have done little to eradicate 
the alternative symbolic systems.579 
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Mobilization and Framing of Contention in the Symbolic Domain 
 
Having discussed at length the international activities in the symbolic domain of Bosnia, 
the Chapter now turns to exploring the local symbolic practices. In this regard, the 
mechanisms of mobilization and framing are particularly useful. Before discussing them 
further, however, it is important to note that an aspect of opportunity structures pertinent 
to the symbolic domain merits attention. Underpinning international statebuilding is the 
notion of tolerance and pluralism which translate into the policy of multiculturalism. 
Yet, the multiculturalism promoted by the international statebuilders is rooted in 
particularism; while foregrounding comparability of cultures it essentially sees them as 
being distinct.580 Indeed, much of the international understanding of Bosnia is 
predicated on the existence of separate and conflictual cultures that are incentivized to 
co-exist. This has served to reify the notion of separate local cultures and consequently 
the local cultural narratives premised on exclusivist identities, while opening up the 
possibility for claim-making based on particularistic demands. 
 
The mobilization of contention in the symbolic domain centers primarily on the 
networks of actors identified in the previous chapters; political parties, interests groups 
and religious organizations. Parties represent an ideal actor in mobilizing contention as 
they have formal organizational structures that can be used efficiently to carry out 
actions. Most political parties also have prestige and credibility that enables them to 
disseminate the message. In addition to parties, representatives of religious 
organizations have played an important role in mobilizing contention at the symbolic 
domain. A case in point are Bosnian Croat representatives of the Catholic Church who 
have publicly undermined the idea of Bosnianess. Bishop Ratko Peric for instance 
claimed that ‘the international community launched a campaign against our most 
sacred book: the Bible is being prepared in the Bosnian language now’.581 Certain 
media outlets have also been important in terms of disseminating the alternative cultural 
narratives. Newspapers such as the Serb-controlled Glas Srpske, the Croat-run Vecernji 
List and Bosniak-owned Dnevni List regularly report on issues relating to renaming of 
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public spaces, ceremonies, monuments and other issues of symbolic value in a manner 
that can be described inflammatory, thus keeping the issues at the fore of the post-war 
development. Vecernji List, for instance, reported on the OSCE’s demand to remove all 
Croat insignia from schools and argued that references to different religions and cultures 
which people should cherish are distinctly unwelcome.582 Glas Srpske, on the hand, 
regularly reports on the local municipalities perceived efforts to erase Serbness in 
Bosnia, ranging from the changing of Serb-related street names to attempts to build 
Orthodox churches outside the RS.583 These newspapers also give voice and access to 
the public debates for interest groups such as the war veterans and families of the 
victims associations; such groups seek often, if not always, to mobilize the public 
opinion for the preservation and maintenance of the exclusive identities at the expense 
of wider Bosnian identity.  
 
The local ways of framing contention that pertains to identities is linked to the wider 
debates on the existence of nations in Bosnia. In these debates Serbs and Croats have 
portrayed Bosniaks as Orthodox or Catholic Slavs who converted into Islam during the 
Ottoman occupation. This line of argument has then denied the primordial existence of 
Bosniaks. Bosniak scholars, on the other hand, have made a concerted effort to 
demonstrate the existence of distinct Bosniak identity prior to the arrival of the 
Ottomans. Linguistic, religious and cultural differences are frequently foregrounded in 
demands that challenge the international statebuilding vision. This has regularly taken 
the form of emphasizing the historic nature of one’s own people. As an interviewee 
involved in a Croat political party asked ‘Do you know how old our language is, by the 
age of its dictionary? The first Croatian dictionary was published around the 
seventeenth century. The first Bosniak one in 1997 or 1998’.584 Serb and Croat framings 
have then regularly portrayed Bosnianess as an artificial construct that has ‘no smell or 
no color’. 585 Another frequent method of framing contention at the symbolic domain 
has been to evoke the unsuccessful Austro-Hungarian attempts to create Bosnianess. 
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The international identity-building efforts are likened to those of Benjamin Kallay, an 
Austro-Hungarian administrator who attempted to create a shared identity for the 
Bosnian subjects. A Croat priest, for instance, lambasted the international statebuilders 
for attempting to ‘return us to the Kallay time’, 586 while a Bosnian Serb intellectual 
noted with reference to Kallay that attempts to create a ‘quasi-nation’ in Bosnia would 
be thwarted again as Serbs and Croats have their distinguishable histories, cultures and 
languages. 587 Although Bosniaks have by and large embraced the notion of Bosnianess, 
certain Bosniak actors have engaged in symbolic actions that highlight the Islamic past 
of Bosnia.  For many in the Bosniak community, as discussed in the earlier chapters, the 
injustice frame is constructed on Bosniak suffering and victimisation during the conflict. 
This has prompted attempts to construct Bosniaks as a linguistic and historical entity, 
distinct from Serbs and Croats.  
 
 
State Symbols 
 
State insignia – flags, coat of arms, currency and other symbols of statehood – play an 
important role in the abstract representations of the people. They function not only as 
focal points of loyalty, but also as signifiers of history and identity. In the Bosnian case 
the rejection of internationally-decreed emblems and the use of alternative symbolic 
framework has highlighted the distinctiveness of each national group.  Local 
ambivalence towards the internationally-designed identity-building measures is 
illustrated well by Kostić’s survey concerning the three ethnic groups’ attitudes on the 
international community’s post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.588  
When asked to indicate a national anthem that best corresponds to the respondent’s 
national loyalty, 93% of the Serbs chose the Serbian national anthem Bože Pravde and 
76% of the Croats in Bosnia indicated the Croatian hymn Lijepa Naša as the anthem 
that expresses their national loyalty.589 In the case of the Croat community, it has 
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become an established practice that all Croat ceremonial activities play the Croat, rather 
than Bosnian, anthem.590 In terms of other state symbols, such as the flag and the coat of 
arms, both Bosnian Serbs and Croats view the symbols of Bosnianess as meaningless as 
they do not adequately reflect all the constituent nations. A Serb representative 
described the design of the Bosnian flag as ‘design of a Danish yogurt package’ 
lamenting the lack of authentic local symbols in the state flag.591 The critique of the 
externally-imposed symbols reflects the deep-seated Bosnian Serb and Croat frustration 
over the perceived lack of international understanding of the alternative identities 
present in Bosnia; ‘this is not a brotherhood and unity - it is impossible to turn Croats 
and Serbs into Bosniaks’.592 It is clear that in many ways the contested nature of the 
state symbols is a reflection of the contested statehood as a whole.  
 
As noted above, the common state insignia representing Bosnian statehood has been 
contested by opting for alternative emblems. This has been the case with Serbs and 
Croats. The usage of separate symbols became a common practice during the recent war 
and the DPA endorsed the practice by permitting each entity to establish their respective 
emblems while also creating shared, state-level symbols.  The state symbols of Bosnia, 
on the other hand, were chosen by international officials three years after the peace 
agreement as local actors were unable to agree upon the flag, coat of arms, currency and 
national anthem. Yet, the invention and imposition of symbols did not go un-negotiated. 
Local opposition to the single design of the currency, for instance, resulted in a 
compromise where the entities had their respective cultural and historical figures printed 
in the notes that were circulated in their entities, as opposed to the common symbols for 
all as proposed by the OHR.  This hardly coincided with the international aim of 
creating a national currency representing unity of the people. In practice the use of 
common currency has been circumvented by the use of alternative currencies, such as 
the Croatian Kuna in the Bosnian Croat-dominated areas.  
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Alongside the currency, the design of the Bosnian flag was also chosen by the High 
Representative in the face of local disagreement. The blue and yellow flag, devoid of 
any religious or national symbols, was chosen by the High Representative to reflect the 
projected outcome of the statebuilding process: EU membership. According to the 
OHR, the flag represents ‘the future…unity, not division. It is flag that belongs to 
Europe’.593 The new flag was initially rejected by all three national groups and was 
rarely used in the immediate years following the war. This indicates the contentious 
function served by flags; while in many states they are generally representations of 
established order, in divided societies flags signify territorial and historical claims.594 
For the international statebuilders the refusal to fly the new flag signaled affront to the 
peace process as a whole. Resorting to the use of capital in countering such contention, 
the US froze its ‘train and equip program’ with the Bosniak-Croat Federation.595  Whilst 
the Bosniaks have gradually come to accept the flag, the Serb and parts of the Croat 
communities continue to reject it.  Bosnian flags are largely absent in the RS that uses 
its own flag, bearing a close resemblance of the Serbian flag. The Šahovnica – the Croat 
checkerboard flag – similarly dominates in the Croat-controlled areas of the Federation. 
In this way, the Serbness and Croatness as distinct from Bosnianess is continuously 
‘flagged’ or ‘reminded’ through the symbols present in the physical environment.596 
Through such ‘flagging’, as Billig argues, ‘nations are reproduced as nations’ as people 
are continuously reminded of their national identity.597   
 
 
Naming and Landscape 
 
If the adoption of alternative symbols has been a salient aspect in the process of 
challenging the international statebuilders’ vision of Bosnian nationhood, a range of 
symbolic practices have been equally important in foregrounding the distinctiveness of 
the national groups and thus providing alternative cultural visions of Bosnian statehood. 
Geography has been particularly important in this regard. Where places evolve in 
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conjunction with conflicts and turbulent upheavals, specific features of the landscape 
take on special importance.598 In an attempt to forge homogenous nations in a multi-
national state, the war in Bosnia entailed extensive destruction of the architectural 
symbols of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, whether churches, mosques or other monuments.599 
A significant part of the war effort involved wiping out of any difference in the 
geographical and symbolic landscape so as to construct and naturalize the notion of 
separate identity and its territorial home.600 The built environment in many ways 
represented, and still does, the most tangible signifier of separate identities as the 
language, dress code or even outward appearance of the people inhabiting the country 
are indistinguishable.601 Thus churches and mosques, as well as other culturally 
significant buildings have acquired political meaning. In this way geography has 
become an important dimension in the symbolic domain as public spaces and building 
have been appropriated for contentious practices. This relates to the lived environment 
in which post-conflict statebuilding occurs; streets, squares, towns, monuments and 
specific buildings.  The practice of naming and re-naming of these spaces transforms the 
otherwise neutral environments into political settings.602 In his research on the practice 
of renaming streets, Azaryahu suggests that street names commemorating specific 
individuals and events and their officially constructed meanings are ‘instrumental in 
substantiating the ruling socio-political order and its particular theory of the world’.603  
 
In the Bosnian case these locally-authorized versions of the past have undermined 
international efforts to create a common state identity. Renaming of public spaces and 
towns in accordance with ethnically-defined criteria are an essential part of creating 
alternative cultural narratives. This has historically been the case in Bosnia; 
transformations in the country’s power structures have been accompanied by changes in 
place and street names to reflect the values of those in charge. When the Yugoslav 
republic was founded following the fall of its former Habsburg overlords, main street 
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names in Sarajevo were changed to illustrate the victory of south Slav values over those 
of the Habsburg Empire. Following the Partisan victory in the Second World War, 
similar act of altering the city’s memorial culture was illustrated in renaming streets 
after the Partisans and their leader Tito. 604 
 
The practice of renaming streets in Bosnia has continued to the post-conflict phase. A 
particular case in point is Sarajevo. In the aftermath of the war a Bosniak-dominated 
committee of Sarajevan writers, artists and historians was given the task of renaming the 
city’s streets; according to Robinson et al605 the committee had popular support for 
changing street names that were associated with the war-time enemies. Even the streets 
named after Bosnian Serbs and Croats with strong ties to Bosnia were replaced by 
predominantly Bosniak names and events. Many of the streets came to be renamed after 
figures or events from the Ottoman period with few references to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Cyrillic script, associated with Serbs, was removed from street signs. This 
signalled the prioritising of the Ottoman era of Bosnian history at the expense of the 
Yugoslav-period when the Bosniaks were in less dominant position. The act of erasing 
references to Yugoslavia thus signifies the transformation in the power structures 
internal to Bosnia. Names alluding to the recent conflict reflect the endeavour of the 
political elites to establish their worldview and rule as legitimate. For instance a square 
at the centre of Sarajevo was named ‘Trg Oslobođenja Alija Izetbegović’ after the war-
time president, while street names such as ‘Zelenih Beretki’ and Crnih Labudova’ 
referred to the Bosnian army that fought against the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.606 In 
addition, various Bosniak-controlled towns were given the prefix ‘Bosanski’ (Bosnian). 
Whereas ‘Bosanski’ became a part of the Bosniak nation-building lexicon, in the RS the 
prefix was dropped from town names as an act of ‘Othering’.607 At the same time, the 
communist and multi-ethnic past has also been rejected through the replacement of pre-
war street names in Banja Luka with those of Serb heroes and no references to the 
Muslim community have remained. In Banja Luka, the RS capital, references to Tito 
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and Lenin have been replaced by figures from Serbian history. Moreover, as an attempt 
to amplify the victimisation of the Serbs, a street in Banja Luka has been named 
‘detainees of Jasenovac’, referring to the Croat-run Second World War concentration 
camp where many Serbs perished.608 Similarly, Croats in Bosnia have renamed streets 
after Croat heroes from the Second World War, while also commemorating 
controversial figures from the recent conflict. In the town of Čapljina, in Herzegovina, 
HDZ-dominated municipal council controversially named a reconstructed bridge ‘Dr. 
Franjo Tuđman’ after the former President of Croatia known for his fervent 
nationalism.  Other symbolic practices that challenge the very notion of Bosnian 
statehood pertain to alternative cartography. Maps are frequently utilised to make claims 
about identity and territory; schools, as well as weather forecasts, in the RS are found to 
use maps showing either the RS only or the RS represented as a distinct geographical 
space from Bosnia.609   
 
As with renaming spaces, monuments and buildings are an integral part of the symbolic 
domain of post-conflict societies. They represent the prevalent interpretations and 
understandings of historical events and individuals. As distinct and physical markers of 
identity churches and historical buildings and monuments became targets of destruction 
during the war, embodying the practice of ‘urbicide’ that occurred in tandem with 
genocidal policies.610 It is against this background that the preservation of national 
monuments was acknowledged and enshrined in the DPA by the international officials 
designing the peace agreement. Indicating the salience of symbolic and cultural aspects 
of peacebuilding and statebuilding, High Representative Ashdown noted that 
preservation of national monuments ‘…is of great political and symbolic significance in 
terms of redressing results of the wholesale destruction of our recent fratricidal war’.611 
The underpinning logic assumes that preservation and rehabilitation of national 
monuments is not only necessary in terms of reconciliation but also to the process of 
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refugee returns in that neutral symbolic environment is crucial for creating a non-
intimidating and inclusive atmosphere.612  
 
Local statebuilding actors have deployed a range of practices to preserve and maintain 
the mono-ethnic symbolic environment in their respective parts of the country. 
Politicians have, for instance, blocked at the municipal level permissions to build new 
monuments. A case in point is the reconstruction of the Ferhadija mosque in Banja 
Luka destroyed by Serb fighters during the conflict. While the process of getting the 
building work started was bureaucratically obstructed by Serb authorities, the ceremony 
of laying the first cornerstone in 2001 descended into a Serb-initiated violent riot.613 
Another case is the urgently needed maintenance work on the famous bridge in 
Višegrad, eastern Bosnia, immortalised by Ivo Andrić’s Nobel Prize-winning novel 
‘Čuprija na Drina’ (‘The Bridge On the Drina’). Regarded essentially as a legacy of the 
Islamic, Ottoman past, the RS authorities under whose jurisdiction the bridge is on have 
not completed the maintenance work.614 Other national groups have engaged in similar 
practices; for instance the attempt to build a Serb Orthodox church near Srebrenica 
faced various obstructions from the local non-Serb authorities.615 Local actors have also 
commissioned memorials and monuments that foreground the exclusive identity of the 
group rather than the wider state identity as advanced by the international statebuilders. 
In practice this has, for instance, meant rejecting shared war memorials commemorating 
all victims of the conflict; in 2001 associations representing the families of the fallen 
Serb fighters and war veterans protested against adding the names of the Serb dead to 
the genocide memorial in Potocari, regarded as Bosniak memorial.616 These practices 
have extended to monuments celebrating specific aspects of the nation. Bosnian Croats 
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in Siroki Brijeg commissioned a monument for the late Croat ruler Franjo Tuđman, 
while strategically placing large Christian crosses in Stolac and Mostar that are 
inhabited by both Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. Serbs similarly erected a statue for 
Draža Mihajlović (World War II Serb leader) in the centre of Brčko during a period of 
extensive minority returns.617 Such practices are certain to cause offense to the other 
national groups, but crucially they also represent cultural alternatives that directly 
challenge the shared Bosnianess propagated by the international statebuilders.  
 
 
Language and National Holidays  
 
Alongside state insignia, place names, architecture and commemorative practice, 
language became an integral part of the local cultural narratives that foreground the 
exclusive identities. Under Yugoslavia the primary language of Bosnia was what was 
known as Serbo-Croatian. Following the dissolution of the state, Serbo-Croatian was 
deconstructed and demarcated into three separate languages.  In many ways these 
languages have been used to create ‘symbolic boundaries’ between nations following 
the collapse of the Yugoslav state.618 In the RS this has been manifested in the exclusive 
use of Cyrillic alphabet, associated with the Serbian language, at the expense of its Latin 
counterpart. The ‘language-nationalism’ of the Bosniaks, on the other hand, has been 
manifested in the use of Turkish words as well as in the construction of a separate 
‘Bosnian’ language through new reference - and textbooks.619  Jeffrey found in his study 
of the Brčko district that the international effort to promote multi-culturalism by having 
street signs on both scripts were undermined  by locals who painted over the script of 
other nationalities.620 In other parts of the country Croats have been locked in 
confrontation with the OHR over the right to establish Croat-language public 
broadcasting company. While the OHR has blocked such efforts as inimical to 
multiculturalism, a high-ranking HDZ figure argues that ‘media in Croatian language is 
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one of important preconditions for Croats’ existence in Bosnia’, thus linking the very 
survival of Bosnian Croats to the question of language.621  
 
If languages have acted as symbolic boundaries and thus reinforced exclusive identities, 
national holidays have served similar functions. This is important in the sense that states 
actively communicate or ‘send messages’ through the holidays they choose to 
celebrate.622 National holidays and celebrations serve then as signifying practices 
relating to the values the given state promotes and reflects the cultural, religious and 
civic features underpinning the society.623 In contrast to other, previously discussed, 
symbolic aspects of Bosnian statehood, the DPA did not decree on public holidays. As a 
consequence there is no state-level law on public holidays; what has emerged instead 
are alternative celebrations and holidays. The Croat and Serb communities continue to 
reject the newly created national holidays and state ceremonies envisioned to create 
loyalty and sense of belonging. As an act of contesting the notion of Bosnianess, Croats 
and Serbs in Bosnia have created their own commemorative schedules. As an 
established practice since the end of the war, Bosnian Serbs refuse to participate in the 
annual Independence Day celebrations as, according to Serb politicians, the day ‘brings 
uncomfortable memories on tragic conflict in Bosnia’ that resulted from ‘ignoring the 
Serb peoples’ will’.624 Rather than celebrating the independence of the country, the RS 
commemorates the 21st of November, ‘Day of Establishing the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in BiH’, which silenced the guns and created the current state 
structure. This is controversial as the day is regarded by many in the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation as the date that established the de facto division of the country.625 Some 
Croats in Bosniak-controlled areas do partake in celebrating independence, while most 
Bosnian Croats celebrate Croatian statehood day. Similarly, Bosnian Serbs celebrate 
hallmarks of the Serbian history, such as the anniversary of the First Serb Uprising. 
Ceremonies marking the suffering of one national group are common; while in each 
July Bosniaks gather in Srebrenica to member the victims of the genocide perpetrated 
by Serbs, the Serb community holds its own separate ceremonies to commemorate the 
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Serb victims. In July 2007, for instance, Serbs organized a memorial service to the 69 
people killed in 1992 in Serb villages in Eastern Bosnia. According to media reports the 
event was marked by presence of Serb symbols from the Second World War and the 
recent conflict626. The presence of these symbols of identity was combined with the 
attendance of the RS prime minister, thus giving the event an official approval. Croats 
have similarly commemorated the Herceg-Bosna, the war-time Croat controlled enclave 
in Bosnia. The celebration in 2011 which marked the ten-year anniversary since the 
foundation of Herceg-Bosna was celebrated with accolades to controversial Croat 
nationalist figures such as Mate Boban.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Chapter has argued that local practices contesting international statebuilding do not 
only take place in the institutional or discursive domain, but also in the symbolic realm 
of society where profound questions on what constitutes the people are debated and 
symbolically performed. In the case study at hand, a range of competing local nation-
building practices have existed since the 19th century; following the end of the war the 
international attempts at cultural reconstruction and creation of state identity have 
encountered and interacted with these local practices. These international efforts have 
essentially entailed statebuilding-via-nationbuilding: they have been guided by the idea 
that current politicized and communitarian identities are not susceptible for efficient 
statehood. Local statebuilding agencies have challenged the international identity-
building efforts by providing alternative cultural visions through the deployment of 
exclusive symbols and symbolic practices. These modalities of contention have entailed 
the rejection of Bosnian state insignia (mainly by Serbs and to some degree Croats), 
renaming towns and public spaces, opposing the construction of architecture and 
memorials that reflect or relate to the other national groups, construction of linguistic 
differences and celebrating alternative national holidays, while boycotting the official 
Bosnian celebrations (by Serbs and some Croats). Practices underscoring the essentialist 
and exclusive identities make the claim that that three culturally distinct groups exist 
and thus problematize the efforts to create Bosnianess. This has been particularly the 
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case with the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. Although Bosniaks have come to accept and 
even embrace some of the international identity-building measures, practices that 
emphasize the Islamic past and culture of the Bosniaks have also occurred. They have 
thus contested the attempts to construct secular and individualistic Bosnianess. The 
analysis suggests then that akin to frame contests whereby different representations of 
the post-conflict space and the actors involved are used contest the internationally-led 
statebuilding, at the symbolic domain symbolic contests exist. In these symbolic 
contests, international and local statebuilding agencies make competing claims with 
respect to the cultural aspects of the statebuilding process. The analysis of contention 
and internal/external interactions in the symbolic domain is indicative of the way in 
which local contention politicizes the process: the dynamic underpinning these symbolic 
contests has been one of de-politicization/politicization. While international 
statebuilding officials attempt to de-politicize local identities through creating state 
identity, local statebuilding agencies maintain the politicization of identities through 
symbols and symbolic practices.  As with contentious practices in the discursive 
domain, symbols and symbolic acts serve multiple purposes. The emotive aspect of 
symbols can instigate and legitimize actions, thus mobilizing contention. However, the 
use of symbols or engagement in symbolic actions can also function as contentious 
practices that directly challenge or undermine aspects of international statebuilding. 
This is the case for instance with the celebration of alternative national holidays or the 
appropriation of geographical spaces in order to maintain the demographic homogeneity 
wrought during the war.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
This research project was motivated by the need to approach post-conflict statebuilding 
as a contested rather than hierarchical process. As argued in the opening Chapters, 
conceptualizations of statebuilding as top-down impositions tend to overlook the wide 
array of both ‘hidden’ and public practices in local spaces that re-negotiate international 
statebuilding measures through strategies of obstructionism and appropriation. It is the 
direct and explicit practices that have been the main concern of this thesis. Given the 
surge of academic interest in the everyday and hidden forms of resistance, this analysis 
has foregrounded the parallel, public acts of contention that have elicited less attention. 
Much of the prior theorizing of public forms of contention has done so through the 
spoiler lens. While the findings of the spoiler literature corroborate some of the 
conclusions reached in this study, its highly normative conceptual language and 
inattentiveness to non-material practices render it a limited framework. Moreover, the 
research on spoilers pays little attention to the way in which the practices of 
international actors may at times create and sustain local non-conforming actors. 
Motivated by the above concerns, this thesis has told a story of bureaucratic, discursive 
and cultural contests between agencies advocating different visions of statehood in 
Bosnia. In these interactions local actors have sought to bring about a change to 
international statebuilding measures or policies that threaten their respective 
statebuilding visions through a range of disruptive techniques. These techniques have 
not been limited to the institutional structures that are perhaps the most lucid domain 
where the statebuilding process can be negotiated; they are also evident in the public 
debates and symbolic realms where local agencies have sought to contest detrimental 
aspects of statebuilding by representing international statebuilding as oppressive and by 
sustaining local exclusive identities.  
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This concluding discussion has multiple aims. After bringing the different strands of the 
analysis together, the Chapter addresses the second question posed in the introductory 
Chapter; how do local acts of contention interact with international statebuilding 
practices. The section focuses on the dynamics of the interactions between internal and 
external actors.  It suggests that statebuilding in the Bosnian case has essentially 
entailed contradictory dynamics of conflict and symbiosis: while the relations between 
the internal and external statebuilders have been contentious and conflictual, a closer 
inspection suggests that this dynamic also has a symbiotic dimension whereby the 
international statebuilders and the extension of their mandates are dependent upon the 
existence of local contentious agencies. At the same time, the presence of external 
authority and use of coercive methods has given the local actors a potent mobilizing and 
framing tool which has enabled self-representations of local elites as the defenders of 
their respective communities. The remainder of the chapter places the research in the 
wider context of the study of International Relations.  
 
 
Key Findings of the Study 
 
The thesis set out to enquire into local agency in post-conflict spaces and interactions 
between internal and external actors. It began by asking the following questions: how is 
international statebuilding contested in post-conflict spaces and how do the local 
practices of contestation interact with international statebuilding practices? The 
following section will rehearse the main findings of the study, before addressing the 
second research question by drawing some conclusions on the dynamics underpinning 
the interrelations.  
 
 
Parallel, Local Statebuilding Agendas 
 
One of the central points of departure for the analysis was the existence of local 
statebuilding agendas that encounter and interact with international statebuilding 
measures. Contra to the accounts of post-conflict spaces as passive recipients of 
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internationally-imposed measures, the analysis has been grounded in local agency. The 
study suggests that this agency can be found in expected places (institutions of 
governance) but also in some less-explored realms (discourses and symbols).  Perhaps 
more importantly, the thesis deployed the notion of contention in analyzing the 
activities local agencies engage in. This was motivated by the observation that parallel 
to the much-analyzed ‘hidden’ and ‘everyday’ practices, alternative set of activities that 
challenge, undermine and shape statebuilding are evident. In cases such as Bosnia these 
alternative modalities of challenging the international statebuilding practice do not fit 
into the existing frameworks of everyday, unstructured and random acts that go 
unnoticed. This point is evident not only in the mobilizing and framing practices traced 
throughout the analysis, but also in the presence of connected networks of political, 
social and religious actors.  An analysis of contention carried out here therefore traced 
and captured discernible practices which are understood as being contentious by the 
object/s of the action and which exhibit some degree of organization even if not being 
formally structured protest movements. Such ‘public transcripts’ 627 have been largely 
neglected by the focus on the ‘hidden transcripts’628 of resistance in post-Dayton 
Bosnia.629 While one might argue that the potential for emancipatory forms of 
development lies precisely in the everyday realm, sharp divisions between elites and 
non-elites may result in unwarranted romanticization of the ‘local-local’630 and 
overlooking the possibilities for progress in the society as a whole. Even though the 
local re-politicization of the statebuilding process in Bosnia has largely occurred along 
ethnic lines, the eventual departure of the international officials may pave the way for 
the start of politics on social and economic, rather than ethnic, grounds. 
 
To return to the point made earlier about the presence of local statebuilding agendas, a 
reoccurring theme in the analysis has been the complexity of actors and agendas and the 
difficulty of drawing clear demarcations between local and international agendas. The 
categories of local and international have been used as heuristic devices for the purpose 
of generating coherent analysis; in practice narratives, concepts, norms and values are 
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shared across the analytical divide of local and international. Not all local contention is, 
for instance, grounded in the claim of international statebuilding as being overly 
intrusive; many local actors in Bosnia argue that it is the half-hearted and inconsistent 
manner of its implementation that has resulted in weak statehood. At the same time, 
international actors do not agree upon the scope of Bosnian statehood nor on the role of 
international actors in the process. Actors such as Russia share the concern of many in 
the Bosnian Serb community over the interventionism of the OHR. This illustrates the 
difficulties in drawing clear demarcations between external and internal agendas.  
 
 
Domains and Modalities of Contention 
 
The core empirical Chapters identified a set of practices, both material and non-
material, that form the overall repertoire of local contention in Bosnia. These practices 
operate in the institutional, discursive and symbolic domains which are overlapping and 
interconnected. The red line running through the empirical Chapters is the local attempt 
to re-negotiate the parameters of the post-conflict process through overlapping 
bureaucratic, communicative and cognitive practices. Chapter 4 provided an in-depth 
investigation into the contentious episodes in the institutional domain. It highlighted the 
way in which a range of disruptive administrative techniques deployed by local agencies 
sought to re-negotiate the shape and the parameters of the externally-administered 
process in accordance with their respective statebuilding agendas. The chapter 
demonstrated how international attempts to counter local contention resulted at times in 
cycles of contention where coercive international measures served to fuel further 
disquiet and contention. Whereas Chapter 4 traced tangible acts of contention, Chapter 5 
shifted the attention to the discursive dimension of local contention and the 
internal/external interactions. Interrogating public discourses and debates, it found that 
local discursive strategies deployed liberal peace narratives and other international 
discourses in order to destabilize and undermine the legitimacy of international 
statebuilding or to affect its course. International statebuilding actors, on the other hand, 
regularly used decertification strategies that depicted local elites as corrupt and self-
interested. These frame contests reflect the discursive hybridity that marks post-Dayton 
Bosnia: while liberal peace remains the hegemonic narrative, its key concepts are used 
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to represent the post-conflict process and the actors involved in profoundly different 
ways. Chapter 6, in turn, explored the symbolic domain that encompasses both material 
and non-material practices. The central argument was that the modalities of contention 
in the symbolic domain – the use of symbols and symbolic acts – challenge the 
internationally-devised cultural reconstruction measures aiming at creating a sense of 
Bosnianess by sustaining exclusive communal identities. The empirical Chapters 
demonstrated that while international statebuilding actors have implemented a number 
of statebuilding reforms and policies, in many instances local actors have been 
successful in using delays, vetoes and other techniques to alter the scope or the form of 
the externally-devised policy. 
 
What does the existence of local contention then mean to the post-conflict development 
of Bosnia? Although for many in the international statebuilding community in Bosnia 
local contention is the key obstacle in the road to peace and prosperity, a more somber 
analysis reveals a more nuanced reading of contention. While it may well be the case 
that some instances of contention reflect the attempt to protect the interests of the few, 
writing all local contention off as self-aggrandizement or corruption misses the 
negotiatory aspect of contention. Local participation in the post-conflict process has 
perhaps not materialized in depoliticized and non-ethnic way envisioned by 
international statebuilding actors, but contention nevertheless represents a local 
alternative to the somewhat hollow concept of local ownership propagated by 
international actors. Local practices of contestation represent an active engagement with 
the post-conflict process of determining the contours of Bosnian statehood. They 
represent re-politicization of the externally-led statebuilding process in which political 
questions are represented as technical and administrative issues of good governance. If 
local acts of contention counter the depoliticizing tendencies of international 
statebuilding, they may also have implications on the process of democratization. 
Contention represents a form of societal negotiation that is crucial in the gradual 
development of democracy.631 It is through this process that the differing statebuilding 
and nationbuilding projects can be peacefully negotiated.  Another noteworthy point is 
that if we understand hybridity - that best characterizes the Bosnian statebuilding 
experience – as an outcome of local mediation of the externally-led process, then it is 
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likely that such negotiated forms of statehood are more sustainable and locally 
legitimate than imposed statebuilding strategies. This implies that local practices of 
contention are not necessarily problematic from the point of view of democratization 
and local ownership of the post-conflict process. Indeed, in many ways one of the 
problems of post-conflict statebuilding process in Bosnia has been the mistaken 
identification of local political engagement with the process as a problem requiring 
resolving through external ‘spoiler’ management techniques, such as the Bonn powers. 
As particularly Chapter 4 demonstrated, international attempts to counter these practices 
have not brought an end to contention but have in many cases reinforced it.  
 
 
Mechanisms of Contention 
 
The thesis began developing a framework that allows the tracing and understanding of 
contentious practices. In this regard it utilized the mechanism of political opportunity 
structures, mobilizing structures and framing. Political opportunity structures were 
particularly useful in understanding the concrete acts of contention at the institutional 
domain. They showed how wider regional and international dynamics as well as 
changes in the political environment affected the opportunities for contention. At the 
same time, political opportunity structures highlighted the divisions amongst the 
international statebuilding actors that incentivized contention: this was particularly true 
when it comes to the international actor should play in the post-conflict process. The 
opportunity structures also entail discursive dimension, as noted in Chapter 2, which 
directed attention to the way in hegemonic discourses enable or limit contention. This 
allowed us to interrogate the discursive environment in which statebuilding takes place 
and appreciate how its main narrative – the liberal peace – has enabled contention. 
Mobilizing structures, on the other hand, directed attention to the range of local actors 
involved, organization of contention and dissemination of contentious claims. Although 
contention in the Bosnian case has not been formally organized activity, investigation 
into the mobilizing structures demonstrated that actors sharing visions of Bosnia’s 
statehood and how to achieve them engaged in propagating frames that have sought to 
affect the international presence. Framing, as a mechanism of contention, has in turn 
been useful particularly in understanding discursive forms of contention. Framing has 
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underlined the discursive hybridity through the focus on competing representations of 
the post-conflict process and the different agencies involved. 
 
As noted above, the aim of deploying these mechanisms is to begin developing a set of 
analytical tools that help us to understand how local contention operates and is 
sustained. Although the specific histories and characteristics of each post-conflict 
society require attention, it is likely that similar mechanisms of contention are at play 
across cases as an extensive body of literature suggests.632 These studies applying 
contentious politics mechanisms are not limited to traditional contentious politics 
subjects such as revolutions, but on range of different processes where actors have 
engaged in contesting authorities’ policies.633 The thesis has argued that such 
mechanisms can help us to better understand the societal negotiation processes that 
occur following conflicts and how local actors seek to protect and promote their 
respective statebuilding projects. Features of the political environment, most notably the 
institutional arrangements through which the country is governed, the degree to which 
the international actors agree upon the course and the methods of statebuilding and the 
way in which they respond to local acts of contention affect the type of contentious 
practices that are available for local actors. Bureaucratic acts of contention, such as 
blocking decision-making, are likely in political systems based on consociationalism. At 
the same time, different understandings of the conflict and the process thereafter among 
the international actors involved may offer local agencies the opportunity to align 
themselves with international actors holding similar views and pursuing similar 
agendas. This can have implications for the ability of the international agents of 
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statebuilding to operate as a coherent and effective actor. Post-conflict statebuilding 
processes are not just physical actions but also consist of verbal and communicative 
interactions. This is not limited to the Bosnian case; similar contests in the realm of 
public debates over the meaning of international statebuilding practice have been 
observed in other cases ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. Bearing close resemblance 
to the Bosnian practice of re-framing ‘liberal peace’ narratives, many East Timorese, for 
example, routinely referred to the UN-administration of the country as the ‘second 
occupation’ following Indonesian oppression of the Timorese.634 This highlights the 
importance of framing the situation and the actors involved in a specific way in order to 
justify and legitimize local acts of contention and alternative statebuilding agendas. 
Formal and informal ways to mobilize and organize these practices are also crucial for 
contesting the international authority in post-conflict states. It is through such structures 
that information is disseminated, activities coordinated and demands and activities of 
local agents made visible.   
 
 
International Statebuilding Contains Opportunities for Contention 
 
The analysis has suggested that certain ideas and practices underpinning the 
international statebuilding venture in Bosnia have provided opportunities for contention. 
This has been the case with the consociational political system, the essentialist view of 
Bosnian identities and the glaring contradictions between the international statebuilding 
rhetoric and practice. All of these aspects of statebuilding are intimately linked to the 
conservative and status quo-oriented nature of statebuilding in that they tend to 
prioritize stability over the seemingly liberal concern of democratization.  The 
consociational structures of governance created by the international actors in Dayton do 
not only enable the vetoing of decisions on the grounds of protecting national interests, 
but the use of ethnic quotas has also institutionalized ethnicity in the country.635 Due to 
the nature of the electoral system, politicians need to attract votes only from their 
                                               
634
 Samantha Power  Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World 
 ( New York; Penguin, 2008), 313 
635
 Florian Bieber ‘Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply 
Divided Societies’ European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper 19, February 2004, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN015487.pdf (accessed 10 October 
2010), 2 
195 
 
national group which disincentivizes political appeals across communities. Although in 
many ways the international actors in Dayton had few alternatives to powersharing 
when it came to finding political structures suitable for all parties, it is nonetheless the 
case that consociationalism has enabled local agencies to continue to protect and 
promote their respective statebuilding agendas through the institutions of governance.636 
The above point is intimately linked to the essentialist view of Bosnian identities: 
consociationalism is grounded in the view that separate and distinct political 
communities exist and they ought to have the right to protect their interests through 
powersharing mechanisms. This essentialist view of identities has not only informed the 
design of the country’s governance, but has also driven the international policy of 
building multicultural Bosnian statehood in which the different cultural groups could 
peacefully co-exist. This thinking has inadvertently legitimized local critiques that point 
out the impossibility of overarching Bosnian nationhood as they see Bosnia as a society 
comprised of multiple and separate nations and cultures.637 Such a view has overlooked 
the socially constructed nature of many of the inter-ethnic differences. At the same time, 
as much of the empirical analysis has suggested, contradictions between the liberal 
rhetoric and coercive practice of international statebuilding have enabled local actors to 
formulate compelling narratives pertaining to the oppressive nature of international 
statebuilding. This has been particularly the case with regards to undemocratic use of 
the Bonn powers as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The Dynamics of Statebuilding in Post-War Bosnia  
 
As noted earlier, the study has been concerned not only with how contention operates 
and is sustained but also with how local actors engage and interact with international 
statebuilding actors and practices. This is important considering that it is through these 
encounters and interactions that the statebuilding process is mediated. The following 
section discusses the contentious and symbiotic dimensions of the statebuilding 
interactions.  
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Conflict/Contestation  
 
A tangible and recurrent manifestation of the troubled relationship between segments of 
the local population and the internationally-led statebuilding in town centers across the 
country have been the frequent and illicit posters and graffiti celebrating war heroes 
indicted by the ICTY. Occasionally the international community responds in kind; when 
posters supporting the Bosnian Serb war-time President Radovan Karadžić appeared 
around the town of Pale in 2004, NATO troops plastered the Karadžić posters over with 
a poster of their own announcing ‘ Radovan, we did not forget you’.638 Although but one 
incident amongst many, this reflects the contention and conflict that has marked the 
internal-external dynamic. It is also indicative of the fundamental inability by 
international statebuilders to overcome the legitimacy enjoyed by many local actors 
engaged in contention in the eyes of the people. Although contention is not the sole 
local response to international statebuilding intervention and local co-operation also 
occurs, conflict and contention become salient dynamics to understand when 
investigating how the statebuilding process is negotiated. Such nature of the 
statebuilding dynamic in post-Dayton Bosnia is often explained with recourse to 
attributes of local actors. Indeed, the dominant account on the contentious nature of the 
statebuilding process in Bosnia - most often produced by the OHR - centers on the self-
aggrandizing Bosnian elites. As the argument goes, it is in the interest of Bosnian elites 
to maintain the current political and economic system through which they can maintain 
their power bases.639 The blame for the contentious relations between certain local 
actors and international statebuilding officials is reduced to a number of local 
individuals who have disrupted the process, thus personifying the pathologies of the 
post-conflict reconstruction process.  This was manifested particularly in the first 
decade of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Bosnia when the key concern of the 
international statebuilders was to send war criminals to the Hague. This policy priority 
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was not only necessitated by the demands of post-war justice but also the idea that the 
presence of war crimes indictees such as Karadžić and Mladić prevented the full 
implementation of the peace agreement. Following this logic then the failure of the 
statebuilding reforms could be accounted for by the pressure of deviant local agencies; 
if only these actors were captured, the real process of unhindered statebuilding could 
begin.  
 
Contra to this view, the discussion throughout the empirical chapters has made the case 
for understanding local contention as a way to re-negotiate the externally-led 
statebuilding process rather than routinely approaching it as an evidence of local 
deviance and criminality. Local agencies have put forth different claims with respect to 
the organization of the country’s governance. Contention has been about providing 
different and contradictory answers to the question of what kind of state should be built 
both in institutional/organizational and ideational terms after the war. Contention in the 
Bosnian case has not meant a wholesale rejection of international statebuilding but 
rather the attempt to mediate aspects of statebuilding that threaten the local visions of 
Bosnian statehood as outlined in Chapter 4. A re-occurring theme in the analysis that is 
closely linked to the above notion of contention as a form of negotiation is the re-
politicization of the process by local agencies. It has become a common place to argue 
that statebuilding de-politicizes the post-conflict reconstruction process: it turns 
profoundly political matters into technical and managerial issues, thus removing them 
from the realm of political decision-making and debate.640 Generally this has entailed 
prioritizing good governance and capacity-building at the expense of policy-making 
autonomy or local self-determination. The idea here is, as Chandler argues, that ‘the 
problems of politics’ can be resolved through law, social policy and administration 
rather than through the political structures and processes of the society emerging from 
conflict.641  This problematization of the political in local spaces produces ‘peace 
without politics’.642 Yet, what is clear is that such attempts to de-politicize the local 
through the bureaucratization of statebuilding are encountered by local practices that re-
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politicize the local space.643 Through a range of contentious practices in the institutions 
of governance, local agents engaged in contention seek to re-negotiate statebuilding 
measures deemed inimical to the interest of their respective groups or communities. In 
the Bosnian case local actors using the institutions to block and delay externally-
imposed measures are ultimately engaging in the democratic process of protecting the 
interests of their respective constituents. Although the democratic process may not have 
brought to the fore actors that many international statebuilders consider as partners, it 
nevertheless signals a local engagement with the post-conflict process via politics.  
 
 
Dynamic of Statebuilding: Symbiosis 
 
Even though contention is crucial to understanding the dynamic of statebuilding in 
Bosnia, conceiving the interactions in the case study at hand merely in terms of 
contestation would be to overlook the complexity that marks the post-conflict process. 
Indeed, a closer look reveals another dynamic that not only maintains local contention 
but also gives the international statebuilding mission its raison d'être. In short, the 
presence of actors contesting the internationally-led statebuilding process has 
necessitated the extension of international mandates, while the extension of 
international mandates and intensification of the statebuilding methods has, in turn, 
generated further local contention. Contentious dynamics then do not necessarily hinder 
international statebuilding but appear perversely to sustain it: in many ways the logic of 
interaction between the external and the internal statebuilders has been one of symbiosis 
whereby the seemingly conflictual agencies and agendas have, in fact, maintained each 
other. This is an aspect of hybridity that has elicited limited attention in the literature. 
Jarstad and Olsson, for instance, allude to the ‘symbiotic’ relationship between 
international and local actors but provide no detailed discussion of what such symbiosis 
entails.644 Divjak and Pugh, on the other hand, refer to the ‘unique symbiosis of 
international and local power’, but focus mainly on the economic aspect of the 
statebuilding.645 It is important to look more closely the issue of symbiosis, as it 
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challenges accounts of statebuilding dynamics as an antagonism between internal and 
external actors.    
 
This symbiotic relationship entails a number of elements. One of them is predicated on 
economic logic. These pathologies of the neo-liberal economic ideology in Bosnia’s 
reconstruction process are well-established by earlier studies.  As Pugh argues, 
international financial institutions are exclusively in control of the country’s economic 
policy (through conditions attached to their loans) which has meant that local 
communities have had no way of protecting themselves against the adverse effects of 
adjustment and austerity measures.646 The neo-liberal economic policies prioritizing 
privatization and the creation of investor-friendly environment have paid scant attention 
to the social aspects of the reconstruction, such as basic public services. This absence of 
state-sponsored social policies has opened up opportunities for the elites and actors in 
shadow economic networks to offer alternative forms of social welfare and protection to 
the people and thus maintain their bases of power. Privatization processes that have 
been captured by the nationalist parties – the main actors engaging in contestation of the 
externally-led statebuilding – have resulted in companies diverting funds to their 
respective political parties and parallel structures, as the cases of Herzegovacka Banka 
and the Bank of BiH illustrate.647 The common ground between the international 
statebuilding officials and local elites, as Pugh notes, is found in the drive to privatize 
and foster the growth of a ‘non-interventionist state’.648  
 
The dynamic created by the international statebuilding intervention has then been one 
where internationally-designed neo-liberal economic policies have facilitated local 
practices of clientelism which in turn has strengthened the alternative, local 
statebuilding agendas.649 In a system where political and economic power are intimately 
connected, access to jobs and other opportunities is exclusively controlled by the 
political elites, elites have been able to accommodate the conditionalities used by 
international statebuilding officials. More importantly, however, the governance 
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structures designed in Dayton have granted local actors measures through which to 
counter structural adjustment policies associated with the liberal statebuilding.650 The 
highly decentralised form of governance has granted local authorities substantial degree 
of both economic and political power.    
 
Much of the international funding aimed at physically and socio-politically 
reconstructing the country are diverted by local agencies to the purposes of their 
respective, local statebuilding agendas. Particularly in the early years of the 
statebuilding project much of the international funding was given directly to the 
municipal level (as opposed to the state level) which has strengthened these entities at 
the expense of the central state institutions.651 Moreover, the highly decentralised nature 
of the Bosnian state has made it difficult to control borders and collect customs duties in 
attempt to deal with trans-border trafficking of goods,652 while also allowing local 
politicians to consolidate their positions of power.653 Rather than using international 
funds to encourage minority returns, local actors have directed aid to the strengthening 
of the mono-ethnic features of the municipalities, for instance by creating jobs for 
people belonging to the majority ethnic group. It is clear then that the international 
attempts to counter local contestation with the means of capital have allowed the local 
agencies to persist.   
 
While Divjak and Pugh as well as Bliesemann de Guevara,654 among others, have shown 
how the economic structures created in Dayton have reinforced the existing structures of 
power and facilitated the misuse of office by parts of the elites in exchange for 
cooperation with the OHR, ostensibly trivial practices have also helped to sustain the 
nationalist political parties that are some of the primary actors challenging the 
externally-driven statebuilding process. This has, for instance, entailed substantial rental 
income from international statebuilding agencies to the coffers of companies controlled 
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by nationalist parties. NATO forces present in Bosnia paid millions of dollars in renting 
land, where military bases were set up, owned by the Government and in effect 
controlled by nationalist parties. These funds were in effect used to buy ‘good relations’ 
with the locals.655  
 
If the symbiotic relationship that is an integral part of hybrid peace has a distinct 
economic dimension, the less-explored political aspect of the symbiosis merits attention 
too. It is a dynamic where international statebuilding partly creates local contention and 
international responses to such local practice reproduce it further. Although local 
contention stems partly from the parallel, local statebuilding agendas, it is also the case 
that the nature of international statebuilding in Bosnia generates contention. This is 
because the policies and strategies of international statebuilding actors are deemed to be 
either non-democratic and “neo-colonial” (Serbs and Croats) or ineffective and half-
hearted (Bosniaks). While this profound lack of legitimacy reproduces contentious local 
agencies, it also creates the continued necessity for the international actors, particularly 
the OHR, to remain engaged. This is based on the internationally-stated intent that the 
OHR’s mission will continue until no significant contestation of the process exists. 
Given the presence of ‘unacceptable challenges to the Dayton Peace Agreement’, as the 
PIC Steering Board stated in 2008, the OHR will remain in place until the so-called 
‘5+2 conditions’ have been met.656 These criteria entail resolving the issue of property 
rights between state and other levels of the country’s government, completion of the 
Brčko Final Award, fiscal sustainability and consolidation of the rule of law. The two 
additional conditions entail signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
the EU and ‘a positive assessment of the situation in BiH’ by the PIC Steering Board 
‘based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement’.657 Particularly the latter 
stipulation, given its ambiguity, gives the PIC the possibility to maintain the presence of 
the OHR for the unforeseeable future as it establishes no concrete benchmark for 
closing down the office. In other words, there is no real end point to the OHR’s 
presence in the country. This has certainly not gone unmissed by local subjects of the 
OHR; many locals perceive the involvement of the international statebuilders as one 
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where they artificially create problems in order to ensure that their mandates are 
extended.658 Whether this really is the case or not is less important; what matters are the 
perceptions the local agencies’ actions are based upon.     
 
The continued presence of the OHR has acerbated the logic of dependency. While the 
OHR’s powers to impose legislation relieves local politicians from having to take 
difficult political decisions or having to negotiate solutions to political, economic or 
social issues and thus ‘depoliticizes’ the process of statebuilding,659 the OHR continues 
to act as the medium through which local and competing statebuilding agendas are 
sought to realize, particularly when it comes to the Bosniak statebuilding agenda. Rather 
than having to find real policy solutions to everyday issues and build election 
campaigns around such considerations, politicians have been able to focus on 
representing themselves as the protectors of their own group vis-à-vis the 
interventionism of the OHR and security threats emanating from the other national 
groups within the country. This has proved to be the formula that has allowed the 
nationalist political parties to cement their role in the Bosnian political life.  
 
Another interesting aspect here is the entanglement of international actors in the 
domestic political dynamics; the OHR in particular ‘has become much more of a local 
player than a representative of the international community’, as an interviewee put it.660 
This has been manifested in the ‘grooming’ of local politicians by external actors; while 
local politicians with policies different to those of international actors are marginalized, 
those supporting internationally-led initiatives are backed up in financial and advisory 
terms.661 Some interviewees even suggested that investigations into corruption of 
Bosnian politicians are used as strategic leverage by international actors when 
countering local opposition to statebuilding reforms.662 In addition to the dependency on 
the OHR, the presence of a highly interventionist OHR has enabled local statebuilders 
to further consolidate their statebuilding agendas. As a former OSCE employee 
observed, uncritical acceptance of the demands of international officials is often 
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politically costly for local politicians.663 This has particularly been the case in the RS 
where protecting the Serb interests against internationally-imposed state-strengthening 
measures has consolidated the popularity of politicians.664 Such confrontational 
dynamic may also help parties to maintain unity in the face of internal disagreements 
even if resistance yields no tangible outcomes. A case in point is the Croat self-rule 
campaign in 2001; despite the fact that it did not achieve Croat autonomy in Bosnia, it 
nevertheless served to consolidate the HDZ BiH’s popularity.665 These potentially 
positive implications of confrontation with the OHR in particular are not limited to the 
nationalist parties; when the non-nationalist coalition of parties, ‘the Alliance for 
Change’, won the elections in 2001, cooperation with the OHR was approached with 
caution. As a representative of the coalition noted, ‘we will not agree to become mere 
yes-men of OHR’.666 The above points underline the complex nature of statebuilding 
dynamics in Bosnia and how statebuilding practices and local acts of contention appear 
to exist in mutual dependency. The reality of statebuilding thus seems to be more 
complex and messy than often assumed, entailing aspects of conflict and symbiosis that 
form a hybrid order of post-conflict intervention and politics.  
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
The thesis has added to our understanding of post-conflict statebuilding conceptually 
and empirically.  In conceptual terms the contribution of the thesis resides in the 
introduction of the concept of contention to the analysis of local agency and local-
international dynamics and applying contentious politics mechanisms in order to trace 
such interactions. The point here is that even though the host countries of post-conflict 
statebuilding interventions vary a great deal, the mechanisms deployed in this analysis – 
political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing – can be found across 
cases where societal change is taking place, as substantial body of contentious politics 
research indicates. The above concepts can help us to capture and interpret processes of 
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societal negotiation that statebuilding operations essentially represent. Empirically, the 
research has identified how and where local agency operates and the range of 
contentious techniques through which the externally-led process is mediated. It has 
demonstrated that more complex and multi-faceted local agency exists than assumed by 
earlier studies on everyday resistance and ‘spoiler’ behavior. Through the in-depth case 
study research method, this thesis has generated hypotheses on the dynamics and 
interactions that drive statebuilding processes in societies emerging from conflicts.  
These contributions of the research speak in many ways to the interconnections between 
internationally-led statebuilding projects and domestic processes of state formation.667 
The complex and contested nature of post-conflict processes often results in what 
Barnett and Zurcher call ‘compromised’ forms of peace.668 Yet, to understand these 
compromised forms of peace as the reason why international statebuilding missions 
have had poor track record would be to overlook the negotiatiory functions of 
contention.  Although we should remain cautious of valorizing local contention as an 
entirely unproblematic feature of statebuilding in Bosnia, it is nonetheless important to 
recognize the potential of contentious practices. In many ways the questions asked and 
the practices and dynamics uncovered in the course of the research speak to the notion 
of hybrid nature of post-conflict peace missions. It is pertinent to make some final 
observations on what the Bosnian case tells us about hybridity. This can generate 
hypotheses for further research and more refined understanding of ‘the variable 
geometry of hybrid peace’.669 
 
Formal Institutions as Site of Hybridization 
 
In terms of the institutional domain, earlier research has identified the hybrid 
composition of formal institutions. In this regard much research has focused on the 
presence of international officials in domestic bodies such as courts.670 Other research 
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has pointed towards the co-existence of formal and informal institutions and governance 
practices, which result in hybridized post-conflict order.671  This study finds that post-
conflict statebuilding processes are hybridized not only through informal institutions 
and modalities of governance but also through the formal institutional infrastructure and 
processes of consociational governance put in place by international actors. In the 
formal institutional domain a set of disruptive political techniques are regularly 
deployed by local agencies to contest aspects of international statebuilding. This has 
often, if not always, resulted in re-negotiation of the measures in question. This dynamic 
draws attention to the importance of formal governance practices, alongside the 
informal institutions and modes of governance, in the hybridization of post-conflict 
peace.   
 
 
Discursive Aspects and Symbiotic Dynamics 
 
If institutions have been key to understanding hybrid forms of order in post-conflict 
states, other realms where local and international agencies encounter have elicited less 
attention. This research discovered a range of local practices in the discursive and 
symbolic domains that provide a richer understanding of not only interactions between 
internal and external agencies but also of the process of hybridization. The discursive 
domain is particularly interesting in this regard; the investigation into the discursive 
domain is indicative of the way in which the hegemonic liberal peace discourse is 
adapted and utilized to construct competing claims about the meaning of the post-
conflict process and the actors involved. This suggests that going beyond understanding 
hybridity as simply local-liberal governance arrangement and inquiring into the non-
material domains where local and international statebuilding practices co-exist 
facilitates the development of a more nuanced understanding of hybridity and its 
different dimensions. Another observation relates to the statebuilding dynamics 
highlighted through the Bosnian case. Heathershaw argues that hybridity does not 
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necessarily ‘work against’ international statebuilding. 672 He suggests that formal 
models of peacebuilding require informal modes of practice to function. Yet, with 
reference to the case of Tajikistan, Heathershaw notes that this hybrid reality of 
peacebuilding is unacceptable to donors: this means that hybridity is concealed in 
official accounts and interpretations produced by international officials.673  In the 
Bosnian case somewhat different dynamics are at play: as noted earlier, the presence of 
local agencies that are seen to pervert the post-conflict process enables the extension of 
international mandates. The presence of local actors who are deemed to hybridize the 
internationally-led statebuilding then ensures the continued international presence. This 
indicates that hybridized forms of peace may not be driven solely by antagonism and 
conflictual relations but also mutual dependency. 
 
Problematization of Local/Liberal Binaries 
 
The investigation carried out in this thesis has problematized simplistic assumptions 
seeking to explain the pathologies of post-conflict statebuilding as the outcome of 
hybridity.674 This is a problematic conclusion to draw as the complexity of the Bosnian 
case highlights. International statebuilding projects and methods are themselves hybrids 
between liberal and non-liberal practices and ideas. Moreover, no single consensus on 
the course and the role of external amongst the international actors exist. Approaching 
statebuilding as stability-prioritizing mission, as suggested in the Introductory Chapter, 
provides a more useful point of departure for understanding hybridity. Secondly, in 
cases such as Bosnia it is inaccurate to view the local as unfamiliar to participatory 
governance and liberal economics. As discussed elsewhere in the thesis, Bosnia as a 
part of socialist Yugoslavia was no stranger to participatory decision-making, even if 
not fully-fledged democracy. Moreover, Yugoslavia was part of the global economic 
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system.675 Although each post-conflict society has its distinct history, the Bosnian 
example cautions against strict dichotomies between local and liberal.676   
 
 
Avenues for Further Research  
 
In many ways this study marks the beginning rather than an end of the inquiry. 
Applying the concepts and mechanisms used in this research to other post-conflict cases 
is undoubtedly vital for refining and retuning them further. At the same time, 
hypotheses created through the in-depth case study method – in the case of this research 
for instance those related to the domains and practices of contention - require testing 
through other cases. Beyond these methodological issues, the analysis has raised a 
number of potential lines of inquiry that can contribute to our understanding of 
hybridization of post-conflict spaces. Perhaps the most interesting line of analysis 
opened up by this research pertains to the hidden and public forms of challenging 
international statebuilding interventions. Systematic inquiry into how these private 
(‘everyday resistance’) and public (‘contentious politics’) modalities interact and 
overlap would further improve our understanding of how international statebuilding is 
responded to in societies emerging from conflicts.  Another set of questions pertains to 
the interactions and dynamics between internal and external actors. Whereas this study 
found that the logic underwriting the interrelations was one of contention/conflict and 
symbiosis, applying this hypothesis to other cases would be interesting in determining 
further dynamics that drive interactions between international and local agencies. 
Moreover, this research was unable due to reasons of scope to examine more 
systematically how the interactions between internal and external actors affect the 
dynamics between the local groups or alternatively, how interactions between local 
groups affect the overall statebuilding process and the role of international actors in it. 
Ethnographic research could potentially uncover the impact of capital, coercion and 
decertification on the local power relations.  
 
In thinking further the relations between local actors, it is also important to conduct 
further research on the relationship between elites and non-elites in post-conflict states. 
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As argued in Chapter 2, the tendency to approach elites as unrepresentative, predatory 
and self-interested seems to simplify the complex relations between different segments 
of society and rule out any possibility for progress. This uncritical assumption requires 
problematization. In terms of thinking beyond the framework of contention laid out 
here, potentially interesting avenue for further research pertains to issues discussed in 
Chapter 6. Although questions of post-conflict identity-politics have been discussed in 
the literature, there has been relatively little empirical engagement with the actual local 
practices of consolidating or building identities. In this regard further investigation into 
local symbolic practices across different cases could allow establishing some patterns 
with respect to local identity-building. At the same time, international nation-building 
and identity-building practices require further research; if ethnic identities are socially 
constructed, then how does the process of de-constructing and re-ordering them look 
like across cases? These questions are important as the process of (re)construing 
statehood entails addressing the idea of state; not only how its institutions look like but 
also who the people are.     
 
The study of the contentious repertoires and interactions is in many ways a valuable 
piece in the larger puzzle of critical peace operations research; it allows us to move 
beyond the ideal notions of the ‘liberal peace’, address the multiplicity of agencies 
involved in the process and understand how statebuilding is shaped and re-negotiated on 
the ground. Such contextually-sensitive analysis does not necessarily translate into total 
un-generalizability; it can allow us to develop a framework for capturing and 
understanding the interactions in different cases.  Generating in-depth knowledge on 
statebuilding operations is critical as they tend to produce weak forms of statehood and 
negative forms of peace.677  It is not only the sense of urgency stemming from the 
largely poor track record of statebuilding that makes statebuilding an important subject 
of study; post-conflict statebuilding can also tell us a great deal about the current world 
order. Statebuilding operations challenge a key norm of international relations, 
sovereignty, through interventions in the affairs of states that the international 
community considers weak or failing. Whether one sees sovereignty as ‘organized 
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hypocrisy’ 678 and a norm that existed more on paper than in practice, statebuilding does 
represent an unprecedented intervention in domestic affairs of states in that it has taken 
a systematic, organized and internationally-coordinated  form. A less-often elicited 
point is that statebuilding can also provide a window for analysis on the relations 
between local and global and how mechanisms of global governance are received and 
mediated in local spaces. Global governance is not merely a set of shared norms and 
values pertaining to the political and economic organization of states and their 
interactions at the international arena; it is also a network of influential donor and 
development organizations and a constellation of strategies and mechanisms through 
which governance is implemented across the globe.679 Building efficient states that can 
function as regulatory agents in local spaces is at the core of global governance 
mechanisms in general and statebuilding operations in particular. Yet, building states on 
the basis of the exigencies of global governance does not often translate into locally-
legitimate statehood which arguably is prerequisite for sustainable and just statehood. 
Such qualities undoubtedly require real local deliberation and participation in the 
process. In terms of thinking of the interactions between national and international 
agencies, the research carried out here suggests that the transactions between global and 
local are highly varied and multi-faceted. These encounters entail a number of agendas 
and agencies that defy simplistic categorizations of international/local, Western/non-
Western, liberal/non-liberal. Global governance measures – such as externally-driven 
statebuilding – are received, understood interpreted and responded to in local spaces in a 
range of different ways. Local practices entail hidden, Scottian, forms of resistance as 
well as public forms of contestation using the institutional and normative frameworks as 
repertoires of contestation through which international practices are challenged and 
negotiated.  This allows us to understand power in the global-local nexus in a more 
nuanced way, paying attention to both the material and non-material modalities of 
power. Whilst research on statebuilding as an instrument of global governance reveals a 
great deal about the power and domination of the West vis-à-vis the troubled and failed 
states around the world, it can also unmask the ways in which such power is negotiated 
in local spaces.  
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6. Lazar Prodanović, Member of Parliament, Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata 
(Alliance of Independent Social Democrats), Sarajevo,  20 June 2009 
7. Member of Parliament, Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic 
Action), Sarajevo 22 June 2009 
8. Mirko Okolić, Member of Parliament, Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian 
Democratic Party), Sarajevo, 23 June 2009 
9. Member of Parliament, Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Party for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) (b), Sarajevo 25 June 2009 
10. Representative of an international organization (a), Sarajevo 22 June 2009 
11. Representative of EUSR, Sarajevo 18 June 2009 
12. Representative of an international aid agency (a), Sarajevo 30 June 2009 
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14. Amna Muharemovic, Head of Office, UNDP, Sarajevo 24 June 2009 
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16. Local civil society activist (a), Sarajevo 26 June 2009 
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18. Representative of an international donor agency (b), Sarajevo, 23 June 2009 
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20. Former representative of an international organization, Sarajevo 29 June 2009 
21. Pauline Neville-Jones, member of the European negotiation team in Dayton, 
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22. Representative of an international organization (b), Banja Luka 16 March 2010. 
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25. Gordan Milosevic, Advisor to the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, 22 
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27. Member of the Republika Srpska National Assembly, Banja Luka 19 March 
2010 
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29. Anthony London, Regional Political Advisor, European Union Police Mission, 
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31. Western Diplomat (a), Banja Luka, 17 March 2010 
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33. Gavrilo Antonic, Director, Partija Demokratskog Progresa (Party of Dem 
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36. Branislav Borenovic, Vice President, Partija Demokratskog Progresa (Party of 
Dem Progress) 
37. Western Political Analyst, Sarajevo 9 April 2010 
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39. Natasa Tesanovic Director of Alternative TV, Banja Luka 31 March 2010 
40. Representative of international organization (d), Mostar 15 September 2010  
41. Representative of local think tank, Sarajevo 24 September 2010 
42. Local journalist, London 20 August 2010 
43. Representative of an international organization (e), Mostar 20 September 2010  
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48. Ernad Deni Comaga, Demokratski Omladinski Pokret (Democratic Youth 
Movement), Sarajevo 28 September 2010. 
49. Representative of an international organization (f), Sarajevo 28 September 2010 
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